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Foreword 
Every 10 seconds, someone dies of a tobacco-related disease. This fact is 
especially painful because the tobacco epidemic is one of the leading pre- 
ventable causes of death and disability among adults in the world today 
In addition, passive smoking has a major effect upon health, especially of 
children. 
Once largely a problem in high-income countries, the epidemic caused 
by tobacco use has become an enormous and growing problem in many 
low- and middle-income countries. Already, half of all global deaths from 
tobacco occur in these countries; by 2025, the proportion will have risen 
to 70 percent, and the number of tobacco-attributable deaths will exceed 
10 million each year. This trend is exacerbated by the efforts of cigarette 
companies to expand sales in developing countries, where many people 
are still poorly informed about the harm to health that tobacco causes and 
many governments have not yet adopted or implemented strong policies 
to discourage tobacco use. 
In one sense, the remedy is simple—not to use tobacco products. But 
deterring young people from experimenting with cigarettes and encour- 
aging smokers to quit adds up to a big challenge. Most people underesti- 
mate the health risks of tobacco use and hugely underestimate how 
addictive nicotine is and how hard it is to quit. Social norms and pressures 
to smoke are difficult to counter, especially in the face of aggressive, 
alluring advertising that associates smoking with success, strength, inde- 
pendence, glamour, and sex. But it can be done, in both developed and 
developing nations. Advertising and promotion of cigarettes has been 
and can be stopped. Prices can be raised, and smoking banned in public 
places. Quit attempts can become more common and more likely to suc- 
ceed with professional and peer support and help. Tobacco control mea- 
sures are also extremely cost-effective. 
There are many countries where committed individuals, civil society 
groups, and governments have worked together to define, advocate, leg- 
islate, and implement effective tobacco control policies. This book tells the 
ix 
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stories of six of these countries, showing how determined and sustained 
efforts resulted in health-promoting tobacco control policies. These efforts 
are paying off: the percentage of smokers has declined in many countries, 
sowing the seeds for long-term gains in health outcomes. There is still 
much to be done in these six countries and elsewhere around the world. I 
anticipate that the world's first international health treaty, the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, will boost national efforts to adopt and 
implement policies to reduce tobacco use and prevent the unnecessary 
deaths and disease tobacco causes. 
Dr Judith Mackay 
Director, Asian Consultancy 
on Tobacco Control 
Preface 
This book was commissioned and published in the hope that descriptions 
of strategies, successes, and setbacks in promoting stronger tobacco control 
policies around the world would be of wide interest and might be useful 
to people grappling with similar issues. As participants in academic, ad- 
vocacy, and policy meetings on tobacco control, we have been struck by 
the impact of real-life stories and examples. We have been educated and 
edified by many excellent presentations and discussions of the principles, 
practice, and impact of tobacco control policy—but what we remember 
most clearly, long after, are the stories. We have seen rooms come alive 
with interest and crackle with energy when people who had been at the 
center of efforts to develop tobacco control policy related their experiences. 
So, we decided to record and share some of those stories. 
The case studies in this book are addressed to a wide set of readers who 
share an interest in health issues and policy—people in nongovernmental 
organizations, community activists, scientists, decisionmakers, health 
officials, and members of the public. Each story is set in the unique his- 
torical, cultural, and political environment of a particular country, but 
there are common threads and shared lessons that can be applied and 
adapted in many other countries and circumstances. 
Most of the stories are told by advocates, many of them health profes- 
sionals, who were (and often still are) centrally involved in promoting 
and developing policies and programs to reduce the harm to health 
caused by tobacco use. Tobacco control is a contentious issue because 
strong policies to reduce tobacco use are always opposed by groups with 
an economic interest in the tobacco industry. This book is not a dispas- 
sionate or theoretical analysis of how policies are made but a set of some- 
times rather personal accounts and perceptions of how tobacco control 
policy evolved in six countries and of the strategies, actions, and people 
that played a role in promoting policies to curb tobacco use. They are sto- 
ries of commitment, determination, passion, and perseverance—often in 
the face of formidable opposition. They show how a few committed indi- 
viduals can bring about change even when confronted with powerful, 
xi 
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well-funded opponents. They also document the practical lessons that 
have been learned in the course of working for policy change. 
This book complements (and is quite different from) the numerous 
scholarly and analytical works on tobacco use and control. The prevalence 
and health impact of smoking and other forms of tobacco use, within 
individual countries and globally, have been well documented elsewhere, 
as has the insidious spread of the epidemic to developing countries.1 This 
book does not present data on the negative health impact of tobacco use 
or estimate the resulting deaths and illnesses, nor is it a political mapping 
or analysis of the policymaking process. It is, quite literally, a collection of 
stories about tobacco control policymaking that illustrate the roles that 
can be played by evidence, advocacy, political and social change, partner- 
ships, media, public relations and public pressure, economic interests, 
and adversity and opportunity. 
The six countries were selected to provide global geographic represen- 
tation but also because all have made great progress (although to varying 
degrees) in adopting and implementing sound tobacco control policies. 
Many other countries also have strategies to share, successes to celebrate, 
and setbacks to lament—too many to be contained in one volume. In each 
of the countries represented in this book, there is still much to be done to 
protect young people and adults from the unnecessary and preventable 
disease and premature death caused by tobacco use. The narratives gath- 
ered here are stories of optimism and of change. It is hoped that they will 
inspire successful efforts toward developing strong and effective tobacco 
control policies in other countries. 
Joy de Beyer 
Linda Waverley Brigden 
May 2003 
1. See, for example, the references cited in chapter 1. 
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1 
Overview 
Joy de Beyer and Linda Waverley Brigden 
Countries around the world are grappling with difficult public health 
challenges and policy decisions. Disease and death caused by tobacco use, 
once a problem mainly in high-income countries, have become a large 
and increasing part of the burden of disease in developing countries. 
According to the most recent estimate by the World Health Organiza- 
tion (WHO), 4.9 million people worldwide died in 2000 as a result of their 
addiction to nicotine, about half of them prematurely (WHO 2002). This 
huge death toll is rising rapidly, especially in low- and middle-income 
countries, where most of the world's 1.2 billion tobacco users live. As 
shown in figure 1.1, developing countries already account for half of all 
deaths attributable to tobacco. The proportion will rise to 7 out of 10 by 
2025 because smoking prevalence has been increasing in many low- and 
middle-income countries even as it is falling in richer countries, especially 
among men. Developing countries also account for about half of the 
world disease burden related to tobacco (figure 1.2). And tobacco use has 
far-reaching indirect effects on human health and the economy, in addi- 
tion to the direct harm it causes.1 
But the course and pattern of this epidemic can be changed. The poli- 
cies that are effective in encouraging tobacco users to quit and dissuading 
young people from starting are well known and proven. Many countries 
have managed to change behavior, reduce the prevalence of tobacco use, 
and ease the burden of tobacco-related disease and death. This book 
describes recent struggles, successes, and setbacks in six countries on six 
continents, where the efforts of public health practitioners, researchers, 
activists, policymakers, politicians, and the press have achieved sound 
tobacco control policies even in the face of enormous opposition from 
those who profit from these deadly products. 
Reducing the devastating health damage caused by tobacco use is 
especially difficult because of nicotine's powerful addictive properties, 
1. For studies on the prevalence of tobacco use and on the associated health and economic 
effects, see, for example, Murray and Lopez (1996); WHO (1997); World Bank (1999); Corrao 
and others (2000); Tha and Chaloupka (2000); and Mackay and Eriksen (2002). 
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Figure 1.1. Deaths Attributable to Selected Leading Risk 
Factors, Worldwide, 2000 
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low prices for tobacco products, well-established social norms, and con- 
stant inducements to smoke, fueled by billions of dollars worth of tobacco 
industry advertising and promotion. Low prices and advertising can be 
countered by policies that raise taxes on tobacco products and outlaw all 
advertising and promotion of these products. Such policies are likely to 
have an even stronger effect in reducing tobacco use if complemented by 
good public information on the associated health risks (for instance, 
through strong, large warnings on cigarette packs), by bans on smoking 
in public spaces, and by advice and help to people who want to quit. 
Why These Six Countries? 
The six countries whose stories are told in this book—Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Canada, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand—are at very different stages 
of development and of the tobacco epidemic (see table 1.1). Brazil and 
Bangladesh are two to six times more populous than any of the other four 
countries. With regard to wealth and social indicators such as child mal- 
nutrition and illiteracy rates, Canada, a developed country, is at one 
extreme and Bangladesh at the other. Life expectancy at birth is consider- 
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Figure 1.2. Disease Burden Attributable to Selected Leading 
Risk Factors, Worldwide, 2000 
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ably higher in Canada than in any of the other countries; it is lowest in 
South Africa, as a result of the ravages of AIDS. 
The six countries also differ in the strength and history of their tobacco 
control policies and in the extent to which they are succeeding in reducing 
tobacco use. The share of adult men who regularly use tobacco is around 
40 percent in five of the countries. In Canada it is substantially lower, 
27 percent, down from a peak of 60 percent in 1960 (Smoking and Health 
Action Foundation 2000). Male smoking prevalence has fallen significantly in three of the other countries: in South Africa, from well over 50 percent in 
the early 1990s to 42 percent in 1998 (Corrao and others 2000; van Walbeek 
2002); in Thailand, from 49 percent in 1986 to 38 percent in 1999 
(Vateesatokit et al 2000); and in the most dramatic case, that of Poland, from 
peak levels of 65—75 percent in the mid-1970s to 39 percent in 1998 (Corrao 
and others 2000). It is no coincidence that, as table 1.1 shows, compared to 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Joy DE BEYER AND LINDA WAVERLEY BR[GDEN 
least affordable in Poland, where a person earning the average wage must 
work for about 40 minutes to earn the price of a pack of cigarettes—roughly 
twice as long as in the other four countries in the same or high income cat- 
egory (Guindon, Tobin, and Yach 2002). In Bangladesh, very low wage rates 
make cigarettes least affordable of all the countries, even though the prices 
(of local brands) are among the lowest. 
This is a very heterogeneous group of countries. But there is a com- 
mon thread: all six have achieved notable successes in tobacco control 
policymaking by building advocacy on sound research and evidence. 
Their stories exemplify important features of policymaking, particularly 
the significant role that can be played by determined individuals and by 
civil society groups. 
The stories make it clear that there is no magic formula. Instead, they 
tell of policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995)—both individuals and 
groups—willing to champion the issue; of politicians committed to pub- 
lic health and to placing tobacco control on the policy agenda; of 
researchers who have published and publicized compelling national or 
international data; and of national, regional, and international political, 
social, economic, and policy environments that supported action on this 
important issue. 
Many other countries, or states and provinces within countries, have 
achieved admirable successes in tobacco control policymaking and could 
have been included in this book, were it not for the limitations of space. 
We hope that the inspiring experiences of other countries will be related 
elsewhere. 
Each country included in this book has some extraordinary accom- 
plishments in tobacco control policy and its own particular strengths. In 
Bangladesh systematic, concerted, and methodical efforts by nongovern- 
mental organizations (NGOs) provide a model of very low-budget but 
effective advocacy against what seemed to be impossible odds. In Brazil, 
by contrast, persistent action led from within the government resulted in 
strong legislation and a nationwide, decentralized program, with training 
and support cascading down the levels of government. 
Canada has long been a world leader in tobacco control legislation, tax- 
ation, and health warnings, backed by strong citizen and political sup- 
port. It provides a model of coalition building among civil society groups 
that resulted in well-planned, systematic advocacy initiatives. 
In Poland and South Africa dramatic political and social change cre- 
ated new environments and policy windows that public health advocates 
were able to turn to their advantage. In the 1990s these countries enacted, 
relatively quickly, strong, comprehensive legislation—in both cases, in 
two legislative steps, with a second law strengthening the first. Both coun- 
tries began with policies to better inform consumers and to restrict smok- 
OVERVIEW 7 
ing and advertising. At a later stage, tax increases were put in place and 
helped reduce consumption. Each country had strong, charismatic cham- 
pions who helped drive the issue, through undaunted, persistent efforts 
over many years. And in both countries the availability of strong local 
research evidence, especially on the economic implications of tax 
increases, was enormously important. 
In Thailand, as in Bangladesh, an NGO played a pivotal role. Tobacco 
control policy has been significantly influenced by strong advocates in the 
health sector with direct access to government officials, some of whom 
showed great political courage, integrity, and commitment to serving the 
best interests of the Thai people. 
Although all of the stories describe setbacks and disappointments, 
none of them dwells on mistakes made or opportunities missed, or on 
what could have been done better. There are lessons to be learned from 
both the successes and the setbacks in each country. The stories describe 
how advocates and policymakers changed their strategies in certain coun- 
tries as they learned from their mistakes and built on their achievements. 
What Factors Made the Difference? 
Although each country's situation and story is unique, there are corn- 
monalities across the six countries—lessons and experiences that are also 
applicable in other contexts. 
• In each case, legislative successes were won in the face of vigorous 
opposition from a tobacco industry striving to defend its profits and 
market. Sometimes the legislation was weakened or delayed or its 
implementation was inhibited. Compromises had to be made, but 
these sometimes paved the way for stronger follow-up laws a few 
years later. • Time and again, a key role was played by NGOs and by individuals— 
often very charismatic people—who showed extraordinary commit- 
ment and dedication. Through their knowledge and perseverance, 
they became credible spokespersons for their cause and won the ear of 
policymakers. • Coalitions of individuals and organizations brought new skills and 
perspectives to bear on the issue. Broad-based groups such as con- 
sumers' rights groups, development agencies, women's rights activists, 
lawyers, and religious organizations made important contributions. 
Personal and institutional objectives and prestige were sometimes set 
aside for the sake of achieving common goals. Groups had to grapple 
with the organizational and relationship issues that are part of main- 
taining a smoothly functioning coalition. Not all coalitions survived. 
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• Effective advocacy has to be learned. Tobacco control advocates found 
that change is a slow, evolutionary process; they learned to expect set- 
backs and make use of them to turn defeats into victories; to take 
advantage of favorable opportunities as they arose, developing rapid- 
response, short-term strategies as well as long-term goals; and to be 
creative in seeking allies. Not least, they learned about the need for 
optimism and for a continuous, sustained effort. 
• While much can be done with little money if funds are used wisely, 
lack of an organizational home and a minimal level of financial 
resources can make it hard to operate effectively. Working collabora- 
tively with national and international agencies can help provide access 
to sustained, if limited, resources. 
• Strong political support and political champions are absolutely crucial 
to success. At times, political champions have had to persuade and win 
over (or prevail over) their own colleagues. Public opinion poiis have 
been influential in some countries, demonstrating to politicians clear 
popular support for strong policies to protect children and adults from 
the harm caused by tobacco use. • Amazing transformations in social norms can occur, spurred by 
changes in legislation, shifts in the socioeconomic context, and better 
public information. This is starkly evident to anyone who choked 
through meetings in smoke-filled rooms in Poland in the late 1980s and 
has had the pleasure of visiting Poland again in recent years and enjoy- 
ing smoke-free meetings and meals. The media can have a powerful 
effect in influencing popular opinion and paving the way for legisla- 
tion. Legislation both reflects and reinforces—or institutionalizes— 
changing social norms. 
• An understanding of the political framework and the legislative 
timetable of the country contributes to effective advocacy. That under- 
standing might involve knowing when to intervene and whom to tar- 
get; cultivating legislators who are favorably disposed to an issue; or 
recognizing when an idea's time has come and responding swiftly with 
information and advocacy. 
• Legislation must be coupled with strong attention to implementation 
and enforcement. This can be an even greater challenge than getting 
the legislation through with its teeth intact. Often, legislation is only a 
first step, and regulations or further actions are required before provi- 
sions can be implemented and take effect. • Sound research and evidence are extremely important as a basis for 
good policy decisions. Evidence and research findings from other 
countries can be compelling, but there is also likely to be a need for 
strategic, selective local studies and data, presented concisely and 
graphically. Building, publishing, and widely publicizing a solid infor- 
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mation base proved enormously useful to policymakers and advocates 
and helped promote changes in public attitudes and awareness that 
gradually led to changes in social norms in several countries. • Tobacco control policies and strategies must be comprehensive. It is 
now well recognized that single initiatives are not enough; real impact 
comes from a combination of education and information, legislation, 
taxation, community action, professional involvement, prevention and 
cessation programs in various settings, prohibitions on smoking in 
public places, and complete bans on advertising and promotion of 
tobacco and tobacco brands. 
• Strong, effective tobacco control policy that includes tax increases and 
complementary health promotion efforts relies on success in bringing 
together diverse interest groups and finding common ground. This is 
especially important with regard to the ministries of health and 
finance, whose objectives of sound fiscal management and better pub- 
lic health outcomes can both be furthered by tobacco tax increases. • Not all policymakers were won over by data on tobacco-related mor- 
bidity and mortality. In Bangladesh reframing the issue to focus on the 
contribution of tobacco use to malnutrition was what captured the 
attention of policymakers. Donor agencies may be more interested in 
and willing to support tobacco control to the extent that it contributes 
to and relates to broader development issues. 
• Not long ago, in some countries, the situation seemed hopeless. Efforts 
by poorly funded public health groups were opposed by tobacco com- 
panies with powerful political connections and deep pockets. Social 
norms favored smoking, and many people were skeptical about or 
even hostile to tobacco control efforts. But, as in Canada, public health 
proponents discovered that "seemingly irresistible forces within the 
tobacco industry could be successfully challenged by effective advo- 
cacy" (Sweanor and Kyle, ch. 4 in this volume). • Persistence is essential. Never give up. 
The Big Picture 
Each country profiled in this book has recorded great progress and sub- 
stantial achievements in tobacco control policy. But in none of them is vic- 
tory assured, and in none has the war against misinformation, ignorance, 
addiction, preventable disease, and premature death been won. Smoking 
still claims too many lives, and too many teenagers are enticed into trying 
"just one" and then another, starting what will become a deadly addiction 
that most will regret ever taking up and will later struggle to break. 
This is an important time—perhaps a watershed—in the history of 
tobacco control policy and of efforts to curb the epidemic caused by 
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tobacco use. The negotiations for an international Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have provided an important forum and 
process, enabling each of the 165 participating countries to weigh com- 
peting national interests carefully and decide how strongly committed 
they are to measures that can improve health outcomes by reducing 
tobacco use. The challenge that lies ahead for countries is to ratify the 
FCTC and to strengthen national legislation, policies, and programs and 
international cooperation to reduce tobacco use. 
Sometimes the discussion about tobacco control is framed as health 
versus economics, with people conceding the harm that tobacco does to 
health but emphasizing the economic contributions of the tobacco indus- 
try in the form of jobs, incomes, exports, and tax revenues. The relative 
economic importance of the tobacco industry, however, is often exagger- 
ated, and the economic costs of tobacco should also be considered. These 
costs include the direct and indirect costs of medical care; the loss of pro- 
ductivity and earnings as a result of tobacco-related illnesses and deaths; 
environmental degradation caused by pesticides and the use of firewood 
for curing tobacco; and fires caused by lit cigarettes and matches. 
Perhaps most insidious is the harm done to poor smokers and their 
families by the diversion of scarce family income to buy tobacco prod- 
ucts. The chapter on Bangladesh presents detailed data on the opportu- 
nity cost of tobacco purchases, comparing the cost of cigarettes with the 
costs of food staples that the money spent on cigarettes might have 
bought—this in a country where perhaps half of all adults smoke or 
chew tobacco while nearly half of all children under five are malnour- 
ished. As Efroymson and others (2001) have shown, "Each tobacco user 
represents one or more people—whether the smoker or his or her spouse 
or child—who is needlessly going hungry." Although this situation is not 
well documented in many other countries, it is certainly not unique to 
Bangladesh; for example, women in a poor village in Sri Lanka said that 
cigarettes were the leading cause of poverty in their village (Skolnik 
2003). National surveys of household expenditure find that in Egypt and 
India 2 to 3 percent of all household expenditures go for tobacco prod- 
ucts; in South Africa, families that include at least one smoker and that 
are in the lowest income quartile spent 4.7 percent of their income on cig- 
arettes in 1995 (Basheer 1993; van Walbeek 2000; Sayginsoy 2002). For 
families living on the edge of poverty, even small amounts can make an 
enormous difference to family well-being. 
It is thus misleading to frame the tobacco control debate as "health ver- 
sus economics." Tobacco generates income for some but entails large costs 
for others. Tobacco control is clearly key to promoting health and pre- 
venting unnecessary deaths, and it can be achieved in the context of 
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sound economic and social policies, without harming economies. Brazil's 
discussions with tobacco farmers and its initiatives to work with them are 
a case in point. 
Tobacco is clearly much more than a health issue; it has significant eco- 
nomic implications and can have an impact on economic development. 
Improvements in health can contribute to sustained and substantial 
improvements in social and economic well-being, as the WHO Commis- 
sion on Macroeconomics and Health (2001) recently emphasized. Con- 
versely, poor health can undermine social and economic development. 
The broader development issues relating to tobacco and its control have 
been much discussed in the FCTC deliberations. The FCTC has the poten- 
tial to provide a common framework allowing countries to move ahead 
together to reduce tobacco use, mindful both of those—particularly 
among the poor—who will benefit and of those whose livelihoods may be 
jeopardized if national and global markets for tobacco decline. 
Global partnerships, both explicit and implicit, can work to the com- 
mon good of citizens in all countries. There is great value in comparing 
notes with other countries, learning from their successes and mistakes, 
and borrowing their data. Governments often hesitate to step out ahead 
of the pack but can be emboldened by the actions of others, as shown by 
the domino effect of changes in tax policy, advertising bans, and the 
recently introduced large pictorial health warnings on cigarette packs. 
We hope that this book will help inspire and inform tobacco control 
activists, public health practitioners, policymakers, and citizens who care 
about their health and the futures of their children, so that more can be done 
to reduce the harm that tobacco does to health and lives around the world. 
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for Tobacco Control: 
The Case of Bangladesh 
Debra Efroymson and Saifuddin Ahmed 
Bangladesh is a small, poor, densely populated country of roughly 130 
million people, about 80 percent of whom live in rural areas. It has a well- 
deserved reputation as being disaster-prone, having been stricken with 
droughts, floods, and a range of health and environmental problems, 
from dengue and cholera to arsenic contamination of the water supply. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that tobacco control has not gained 
much attention or been considered a priority. With so many competing 
causes of disease, and with nearly half the population living below the 
poverty line and consuming less than 2,122 calories per day (Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics 1998a), tobacco has generally seemed too remote and 
insignificant an issue to be on the country's agenda of concerns. Yet 
tobacco use is widespread and increasing rapidly, and knowledge about 
the harm it causes to health is slight. Moreover, although other causes of 
death still dominate, tobacco use contributes a nontrivial amount to the 
overall burden of disease and death. And it has clear and significant 
immediate negative effects on the welfare of poor families, when scarce 
resources that could be used for food are instead spent on tobacco. 
From the late 1980s through most of the 1990s, tobacco control 
remained the domain of a few groups: Amra Dhumpan Nibaron Kori 
(ADHUNIK), which, roughly translated, means, "We prevent tobacco"; 
the Bangladesh Cancer Society; Madok o Nesha Nirodh Shansthya 
(MANAS—the Association for the Prevention of Drug Abuse); and the 
National Non-Smokers' Forum. Although these groups achieved some 
significant successes, for the most part tobacco control remained a fringe 
activity that received wide publicity on World No Tobacco Day, May 31, 
and was then forgotten for the rest of the year. 
But in 1999 the tide began to turn. The aggressive activities of British 
American Tobacco (BAT) pushed the advocates toward stronger action. 
For the first time, a number of organizations got together and coordinated 
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their activities. A coalition emerged, a High Court victory was obtained, 
and tobacco control in Bangladesh finally began to assume some of the 
importance and receive some of the attention it had long warranted. By 
late 2002, strong new legislation had been submitted for consideration by 
Parliament. 
This case study discusses the dynamic process of tobacco control 
policymaking in one developing country and the role that advocates can 
play in informing and influencing the process. The ultimate goal has not 
yet been reached, but the journey has begun. 
Tobacco in the Lives of the Bangladeshi People 
Although Bangladesh is a Muslim country and tobacco is generally con- 
sidered haram (forbidden) under Islam, tobacco use is widespread. The 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics regularly conducts surveys that monitor, 
among other things, smoking rates. As table 2.1 shows, smoking rates are 
higher among men than women. In 1997 the highest reported rate (70.3 
percent) was for men age 35—49, while the lowest (0.1 percent) was for 
girls age 10—14. 
A significant flaw in the prevalence measures is that they cover only 
smoking, not tobacco consumption as a whole. Tobacco chewing is com- 
mon in Bangladesh, particularly among women. A study by Naripokho, a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) working on women's issues, indi- 
cates that the rate for use of all forms of tobacco, smokeless and smoked, 
by women is around 50 percent, but no nationwide or large-scale surveys 
exist to verify this finding (Haq 2001). 
According to data compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
on tobacco and cigarette production and consumption in Bangladesh, an 
estimated 70 percent of the tobacco produced is used for cigarettes and 
bidis (small cigarettes handrolled in paper), 20 percent is consumed as 
chewing tobacco, and the remainder is used in cigars, snuff, and pipe 
tobacco. In 1997, 16,500 million cigarettes were manufactured, consisting 
Table 2.1. Smoking Rates by Age and Sex, 
Bangladesh, 1997 (percent) 
Age 
Sex 10—14 15—19 20—34 35—49 50+ 
Male 2.8 14.4 47.6 70.3 21.2 
Female 0.1 0.9 3.3 6.6 2.8 
Average for both sexes 1.6 8.3 23.7 41.0 12.3 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
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of 2,900 million filter and 13,600 million nonfilter cigarettes. Since the 
mid-1980s, Bangladesh has had a growing negative trade balance in 
tobacco and tobacco products as leaf imports have increased strongly (see 
table 2.2). In 1993 export earnings amounted to US$10 million, half of the 
US$20 million that was spent on tobacco and tobacco product imports. By 
1995, according to the World Bank, the negative net earnings from tobacco 
trade (leaves and cigarettes) had nearly tripled, to US$27.8 million. 
Although tobacco is available in a multitude of forms in Bangladesh, 
only cigarette packages carry a warning. This states (in Bengali), in small 
type, "Government warning: smoking is deleterious to health." The same 
warning is used on BAT billboards and on television advertisements but 
not on advertisements for cigarettes produced by other companies or for 
bidis. What little information is conveyed in the warning is inaccessible to 
Table 2.2. Annual Tobacco Trade and Agricultural Statistics, 
Bangladesh, Selected Years, 1970—98 
Indicator 1970 1980 1990 1995 1998 
Cigarette imports 
(millions of sticks) — 177 86 70 52 
Cigarette exports 
(millions of sticks) 2 47 
Tobacco leaf imports 
(metric tons) — 740 805 1,137 5,012 
Tobacco leaf exports 
Metric tons — — 870 278 2,307 
Percentage of total 
exports — — 0.11 0.02 
Cigarette production 
(millions of sticks) 17,787 13,830 12,289 17,379 
Tobacco leaf production 
(metric tons) 41,200 39,524 37,800 38,000 36,655 
Land devoted to 
growing tobacco 
Hectares 45,700 45,091 45,070 36,000 32,823 
Percentage of 
agricultural land 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.44 
Employment in tobacco 
manufacturing 
(number of workers) 4,190 6,340 27,155 
— Not available. 
Source: Corrao arid others 2000. 
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the large proportion of the population unable to read. According to the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1999), in 1997 only 42 percent of females 
and 51 percent of males over age 7 were literate. 
The law has yet to set a standard for informing tobacco users about the 
range of diseases caused by smoking and tobacco use. One study found 
that while more than 93 percent of male smokers and more than 84 percent 
of female smokers know that smoking is generally bad for health, far fewer 
are aware of specific effects such as cancer, respiratory diseases, stroke, and 
heart disease. In general, nonsmokers have slightly higher awareness of 
the diseases caused by smoking than do smokers (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics 1996). 
Although the lack of nationwide statistics on tobacco use makes track- 
ing the epidemic difficult, a few facts are clear. Tobacco use (as distin- 
guished from smoking) is widespread among men and women. Most 
users are not aware of the health effects, and written warnings can be read 
by only about half the population. Better statistics are needed to track 
tobacco use among the population and to monitor changes when tobacco 
control laws and interventions come into effect. 
The Tobacco Industry in Bangladesh 
The Bangladesh Tobacco Company (BTC) operated essentially as a 
monopoly for many years. It was originally a subsidiary of BAT, which 
has been doing business in Bangladesh since 1954. In the late 1990s BAT 
bought controlling shares in the BTC, which then began operating directly 
as BAT. 
BAT reported pretax profits in 1998 of US$15.4 million and had a bud- 
get of US$3.34 million for brand promotion and development (BAT 1998). 
This huge promotion budget explains the ubiquitous presence of BAT 
brands (mostly Benson & Hedges and John Player Gold Leaf and, to a 
lesser extent, 555) on billboards, in newspaper advertisements, and in cig- 
arette display cases, as well as in television advertisements and at con- 
certs sponsored by Benson & Hedges. BAT advertises its cheaper brand, 
Star, less widely, mostly on inexpensive posters on the street. 
About 15 local companies also produce cigarettes, which are less 
expensive than BAT's. The largest manufacturer of bidis is Akiz Bidi, 
which also produces the Navy brand. Various cheaper brands are adver- 
tised to some extent through posters, on small signs in shops, and in dis- 
play cases, but Navy is the only non-BAT brand for which there is any 
extensive advertising. 
Researchers monitored the advertisements on ATN Bangla (a Bengali- 
language Indian satellite television station) from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. on a 
Saturday evening, a time when young people are fairly likely to be watch- 
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ing television (Shaha, Dhar, and Efroymson 2000). During the two-hour 
period, they counted 38 tobacco advertisements, covering 14 minutes and 
13 seconds. There were advertisements for two different brands of bidis 
and seven different brands of cigarettes. Ten advertisements for Navy 
brand ran during the two hours. Many of the advertisements conveyed 
the message that smoking makes one strong, healthy, and irresistible to 
women. Two examples illustrate the point: 
• An oxcart gets stuck in the mud, and the driver is unable to push it out. 
A young man approaches, watched with great admiration by a pretty 
peasant girl. He takes a few puffs of a cigarette, then pushes the oxcart 
out of the mud and offers a cigarette to the driver. The girl is in ecstasy. • Mr. Navy rescues a young woman from drowning. She turns out to 
have been faking the incident, but she wins his affection by calling him 
back to retrieve the pack of Navy cigarettes that fell from his pocket 
while he tried to resuscitate her. They frolic on the beach, then stand 
lovingly while he smokes. 
These advertisements carry a health warning in Bengali, but it is 
flashed briefly either at the beginning or the end of the ad, so quickly and 
in such small type that it is virtually impossible to read, even by the half 
of the population that is literate. In any case, it simply repeats the statu- 
tory warning that is printed on cigarette packs: "Smoking is deleterious to 
health." The High Court of Bangladesh, in response to a petition brought 
by members of the Bangladesh Anti-Tobacco Alliance (BATA), recently 
held that this mode of flashing the warning is in violation of the law. The 
court went on to say that all tobacco advertising should be banned. The 
case is currently on appeal. 
As part of its attempt to resist regulation, BAT has promoted itself as a 
responsible company. It has done this in several ways: 
• In 2001 the company issued a voluntary code of conduct that limited 
tobacco advertisements on television and radio to the hours of 10 p.m. 
to 6 a.m. (BAT 2000). 
• BAT claims that it offers samples only to smokers or tobacco users over 
18 years of age. • In newspaper advertisements and in programs distributed at cultural 
events sponsored by BAT, messages such as "Our events promote more 
than just our brands" are displayed. • A tree nursery program supported by BAT has brought the company 
much positive attention. The minister of the environment has visited 
the Dhaka nursery, and the trees and accompanying advertising signs 
line some medians in Chittagong, the main port city. In August 2001 
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BAT set up highly publicized roadside stands in Dhaka to hand out tree 
saplings. 
On July 28, 2001, BAT launched a so-called Youth Smoking Preven- 
tion Campaign consisting of 30-second television advertisements, 
three 1-minute radio scripts, billboards, and stickers. In all the mate- 
rials, BAT claimed that smoking is an adult choice, that those under 
age 18 should not smoke, and that BAT feels a responsibility to cur- 
tail and prevent youth smoking. More astute young people easily see 
through this campaign and recognize the contradiction between the 
company's heavily advertising its brands and yet telling youths not 
to smoke (WBB and PATH Canada 2001). For many, however, the 
campaign seems to offer evidence of how responsible and well- 
meaning BAT is, and it provides a further excuse for the inaction of 
lawmakers who wish to avoid passing tough laws to control tobacco. 
The Economics of Tobacco in Bangladesh 
The government of Bangladesh has sent mixed messages about tobacco. 
Former prime minister Sheikh Hasina has said that tobacco spending is a 
waste of money and that redirecting the money spent toward food pur- 
chases could lower the rate of malnutrition (BATA 2001). Yet Hasina's gov- 
ernment awarded BAT a trophy for being one of the country's largest 
exporters. BAT is apparently the biggest taxpayer in the country with 
reported tax payments in 1998 of approximately US$5.55 million (BAT 1998). 
But export earnings and tax payments do not provide a complete eco- 
nomic picture of the tobacco industry in Bangladesh. Missing are such 
items as the trade deficit, the costs associated with tobacco-related health 
problems, and the effect of smokers purchasing tobacco rather than food. 
In fiscal year 1997—98 Bangladesh earned US$5.4 million in tobacco 
exports, but it also imported US$19.93 million worth of tobacco, for a net 
loss of over US$14.4 million (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 1998b). 
Although figures on health costs associated with tobacco use are not 
available, the Bangladesh Cancer Society estimates that half of the annual 
deaths from cancer in Bangladesh (75,000 people) result from tobacco use. 
The tobacco industry also has an effect on employment. Cigarettes 
require very little labor to manufacture. Bidi rolling is much more labor- 
intensive, but most of the profits are absorbed by middlemen, with the 
laborers, almost exclusively women and children, earning a pittance for 
their many hours of grueling work in uncomfortable and unhealthy set- 
tings (UNICEF 2000). According to the World Bank (1999), because most 
goods and services in Bangladesh require a larger labor input than ciga- 
rettes, a shift from tobacco product use and manufacturing to other prod- 
ucts and services could mean a tremendous boon for employment. 
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Although tobacco is perceived as being cheap, its actual cost, compared 
with food, education, and health care, is quite high—exorbitantly so for 
those for whom basic survival is a daily struggle. A study on tobacco and 
poverty (Efroymson and others 2001) revealed that tobacco is most com- 
monly used by those who can least afford it. The smoking rate among the 
poorest (those with a household income of less than US$20 per month) is 
58.2 percent, while for the wealthiest (those with a household income of 
more than US$100 per month), it is 32.3 percent. On average across the 
country, spending for tobacco represents 2.8 percent of total income, from a 
low of 1.5 percent for households with total spending of less than US$18 per 
month to a high of 4.4 percent for households spending more than US$472 
per month. The amount spent by the average male cigarette smoker in 1997 
would purchase 2,942 calories of rice per day—enough to make a difference 
between family members getting by or suffering from malnutrition. 
Between 1992 and 1996, annual per capita cigarette consumption 
increased by 33 percent, from 100 to 133 sticks. Meanwhile annual per 
capita egg consumption fell by 29 percent, from 17 to 12 eggs. In other 
words, per capita consumption in 1996 was 1 egg and 11 cigarettes per 
month. Average per capita expenditure on tobacco is almost half per 
capita expenditure for health, and more than half the amount spent on 
education. In both urban and rural areas, per capita expenditure is higher 
for tobacco than for milk. At 2000 prices, the money needed to purchase 
one pack of BAT's John Player Gold Leaf regular cigarettes would buy 
more than a dozen eggs, or more than a kilogram of lentils, or more than 
a liter of soybean oil, or half a kilogram of beef. BAT Bangladesh's gross 
turnover in cigarettes for 1998 (US$293 million) could have purchased 4.7 
billion eggs, or enough to feed almost 13 million children one egg per day 
(Efroymson and others 2001). 
Efroymson and others (2001) estimate that 10.5 million children who are 
currently going hungry would have enough to eat if their parents redirected 
69 percent of their tobacco expenditures to food. Malnutrition wreaks havoc 
on the Bangladesh economy: UNICEF (1998) estimates that lost lives, dis- 
ability, and productivity losses caused by malnutrition cost Bangladesh the 
equivalent of more than 5 percent of its gross national product. 
So far, research and publicity have not sufficiently impressed on policy- 
makers and the public the negative economic impact of tobacco use in 
Bangladesh. As long as BAT is able to convince policymakers that the 
company is a positive factor in the economy, advocates are unlikely to 
succeed in obtaining strong tobacco control laws and policies. 
Whatever the features peculiar to Bangladesh, in many ways the 
tobacco situation is like that in many other countries, particularly those 
with a similar economic status. The tobacco industry, as in most countries, 
is dominated by a transnational company; tobacco use is widespread, as 
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is ignorance of the effects of its use; and policymakers and civil society 
have a distance to travel to recognize the harm that tobacco does and to 
be convinced of the need for tobacco control legislation. 
A Chronicle of Tobacco Control in Bangladesh 
Until recently, tobacco control advocacy and activities were limited, and 
hopes and aspirations concerning the issue were generally modest. This 
was partly because of the many health problems that face Bangladesh but 
perhaps also because public health advocates felt overwhelmed and dis- 
couraged in the face of BAT's enormous influence, resources, and visibil- 
ity. Then the industry went too far and sparked an extraordinary reaction, 
the outcome of which has given new hope and a new impetus to tobacco 
control efforts. 
In the following necessarily simplified account, the key role played by 
various NGOs in studying the problem, promoting solutions, and influ- 
encing key players is evident. The government and the judicial system 
have also played a critical part, as have the media and the general public. 
Early Concern about Tobacco Use 
Although the issue of tobacco use has always attracted some interest in 
Bangladesh, it has mainly been perceived as a problem only by people 
concerned about cancer and drug use. Tobacco control was taken on by a 
few isolated groups with no real power to change society or public policy. 
And as long as tobacco use continued to be perceived as an issue of minor 
importance, a strong policy response was unlikely. 
The dominance of doctors in tobacco control organizations kept the 
focus mainly on health, with little attention to the nonhealth dimensions 
of the epidemic such as the direct and indirect costs of health care, includ- 
ing lost earnings. Tobacco control efforts mostly concentrated on school 
programs and the organization of rallies and other small-scale events on 
World No Tobacco Day. The emphasis on talking to schoolchildren with- 
out taking other steps to address adult tobacco use may even have unin- 
tentionally attracted young people to using tobacco. In any case, the unso- 
phisticated tobacco control messages were no match for glossy, attractive 
tobacco advertisements, particularly those of BAT. 
One of the pioneer organizations involved in tobacco control was 
ADHUNIK, founded in 1987 by National Professor Nurul Islam.' 
1. "National Professor" is an honorific title conferred by the government. 
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ADHUNIK representatives held many seminars and press conferences, 
published information in newspapers, appeared on television, printed 
information about tobacco and Islam for distribution to Muslim religious 
leaders, and contributed to the syllabus for class 8 in Bangladeshi 
schools. They also succeeded in making the president's residence a non- 
smoking establishment (ADHUNIK 1988). 
Some other organizations have worked on tobacco control for many 
years. Among them are 
• The Bangladesh Cancer Society, which has long attempted to raise con- 
cern about the issue of tobacco use, mostly through school campaigns 
and programs highlighting the connection between tobacco and cancer. 
In 1995 the Cancer Society also printed a booklet that discussed the 
economics of tobacco in Bangladesh, including the viability of alterna- 
tive crops (Ahmad 1995). 
• MANAS, started in the 1990s by Dr. Arup Ratan Chowdhury, a well- 
known dentist and singer. Its main activity is conducting school cam- 
paigns and seminars, as well as presenting programs on television. 
• The National Non-Smokers' Forum, founded in 1986—the first anti- 
tobacco organization in Bangladesh. It publishes a quarterly newsletter 
and undertakes various public relations activities such as running sem- 
inars and workshops and printing informational materials. 
These organizations are still active, both independently and in collabo- 
ration with BATA, whose founding is described in the next section.2 
Before 1999 most of these groups focused on awareness-raising activi- 
ties, particularly on health and for school-age children. What was missing 
was a determined effort to urge the government to pass strong tobacco 
control legislation, as well as the information and research needed to 
demonstrate the multisectoral nature of the problems of tobacco use. 
The Catalyst for Change 
It was a specific marketing campaign by BAT that finally provided the 
impetus for a concerted and courageous effort by tobacco control advo- 
cates. Even though advocates had become used to the flashy, sophisticated 
2. ADHUNIK and the Bangladesh Cancer Society played an active role when BATA was first 
formed. As a result of internal politics, ADHUNIK is no longer active in BATA, and the Can- 
cer Society has formally withdrawn. In April 2001 ADHUNIK announced that it was form- 
ing its own alliance, the Coalition Against Tobacco (CAT). 
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cigarette advertisements on television, in newspapers, and on billboards 
throughout the country, BAT's Voyage of Discovery campaign in the sum- 
mer of 1999 was startling. The idea of sailing a yacht carrying the John 
Player Gold Leaf brand logo to 17 countries in 177 days caught people's 
imagination. The excitement was enhanced by the choice of the port of 
Chittagong as the final destination. 
Alarming as were the billboards, newspaper advertisements, and 
cigarette display stands embossed with the Voyage colors and its slo- 
gan "Go for the Adventure," more worrisome were the lengthy and 
highly sophisticated television advertisements on the national TV sta- 
tion, Bangladesh TeleVision (BTV). Despite a law prohibiting BTV 
from carrying tobacco advertisements, the station repeatedly broad- 
cast advertisements for the Voyage. This blatant disregard for national 
law in pursuit of profit, and the national fervor about the Voyage, 
caused a wave of unprecedented concern about tobacco control. But 
the concern was mixed with a sense of despair, as there seemed little 
that tobacco control advocates could do in the face of the wealth and 
power of BAT. 
In July 1999 Work for a Better Bangladesh (WBB), a new organization 
devoted to tobacco control and urban environmental issues, organized a 
meeting to discuss possible responses to the Voyage campaign. Although 
only one other organization, the National Non-Smokers' Forum, was 
represented at this first meeting, the WBB was not deterred. What these 
tobacco control advocates lacked in wealth and power, they more than 
made up for in persistence. WBB staff contacted other organizations 
that might be interested—groups working on drug problems, develop- 
ment, consumer issues, and women's issues—and continued to orga- 
nize meetings. Gradually attendance increased, and BATA was born. 
The WBB, on behalf of BATA, organized a press conference at which 
dignitaries, including Nurul Islam, founding president of ADHUNIK, 
spoke. At a seminar organized by BATA, a range of organizations pre- 
sented their views, and barrister Tania Amir of the firm Law Associates 
offered her ideas on legal remedies that were unlikely to succeed but 
were worth trying in the absence of other possibilities. (Amir later 
founded Law and Society Trust, Bangladesh—LSTB—a member orga- 
nization of BATA.) 
Besides attracting advocates to the cause, BATA faced the challenge 
of raising funds for its activities. Most of the groups in BATA were small 
and had limited funds, and the larger organizations faced administrative 
difficulties in committing a significant amount of money for advocacy 
work. To overcome the hurdle, all of the organizations involved agreed to 
contribute small amounts; PATH Canada provided further financial assis- 
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tance.3 With a total of US$3,000—in marked contrast to BAT's annual 
advertising budget of US$3.3 million—the groups moved forward with 
their strategy. 
From September to November 1999, BATA members conducted a series 
of activities, with different organizations taking the lead for different 
events. The president of the WBB, Saifuddin Ahmed, flew to Chittagong 
and looked through the docking permits for the Voyage campaign. He dis- 
covered that the yacht had not obtained proper permission, having applied 
to dock on a visit rather than for commercial purposes. BATA members 
designed and posted in cities all over the country "Sinking Boat" posters 
comparing the Voyage to the British colonization of Bangladesh. They also 
organized a bicycle rally from Dhaka to Chittagong, human chains in 
Dhaka and Chittagong, a press conference, and other events. Tania Amir of 
LSTB, barrister Omar Sadat of ADHUNIK, and several other individuals 
involved in BATA filed a petition with the High Court seeking a stop to the 
promotional activities planned on the yacht's arrival. BATA members made 
their voices heard, and their message was clear: the Voyage was not about 
adventure, glamour, or sophistication but about the efforts of a rich transna- 
tional company to hook poor Bangladeshis on expensive cigarettes. 
The boat docked in Chittagong on November 21, 1999, one day after its 
expected arrival date. The mayor of Chittagong attended an event to greet 
the yacht, declaring that while cigarettes are dangerous to health, he wel- 
comed foreign investment in Bangladesh. Almost simultaneously, the 
High Court issued its decision: a stay order on all promotional activities 
of the yacht. The concerts and other events were canceled, tickets were 
refunded, and a small notice was published in the paper explaining the 
occurrence. The yacht sailed away quietly a few days later. 
When the case was reheard a few months later, the lawyer for BAT— 
one of the highest-ranking people in the opposition party—defended the 
Voyage as being not an advertisement for cigarettes but merely a generic 
promotion. His statement was challenged by barristers Omar Sadat and 
Tania Amir, who argued that the defense was absurd and pointed out the 
dangers of tobacco and the need for strong controls. With no laws to back 
up the argument against advertising (a law banning advertisements had 
been blocked in Parliament years before), Amir utilized the constitutional 
guarantee of right to life to support the case, arguing that the promotion 
of a product that causes serious disease and death is not consistent with 
the government's mandate to support health and life. 
3. PATH Canada (the acronym stands for Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health) 
is an NGO based in Ottawa. 
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The judge agreed with the arguments of Sadat and Amir and issued a 
decision that urged the respondents, including the government, to: 
• Ban production of tobacco leaf in phases, give subsidies to tobacco 
farmers to produce other agricultural products, and help tobacco 
workers find other jobs through such means as providing vocational 
training 
• Restrict permission and licenses for establishing tobacco factories and 
direct the owners to switch to other products in phases, compensating 
them if necessary • Persuade owners of tobacco factories not to continue with produc- 
tion of tobacco products beyond a reasonable time by banning such 
production • Close down the bidi factories in phases and restrict the harvesting of 
tobacco to produce bidis • Discontinue advertising of tobacco products and forbid any show or 
program that propagates smoking beyond the period of the existing 
contract or agreement • Prohibit import of tobacco "within a reasonable period" and in the 
meantime impose a heavy import tax; require all imports to print a 
statutory warning legibly in bold type in Bengali • Ban any promotional ventures such as the Voyage of Discovery • Ban smoking in public places.4 
The High Court had made an astonishingly strong ruling in favor of 
tobacco control, and BATA had been born out of the ashes of the Voyage 
campaign (Efroymson 2000a). 
Power in Numbers: The Importance of BATA 
Despite the victory in the High Court, the Voyage has not, in fact, disap- 
peared from Bangladesh. Billboards still display the yacht, with the slo- 
gan changed to say "Follow the World Adventure." But more than just the 
billboards serve as a reminder of the yacht's eventful visit to Bangladesh. 
BATA, the alliance that was formed to fight against the Voyage, is the 
legacy and continues in its efforts to achieve better tobacco control poli- 
cies for Bangladesh. 
4. Bangladesh High Court Division Hearing on Writ Petition No. 1825 of 1999 and Writ Peti- 
tion No. 4521 of 1999 in the Matter of an Application under Article 102 of the Constitution 
of the People's Republic of Bangladesh; summary available on the BATA Website, 
<http://bata.globalink.org>. 
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A key aspect of Bangladesh's new approach to tobacco control has been 
to widen the debate beyond health and enlist advocates from fields other 
than medicine (Efroymson 2000b). Although doctors around the world 
have achieved important successes in tobacco control, the exclusion of 
other groups has limited the effectiveness of advocacy efforts. People from 
fields such as law, consumer rights, and development work can bring dif- 
ferent perspectives to the debate and additional tools to the advocacy 
movement, along with, potentially, a keener focus on law and policy. 
Tobacco-related diseases are not considered a health priority in 
Bangladesh, and to focus exclusively on them would have essentially 
guaranteed failure in bringing about any major changes in tobacco control 
laws and policies. Rather than attempt to quantify the disease and death 
caused by tobacco, BATA focused instead on an issue of much more 
immediate relevance: malnutrition. As mentioned earlier, the poor of 
Bangladesh—as in many other countries—are much more likely to smoke 
than the wealthy, and the money they spend on tobacco, if used instead to 
purchase food, could make a significant difference in their children's 
nutritional status. 
BATA now has 270 diverse organizations around the country in its net- 
work, as well as an international advisory board. In addition to MANAS 
and the National Non-Smokers' Forum, the following organizations are 
members: 
• Body Against Destructive Social Activities, Bangladesh (BADSA). An 
antidrug organization, founded in 1994, that regularly organizes rallies 
and other events to highlight the problem of tobacco use in 
Bangladesh. • Consumers' Association of Bangladesh (CAB). As part of its mandate to 
protect consumers, addresses the issue of tobacco as the most danger- 
ous of all consumer products. • Dhaka Ahsania Mission. Works in many sectors and has conducted 
many activities in tobacco control, including organizing (jointly with 
the LSTB) a discussion meeting on tobacco control law; persuading the 
Bangladesh Postal Department to produce a stamp and other materials 
celebrating World No Tobacco Day; organizing discussion meetings 
throughout the country; running a program to establish smoke-free 
schools; and printing and distributing stickers and posters. 
• Ghas Phul Nodi, An antidrug organization; conducts various activities 
to draw attention to the problems of tobacco use. • Institute of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, Bangladesh (IACIB). One 
of BATA's newest members; recently carried out a survey of ricksha 
pullers and their tobacco use habits and is conducting awareness 
programs. 
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• Law and Society Trust, Bangladesh (LSTB). A key party in obtaining the 
High Court decision against BAT. Tania Amir of the LSTB has been 
active in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) meetings for 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and in revising 
legislation for submission to the government. She is a member of the 
law-drafting committee of the Ministry of Health. • MANOBIK (Madok Drabya-O-Nesha Birodi Council [Antidrug Council]). 
An antidrug association that has recently taken on tobacco control as a 
major issue. Its activities include a sit-in protest in front of the National 
Press Club in favor of higher taxes on tobacco products and organiza- 
tion of rallies and discussion meetings. • Pratyasha. An antidrug organization that conducts awareness cam- 
paigns on tobacco. 
• Welfare Association for Cancer Care (WACC). Currently focuses on involv- 
ing more organizations in addressing women's and children's issues 
with respect to tobacco control. It has produced various materials 
addressing women's tobacco use, as well as a book on tobacco and can- 
cer that highlights the human face of tobacco-related illness. 
• Work for a Better Bangladesh (WBB). The WBB, as BATA's secretariat, 
plays a key role in coordinating BATA events. It has conducted a series 
of tobacco control training workshops throughout the country. It 
coproduced, with PATH Canada, the "Hungry for Tobacco" report and 
two PATH Canada publications: a how-to guide for tobacco control 
and a guide to tobacco control law. The WBB has issued and is distrib- 
uting, through BATA, a booklet of advice on quitting smoking, and it 
has produced various leaflets, stickers, and posters. Saifuddin Ahmed, 
WBB president and coordinator for BATA, has attended INB meetings, 
is active in the Framework Convention Alliance (a coalition of NGOs 
working for a strong FCTC), and sits on the law-drafting committee of 
the Ministry of Health. 
• Young Power in Social Action (YPSA). Based in Chittagong; had a critical 
role in organizing events to protest the landing of the Voyage of Dis- 
covery yacht in Chittagong port. With the WBB, it also organized a 
workshop in Chittagong, and it is active in encouraging local organi- 
zations to work on tobacco control. 
The BATA member organizations listed here are NGOs registered with 
the government of Bangladesh. With the exception of the YPSA, all are 
based in Dhaka. Most are small organizations with a flexible structure that 
facilitates their involvement in the politically sensitive area of advocacy. 
BATA's mission is to: 
• Contribute to the health and well-being of Bangladeshis by reducing 
tobacco consumption 
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• Reduce the damage to health, the environment, households, and the 
national economy from tobacco consumption • Educate the public and policymakers about the dangers of tobacco • Help strengthen the nation's tobacco control policies and legislation • Conduct research to learn more about tobacco use and its effects, par- 
ticularly its economic impact • Raise awareness among development organizations about the impor- 
tance of tobacco control and encourage more groups to become 
involved 
• Continue to be a strong, united force in tobacco control locally, nation- 
ally, and internationally. 
The alliance has been active since its inception in leading and coordi- 
nating activities pertaining to education, awareness raising, training, 
advocacy, research, and coordination with government and NGOs on 
both the national and the international levels. These activities are an 
example of how NGOs can influence policy and build coalitions, as long 
as the members are willing to suspend an interest in exercising control 
and assuming leadership in order to work cooperatively The following 
are just some examples of activities that BATA has championed since its 
founding in 1999: 
• Advocacy. BATA has regularly held events calling for legislative 
changes, including a signature campaign in favor of nonsmoking car- 
riages on trains and protests calling for higher tobacco taxes and an end 
to tobacco advertising. BATA is also urging the government to negoti- 
ate for and sign a strong Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. • Draft legislation. After compiling laws from various countries, BATA 
helped draft a comprehensive tobacco control law which, as of March 
2003, was still being discussed in parliamentary committees and is yet 
to be voted on by Parliament. The draft law bans advertising (except 
at point of sale), mandates pictorial warnings on cigarette packs, and 
prohibits smoking in many public places. BATA is working to 
strengthen the provisions and to ensure that the law is not weakened 
by Parliament. 
• Public education. BATA members produce a range of materials, includ- 
ing posters, stickers, and pamphlets, to educate the public about the 
dangers to health, economics, and appearance from tobacco use and 
about how to quit smoking. • Public mobilization. BATA encourages the public to take a stand against 
tobacco promotion and use. Mobilization activities include rallies and 
marches for the WHO's South-East Asian Anti-Tobacco (SEAAT) Flame 
for Freedom from Tobacco campaign in which, in 2000, a torch sym- 
bolizing the tobacco control movement traveled throughout South and 
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Southeast Asia. BATA has also held workshops, seminars, and press 
conferences on tobacco control themes. 
• Research. BATA has conducted studies on the effect of tobacco use on 
poverty and has carried out research on demand for a smoke-free bus 
service. It has also run an analysis of BAT's "Youth Smoking Prevention 
Campaign," which included use of focus groups and a questionnaire. 
• International activities. BATA has attended and made presentations at 
various international workshops and conferences, including regional 
meetings in India and Thailand, the People's Health Assembly, various 
WHO meetings, and the 11th World Conference on Tobacco or Health. 
Fifteen of its member organizations have made submissions to the 
WHO expressing support for a strong FCTC, and BATA is an active 
participant in the Framework Convention Alliance. 
By broadening the base of support for tobacco control, BATA hopes to 
build a much stronger movement for tobacco control advocacy. With that in 
mind, the WBB, with financial support from the American Cancer Society 
and technical support from PATH Canada, is holding a series of workshops 
around the country for NGOs and the media on tobacco control. The work- 
shops emphasize that tobacco is a multisectoral issue, one that touches on 
the environment, poverty, human rights, religion, and many other areas, as 
well as health. In the workshops the participants, mostly from small local 
NGOs, engage in small-group discussions to plan activities and create work 
plans. The WBB hopes in the future to provide small grants for these NGOs 
to encourage them to put some of their ideas into practice. 
Tobacco control policy cannot be successfully formulated or imple- 
mented unless a broad base of NGOs around the country actively sup- 
ports it. Effective support for a large NGO network is in turn contingent 
upon raising awareness among NGOs about the importance of tobacco 
control and their capacity to become effective advocates. In BATA's case, 
technical and financial support from American and Canadian agencies 
has been essential in enhancing the capacity of local NGOs to support the 
government and promote good policies for tobacco control. 
The Politics of Policymaking 
Bangladesh's democracy does not always operate smoothly. Rather than 
discussing issues in Parliament, the opposition party sometimes stages 
walkouts and then protests if decisions are made in members' absence. The 
most common form of protest is a hartal (general strike), in which a party 
or a coalition of parties asks people to stay home, usually from dawn to 
dusk. Reported cases of corruption and bribery within the government 
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system further undermine the democratic process. These characteristics, 
coupled with the influence that tobacco companies wield, make tobacco 
control efforts difficult. 
Despite all the vagaries of Bangladeshi politics, the government holds 
most of the solutions to the problem of tobacco use. Without strong laws 
and high tobacco taxes, there is little that organizations and individuals 
can do. This should not be used as an excuse to accept defeat; rather, it 
should be a reminder to everyone working in the field of tobacco control 
of the importance of continuing advocacy work. 
Bangladesh's existing laws on tobacco control are weak. Advertising is 
banned on state-controlled media (BTV and radio) but is allowed every- 
where else, including on local private and satellite television stations, in 
newspapers and magazines, and on billboards. Sponsorship of rock con- 
certs by BAT (e.g., Benson & Hedges Star Search) is common, and despite 
the claim that youths under 18 are not admitted, no such rules appear to 
be followed (WBB and PATH Canada 2001). In addition, airing the pro- 
grams on television effectively guarantees a young audience. One 
national daily newspaper, Bhorer Kagoj, voluntarily refuses to run tobacco 
advertisements (Simpson 1998), but other newspapers frequently run 
half-page, full-color advertisements for cigarettes. Billboards, storefront 
signs, cigarette display cases, and other forms of advertising are wide- 
spread throughout the country. 
Smoking is banned in hospitals and some other premises, but these 
prohibitions are largely ignored. Operators of many air-conditioned buses 
and some owners of air-conditioned restaurants voluntarily forbid smok- 
ing. Biman, the national airline, prohibited smoking on domestic flights 
years ago, and in April 2001 it extended the ban to all international flights. 
Warnings on tobacco products are limited to cigarette packs and con- 
sist of one weak statement, in Bengali and in small type, on the side of the 
pack. None of the other tobacco products available on the market are 
required to carry a warning. 
The government is currently in the lengthy process of revising its 
tobacco control laws and drafting new ones. Pressure to do so came 
largely from the High Court's decision following the Voyage of Discovery 
case. If the new draft law under consideration is passed in its present 
form, it will be an enormous improvement and will provide a strong leg- 
islative base for better tobacco control in Bangladesh. Advocates continue 
to work to convince policymakers of the need for a comprehensive ban on 
promotions, strong and clearly visible warnings on all tobacco products, 
and protection of nonsmokers, among other measures. 
BATA has developed a close working relationship with the government 
on the basis of simple principles appropriate to the Bangladeshi cultural 
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environment, such as working with the government, rather than against 
it, and providing assistance to the government in carrying out its pro- 
grams where possible. BATA members generally regard confrontational 
tactics as counterproductive in dealing with the government. In their 
view, the key to success in Bangladesh lies in maintaining a strong, close 
working relationship with the government and thus being able to form a 
constructive relationship with policymakers—an essential ingredient of 
effective tobacco control policies. Such a relationship does not preclude 
criticizing government policies or advocating strongly for change; rather, 
it involves a constructive attitude toward working with policymakers, 
based on mutual respect. 
BATA tries to focus on providing services to the government—for 
example, designing stickers and posters and helping to organize govern- 
ment events. Where necessary, this includes providing services gratis and 
without taking credit. In return, the government is open to collaboration. 
Although this process means extra work for tobacco advocates, the pay- 
off can be significant in developing and maintaining a strong relationship 
with the government. 
Some of the ways in which BATA has sought to provide support for the 
government include: 
• Organizing activities for WHO's Flame for Freedom from Tobacco 
campaign. 
• Designing posters and organizing rallies for World No Tobacco Day. • Briefing the government on the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. This gave delegates the information they needed to participate 
in meetings and allowed BATA to present its view of the proposed lan- 
guage for the FCTC during the government negotiations. 
The relationship between BATA and the government has been close 
and successful enough that BATA received the WHO's Tobacco Free 
World Award in 2001 at the recommendation of the government. In 
addition, two members of BATA—Tania Amir of the LSTB and Saifud- 
din Ahmed of the WBB—have been invited to sit on the Health Min- 
istry's law-drafting committee and to participate directly in the process 
of drafting new legislation. In some respects BATA members now serve 
as a liaison between other BATA organizations and the government, 
soliciting ideas from members on what should go into the laws and 
what language should be used. The battle will not end with the passage 
of new laws: BATA members will also have a critical role to play in mon- 
itoring the behavior of the tobacco companies and ensuring enforcement 
of the laws. 
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Lessons Learned 
Despite the progress that has been made, challenges remain. Among them 
are funding, the struggle to build the political will necessary for change 
and to establish tobacco control as a priority for the country, the con- 
struction of lasting alliances, and the continuing strength of the opposi- 
tion. But important lessons have been learned in each of these areas. 
Obtaining Funds 
Important work such as advocacy for new laws can be done even with lim- 
ited funding. Some of the strongest laws in other countries were passed 
when tobacco control movements had relatively little funding, as in South 
Africa and Thailand. But although ample funding does not guarantee suc- 
cess, it is difficult to do the work with no funding; critical tasks such as law 
enforcement and surveillance of the epidemic to measure progress can be 
expensive. Certain assets that are taken for granted in developed countries— 
a steady power supply, phone lines, computers, e-mail and Web access, and 
a good command of English—are in short supply in many developing coun- 
tries. Such comparatively simple matters as finding basic information to 
back up a proposal for new laws, a space in which to hold meetings, and the 
money to print documents can be major obstacles. Lack of full-time staff 
devoted to tobacco control—and with access to resources—can seriously 
undermine efforts. From the perspective of tobacco control advocates, the 
ideal source of funding is a dedicated tax on tobacco, but advocacy groups 
need immediate funding to sustain the (perhaps lengthy) lobbying effort 
needed to get such a tax passed. Large organizations that have sufficient 
funds to conduct the work may shy away from advocacy, preferring less 
controversial areas such as school-based programs. 
One way of overcoming lack of funds is through partnerships with local 
NGOs or with institutions in developed countries. To help provide at least 
minimal operating funds, PATH Canada offered the WBB some startup 
funding, shared office space, and, perhaps more important, ongoing tech- 
nical input. PATH Canada's support enabled the WBB to focus on tobacco 
control work, including the building of BATA, rather than on seeking 
funds. The relationship also gave the WBB the assurance that small, neces- 
sary expenses could be met, such as those involved in holding a press con- 
ference and establishing computer and e-mail links for global networking. 
The technical assistance has been valuable in gathering evidence to support 
arguments for tobacco control. It enabled the WBB to provide the essential 
foundation and minimum operating costs for BATA, with other organiza- 
tions contributing some funds and large amounts of time and expertise. 
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Having created an excellent track record in its first year of work, BATA 
was able to gain supplementary funding in the following forms: 
• Three small one-year grants from the American Cancer Society to three 
BATA member organizations—the LSTB, to support legal advocacy; 
the Welfare Association for Cancer Care, to work on issues affecting 
women and children; and the WBB, to strengthen BATA through divi- 
sional workshops and printed materials • A two-year grant from the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) to PATH Canada, the WBB, and BATA to develop and 
print materials, hold workshops, develop the capacity of WBB and 
BATA staff, and design and air counteradvertising. 
In addition to these specific grants, BATA members have received 
funding from the WHO, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Canadian Can- 
cer Society, and other groups to attend workshops, meetings, and confer- 
ences. Because dependence on external funding is a concern, BATA is 
seeking to increase contributions from its member organizations and to 
finance some of its publications by accepting advertising. 
Much work can be done with little money if resources are used wisely. 
Writing letters, holding meetings, organizing public demonstrations, and 
talking to politicians cost little. Rather than waiting for funds to material- 
ize, it is best to make a start, utilizing existing resources. If the work is suc- 
cessful, it will be easier to find funding in the future. 
Creating Political Will and Working with the Media 
It is often said that policy change cannot occur without political will. This 
statement seems to imply that political will is something innate rather 
than created—a dangerously passive approach to advocacy. Although 
that may sometimes be the case, a critical part of tobacco control is to cre- 
ate the will to make the changes. And in a democratic government, this 
often means convincing politicians that they will gain more votes if they 
are seen to support tobacco control. 
How does one go about generating political will? 
• Educate and involve the public. A public unaware of the problems associ- 
ated with tobacco use and of the role the tobacco industry plays in 
blocking legislation will not put pressure on politicians for change. The 
public needs to know not only that tobacco is harmful but also what 
role the tobacco industry plays in opposing policies designed to reduce 
tobacco use. Involving the public includes taking the lead in activities 
such as letter-writing campaigns, petitions, and public demonstrations. 
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• Educate politicians. Politicians need to know how the tobacco industry 
may be trying to manipulate them through public relations activities 
and lobbying (e.g., suggesting that taxes be lowered to reduce smug- 
gling when in fact the tobacco company itself has been shown to be 
involved in smuggling in several court cases). They need to understand 
the implications of tobacco use on health and the economy. And they 
need to know that activists will not keep quiet. Well-intentioned but ill- 
informed politicians can be educated to support tobacco control, and 
others can be shamed into doing so. 
• Show politicians that there is strong public demand for tobacco control. Cre- 
ating visible support for the issue—through public demonstrations, 
editorials, letters to the editor, and so on—can help persuade politi- 
cians that they will gain more by doing as the public wants than by 
pleasing their friends in the industry. 
The media are critical to the creation of political will. Given the low 
budgets of most tobacco control programs around the world, the use of 
free media coverage is essential. One of the successes of tobacco control 
work in Bangladesh has been the ability to gain media attention. Activi- 
ties have included: 
• Holding press conferences. • inviting the media to seminars and workshops. • Organizing rallies, human chains, and other protests, often in front of 
the National Press Club. 
• Writing letters to the editor. • Holding discussions with the newspaper Bhorer Kagoj that led to the 
publication of color messages about tobacco every day during the 
month of May, free of charge. • Maintaining positive relations with the press. For instance, the Eco- 
nomic Times, a weekly newspaper on economic issues, frequently car- 
ries news releases provided by BATA. 
It is possible that the willingness of the media to report on tobacco con- 
trol topics, including the dangers of tobacco use, is in inverse proportion 
to the amount of income they gain from tobacco advertisements, although 
no study on this has been done in Bangladesh. The authors' subjective 
observation is that newspapers such as Bhorer Kagoj, with no tobacco 
advertisements, and The Observer, with only sporadic ones, devote more 
attention to tobacco-related problems than do newspapers that regularly 
run tobacco advertisements. 
The media in many countries gain significant income from tobacco 
advertising, but there are always some individuals and institutions that 
34 DEBRA EFROYMSON AND SAIFUDDIN AHMED 
are willing to help prevent disease and death from tobacco use, that envi- 
sion a more effective role for the government in tobacco control, and that 
are prepared to provide support gratis. Building relationships with the 
press often pays off in free media coverage. We do not know what is pos- 
sible until we try. 
Competing Priorities 
In many low-income countries there is a general feeling that tobacco con- 
trol is an issue for rich countries that have the "luxury" of being able to 
worry about chronic diseases, while low-income countries have to con- 
centrate on infectious disease, malnutrition, access to clean water, and the 
like. Framing the tobacco problem only in terms of cancer, or even only in 
terms of health, adds to this perception. Talking about the number of 
deaths likely to result from tobacco use can be ineffective, as many such 
deaths are likely to occur late in life. Where life expectancy is low, mor- 
tality from cancer and heart disease is not likely to be considered a prior- 
ity, no matter how significant it may in fact be. 
While never forgetting that tobacco is primarily a health issue, tobacco 
control advocates in Bangladesh have tried to stress that the health prob- 
lems arise not only from disease but also from the opportunity costs 
involved in spending money on an addictive and harmful substance 
rather than on food or other basic needs. The argument is most appropri- 
ate when applied to transnational tobacco companies whose products are 
essentially unaffordable for most of the population yet are so widely 
advertised that they are likely to become aspirational goods, even at the 
cost of a large portion of family income. Repositioning tobacco use as an 
issue of poverty, nutrition, and human rights can gain the attention and 
support needed to deal with an entirely preventable epidemic. 
It is important to be innovative in framing the tobacco control issue and 
to use concepts appropriate to the setting. In some areas the focus might 
best be on the environmental damage resulting from tobacco cultivation 
and curing; in others, on the labor issues involved in tobacco production. 
Tobacco control advocates should be flexible enough to present the issue 
in a way that broadens support and to obtain or develop the knowledge 
base on which to build their efforts and claims. 
Maintaining a Strong Alliance 
Alliances can be powerful tools, but they are often fraught with problems. 
It can be difficult to maintain a balance between attending to the organi- 
zational and relationship issues that have to be addressed to keep the 
alliance functioning and staying focused on the actual work of tobacco 
BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 35 
control. Bangladesh has experienced mixed success in this area: although 
BATA is strong and continues to grow, it has not been able to maintain the 
involvement of all the key players. 
Working within a coalition has many advantages: 
• The coalition can draw on the strengths of individual members, giving 
it access to a base of skills, experience, and connections that would be 
hard to find in any single organization. 
• A coalition increases the number of voices speaking out and thus the 
level of attention to the issue. 
• A coalition can be a forum for sharing ideas and communicating about 
individual actions so that even when joint organizing does not occur, 
work is more coordinated and groups do not unnecessarily duplicate 
each other's efforts. 
• A coalition can, when it functions well, be an energizing force, where 
individual members gain ideas and motivation from each other and all 
face the work with greater eagerness. 
But maintaining a strong and active coalition is difficult. Challenges 
can arise if individuals focus on personal gains and prestige more than on 
group plans or institutional objectives, if there is conflict over the best 
approach to shared work, and if personal conflicts or animosity arise. In 
such cases, creating smaller working groups or committees may be the 
way to continue building the group's effectiveness. 
In Bangladesh the formation of an alliance was critical to the successes 
achieved. A balance is always needed between the administrative, orga- 
nizational, and personal tasks needed to keep individual members satis- 
fied and a focus on the work at hand. There is no such thing as a "perfect" 
coalition, but if the group can achieve more than was previously possible, 
without impossibly high inputs of time and other resources, then it can be 
described as successful. While the building of an alliance or coalition is 
one way to increase effectiveness in tobacco control, by no means should 
it come at an excessive cost in money, time, or energy. 
Standing Up to the Opposition 
The task of tobacco control often—and understandably—appears daunt- 
ing. What can a few individuals or organizations working in the interest 
of public health do when faced with the power of one or several transna- 
tional tobacco companies, with their enormous financial resources and 
political connections? At least David and Goliath were standing on the 
same field; the tobacco industry may have access to lawmakers and other 
officials that tobacco control advocates can only guess at and wish for. 
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It is unrealistic to expect that the task will be simple. There will 
always be times of discouragement. It is important to keep a sense of 
perspective and to remember that even in the countries that boast the 
greatest successes in tobacco control, about a quarter of the population 
still smokes; in many other countries, the percentage is far higher and 
continues to rise. 
Every time a tobacco company launches a new public relations cam- 
paign, or a government cuts tobacco taxes or refuses to pass new legisla- 
tion or passes legislation drafted by the tobacco industry itself, there is a 
need for advocates to take stock. Yes, the tobacco industry is a powerful 
adversary, and yes, the companies have vast financial resources, but they 
are also trading in a deadly and addictive product that most of the popu- 
lation does not consume and that most addicted users wish they could 
stop using. The victories achieved by tobacco control advocates and 
policymakers are almost always hard-fought. There are plenty of setbacks 
along the way, and a long way farther to go, but however great the power 
of might, even greater is the power of right. 
A powerful opponent can sometimes provide motivation. BATA was 
formed during the struggle against BAT over the Voyage of Discovery, 
and other work was inspired by BAT's launch of its "Youth Smoking Pre- 
vention Campaign." Policymakers and advocates, working together, will 
be able to curb BAT's ability to advertise, thus narrowing the gap between 
the tobacco industry's reach and BATA's. The only sure path to defeat is 
to accept it without a struggle. 
Conclusion 
Most of the story of tobacco control in Bangladesh is still unwritten, and 
events continue to unfold. It remains to be seen whether the tobacco con- 
trol movement will be sufficiently powerful and proactive to counter 
industry tactics and persuade the government to take strong measures to 
control tobacco. The tobacco industry is a mighty force in Bangladesh, as 
elsewhere, and it will be difficult to maintain a spotlight on tobacco in the 
face of so many competing causes of disease and ill health. But if the 
progress made over the past few years is any indication of the future, the 
many organizations and individuals working for tobacco control in 
Bangladesh have good reason to be optimistic. 
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Government Leadership 
in Tobacco Control: 
Brazil's Experience 
Luisa M. da Costa e Si/va Goldfarb 
A broad national network of dedicated activists helped achieve Brazil's suc- 
cess in tobacco control. Thousands of committed individuals have worked 
together and have enlisted the support of politicians, religious leaders, and 
the media to increase public awareness of the hazards of tobacco use and 
limit the influence of the tobacco industry. Their voluntary and professional 
efforts have made Brazil a world leader in tobacco control. 
This case study describes the creation and consolidation of Brazil's 
National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) at the National Cancer Insti- 
tute (INCA). It emphasizes the strategic decisions that led to new laws, 
higher taxes, and educational programs. 
The Scope of the Tobacco Problem in Brazil 
Tobacco consumption in Brazil—as in other countries in Latin America— 
grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s, fueled by a significant increase in 
the proportion of females smoking (PAHO 1992; USDHHS 1992). By 
1989, 30 percent of the population over the age of 15 smoked. Of Brazil's 
30.6 million smokers, 18 million (59 percent) were male and 12.6 million 
(41 percent) were female (Ministry of Health and IBGE 1989). 
In 1989, 2.742 million Brazilian children and adolescents age 5—19 
smoked. Of these, 369,767 were between the ages of 10 and 14, and 2,341,151 
were age 15—19. Among children younger than 10 years old, there were 
30,531 smokers, 98 percent of them in rural areas (Ministry of Health and 
IBGE 1989). Surveys in 10 Brazilian state capital cities in 1987, 1989, 1993, 
and 1997 showed an increase in the percentage of school attenders age 10—18 
using tobacco for the first time (Galduróz, Noto, and Carlini 1997: 130). 
The same studies showed that first use of tobacco among girls 
increased between 1987 and 1997. By the 1997 survey, in 3 of the 10 state 
capitals studied—Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo—first-use 
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numbers for the 10—18 age group were higher for girls than for boys. In 
Curitiba, Salvador, and Recife there was no statistically significant differ- 
ence between boys and girls in age of first use. The study concluded that 
the percentages of male and female smokers would soon be equal. 
The data on young Brazilian smokers, in particular, raised the alarm. 
Studies have shown that 50 percent of those who try cigarettes for the first 
time as adolescents become adult smokers (Henningfield, Cohen, and 
Slade 1991; USDHHS 1994; WHO 1998). The data highlighted the urgent 
need for measures to reduce the number of young people who experiment 
with smoking. 
Health and Environmental Effects of Tobacco Use and Production 
An estimated 80,000 people die every year in Brazil from the effects of 
tobacco use (Silva and others 1998b: 71). Cardiovascular diseases are by 
far the biggest cause of death, accounting for 27.5 percent of all deaths, 
and cancers are in fourth place; both are strongly related to tobacco use 
(Ministry of Health 1999a; Duchiade 1995). 
Added to the gloomy health data for smoking is the impact of tobacco 
production on people and the environment. Tobacco crops are grown 
with intensive use of chemicals: soil sterilizers, fertilizers, and pesticides 
that can all be highly toxic (Perez 1990). This means that both people and 
the environment—soil, water, air, and animals—have been systematically 
contaminated by chemicals for years. Brazil also suffers other negative 
effects of growing tobacco. The use of wood to feed 116,000 ovens to cure 
tobacco leaves has contributed to the loss of native forests in southern 
Brazil, which are now only 2 percent of their original extent (Quesada and 
others 1989; Lopes and others 1992). 
Brazil's Tobacco Economy 
Brazil is the biggest tobacco exporter and the third largest tobacco pro- 
ducer in the world. In 2000 it produced 595,000 metric tons of tobacco 
leaves and exported 341,000 tons, which brought in US$961.2 million in 
revenues (MDIC/SECEX 2001). The size of the tobacco industry in Brazil 
can also be measured by the 165,000 families (about 700,000 people) who 
make their living from growing tobacco and the 1.3 million more whose 
income indirectly derives from the tobacco industry (ABIFUMO 2000). 
Taking measures that could affect this economy requires considerable care. 
Changing the tobacco economy may not be as difficult as it seems, 
however, because the Brazilian economy does not depend on tobacco 
production. Only 2.6 percent of all export earnings comes from tobacco. 
(By contrast, in Zimbabwe the percentage is 23 percent and in Malawi, 
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61 percent—World Bank 1999: 122.) Of course every job is important, but 
tobacco farmers represent only 0.44 of 1 percent of all full-time jobs in 
Brazil, and even if indirect employment is added, the tobacco industry's 
contribution to employment is small. Furthermore, if people stop smok- 
ing, they spend the money on other goods and services instead, and this 
generates new jobs across the economy. 
As a tobacco exporter, Brazil must prepare for global changes in con- 
sumption. Tobacco controls are growing stronger around the world, and 
the industry is shifting its sources of supply. This could well lead to a drop 
in demand for Brazil's tobacco, and supply must adjust. The sooner that 
a tobacco-exporting economy such as Brazil begins to redirect invest- 
ments away from tobacco, the quicker and better it will be able to adjust 
to future global consumption and trade patterns. 
Given the environmental damage and health risks from tobacco, 41 
percent of tobacco producers surveyed in southern Brazil said they would 
switch from tobacco to another crop if certain economic conditions 
existed, including the availability of good credit and a guarantee of a mar- 
ket for the new crop (Etges 1989). The results of this survey were rein- 
forced at a meeting in 2001 of farmers, government officials, workers, and 
institutions interested in the fate of the tobacco economy. Farmers empha- 
sized that they would need financial help to switch to alternative crops 
(Ministry of Health and others 2001). 
Government Support for Tobacco 
Farmers are only one part of the tobacco economy. Firms involved in man- 
ufacturing and selling tobacco products make up another powerful group. 
Vigorous lobbying by this industry has produced a level of government 
support out of proportion to the commodity's economic importance. Data 
show that since 1997, 22 percent of all resources from the National Pro- 
gram for Family-Run Agricultural Businesses (PRONAF) has been used 
for tobacco crops, particularly in the south, where 93 percent of tobacco 
production is concentrated (BACEN 1999; Ministry of Health 2000a). Aim- 
ing to reduce this percentage, the Brazilian Central Bank has forbidden the 
use of PRONAF funds to finance tobacco production in partnership with 
or through "integration" with the tobacco industry (Resolution 002833, 
April 25, 2001). Individual tobacco growers are still eligible for these funds, 
but they lose their eligibility if the tobacco industry acts as an intermedi- 
ary for them or if they have any direct association with tobacco companies. 
The Beginnings of Tobacco Control in Brazil 
As long ago as the early 1970s, some Brazilians were worried about the 
harmful effects of tobacco. But actions to control its use were limited by 
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pressure from the industry and by lack of knowledge among health pro- 
fessionals, politicians, and the general public. 
The first attempts at tobacco control took place in several different 
areas: Bahia, Paraná, EspIrito Santo, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, and 
Rio de Janeiro. The main players, and the driving force behind these 
attempts, were health professionals—mostly physicians—motivated by 
information from international publications. Some of the original tobacco 
control advocates are still active. Dr. J. Rosemberg of Sorocaba Medical 
School deserves special mention because of his inspiring example. At the 
age of 93, he is the president of the Coordinating Committee for Tobacco 
Control in Brazil (CCCTB) and is still speaking up about tobacco. 
In 1977 the National Cancer Association drew up an action plan to con- 
trol tobacco use. The following year, as a spinoff of the plan, the associa- 
tion organized Anti-Tobacco Use Week and launched Rosemberg's book 
Tobacco Use: A Public Health Issue. Two years later, acting on a proposal by 
the Brazilian Cancer Society, the Brazilian Medical Association organized 
local committees to give talks to physicians about the effects of tobacco 
use. They also pressed to have the subject added to the curricula of med- 
ical and paramedical schools and placed on the agenda of medical con- 
gresses around the country. 
In 1979 the First Symposium on Tuberculosis took place in Salvador, 
Bahia state. The resulting "Salvador Letter" contained information and 
warnings about the harmful health effects of tobacco use (Rosemberg 
1987). The letter also provided the first estimate of mortality related to 
tobacco use in Brazil: 100,000 per year. (Later, this figure was revised 
downward.) The letter recommended a two-pronged preventive 
approach to controlling tobacco use through education and legislation. In 
April 1980 the First Brazilian Conference against Tobacco Use was held in 
Vitória, EspIrito Santo state, and produced a similar document, the 
"Vitória Letter" (Rosemberg 1987). 
Growing awareness of the dangers of tobacco use increased public sup- 
port for tobacco control activities. Politicians in some states recognized the 
strength of this support and added tobacco control to their political agendas. 
The state of Paraná, for example, organized the first Strike Against Tobacco 
Use and established the statewide Day Against Tobacco (Law 7,419, 1980). 
During the strike, students collected tolls from passing motorists to raise 
funds for the campaign, educational handouts were distributed, and non- 
profit organizations provided funding to support the effort. 
In the early 1980s countries in the region created the Latin American 
Coordinating Committee for Tobacco Control (CLACCTA) through an 
initiative of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
and the American Cancer Society. CLACCTA's first president was the 
late Dr. Mario Rigatto, a very active professional from Rio Grande do Sul 
and one of the pioneers in Brazilian tobacco control. 
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Brazilian tobacco control efforts evolved slowly until 1985, when the 
federal government began participating in the process. Health Minister 
Waldir Arcoverde established a commission to write a national tobacco 
control action plan for the ministry. The commission worked quietly for 
more than six months, avoiding attention from the industry and its lobby- 
ists. Brazil's first Action Plan for Tobacco Control was completed in 1986. 
An important element in the plan was the involvement of the National 
Health Foundation (FUNASA) of the Ministry of Health. FUNASA's 
existing national network for tuberculosis control became the distribution 
system for information about the harmful health effects of tobacco, with 
pneumologists Germano Gherardt, José do Vale Feitosa, and Miguel Aiub 
Hijjar playing key roles. 
In June 1986 Federal Law 7,488/86 created the National Day Against 
Tobacco (August 29) and reserved the week prior to the day for national 
events related to the issue. That law, although weak, was a great step for- 
ward in Brazilian tobacco control legislation. 
Gaining Momentum: The National 
Tobacco Control Program 
Brazilian tobacco control efforts reached a turning point in 1987, when the 
National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) was established. The head of 
the chronic degenerative disease unit in the Ministry of Health, Geniberto 
Paiva Campos, provided the needed support and political status to 
launch tobacco activities under the program through INCA, which desig- 
nated Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva as its representative on the program. 
Between 1987 and 1989 the group in charge of the NTCP was limited to a 
few professionals who worked under INCA's coordination but were 
based in different departments of the Ministry of Health. NTCP's first 
strategic action was to identify health technicians in the state health sec- 
retariats to act as NTCP's state coordinators and to be responsible for 
delivering the program in their states. 
Also in 1987, the Ministry of Health established the Advisory Board on 
Tobacco Use Control, and the first National Day Against Tobacco was 
celebrated. This was the first time that the Brazilian people were officially 
given information about the damage caused by tobacco and the impor- 
tance of reducing its use. 
Business Joins In 
Businesses were involved early in tobacco control efforts. The law that 
created the National Day Against Tobacco appealed to businesses by insti- 
tuting an honors certificate awarded by the Ministries of Health and 
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Labor to companies that attained certain standards such as workplace 
smoking bans, restricted smoking areas, and educational programs. The 
participation of business greatly benefited the program because the com- 
panies' actions provided examples for others to follow. In the first eight 
years only a few companies received certificates, but since 1996 the num- 
bers have grown, and the system has become a success. The Central Bank 
(Banco do Brasil) deserves special recognition because of its participation 
in the plan right from the beginning. 
Banco do Brasil has contributed enormously to the program. It has 
been a role model for other companies and institutions through its occu- 
pational health initiatives, including tobacco control, and its support for 
sports and "healthy" events such as swimming, jumping, running, danc- 
ing, and athletic competitions known as Largue o Cigarro Correndo (Run- 
ning Away from Cigarettes). In the 1990s these competitions were taken 
to 600 cities where the bank's Workers' Athletic Association (AABB) had 
branches. This increased the NTCP's visibility around the country and 
spread information about the harmful health effects of tobacco to the gen- 
eral public. 
Later, as a part of World No Tobacco Day, coordinated by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the NTCP's coordinating body extended the 
honors certificate awards to individuals who supported the government's 
campaign against tobacco. People in the media, writers, actors, lawyers, 
teachers, and athletes have received certificates. The awards have 
attracted considerable public attention and wide media coverage—so 
much so that the president and the health minister are increasingly seen 
at these celebrations. 
Support Grows 
Public campaigns against tobacco grew in importance as people's under- 
standing of tobacco's harmful health effects increased. Between 1987 and 
1989 a variety of activities boosted public awareness. 
• In 1988 Ministry of Health Act 490 required cigarette packs to display 
the warning "The Ministry of Health advises: smoking causes damage 
to health." 
• A survey showed that 70 percent of children questioned lived in a 
home where at least one person smoked (Silva 1987). This statistic was 
widely discussed in the media. 
• Some 70,000 students from 16 states took part in the antitobacco Chil- 
dren's Slogan and Drawing Contest. 
• Radio and TV campaigns on the effects of secondhand smoke were 
launched, with great impact on public opinion. 
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• A children's comic magazine, Stop Smoking Around Me, by a major 
Brazilian comic book artist and featuring a well-known female hero, 
was published. • Four posters designed by another Brazilian comic book artist and tar- 
geted at different population groups were distributed around the coun- 
try. Ten years later, one of these posters appeared on the cover of the 
international journal Tobacco Control, published by the British Medical 
Journal Publishing Group. 
Efforts Stall and Then Resume 
Tobacco control efforts abruptly stalled in 1990 when the NTCP was taken 
from INCA and transferred to Brasilia. This shift brought the program to 
a halt. At that time, the author became part of the INCA team, which con- 
tinued its involvement in tobacco control at an institutional level. At the 
end of 1992 Health Minister Adib Jatene moved the NTCP back to INCA. 
The INCA team was delighted: the minister had the political will needed 
to carry on the program. Vera da Costa e Silva was once again in charge 
of the NTCP. In 1993 INCA restarted the program with a technical coor- 
dinating team that consisted of Vera da Costa e Silva, Tânia M. Caval- 
cante, Tereza P. Feitosa, and the author. 
The team pushed hard to make up for lost time. It ran its first capacity- 
building workshop in 73 health units in Rio de Janeiro—a first step in tak- 
ing the NTCP to local health units. In addition, an annual evaluation and 
planning meeting was held at which 14 of Brazil's 27 states were repre- 
sented. Much work still needed to be done to cover all the states. 
That same year, NTCP staff participated in the Annual Seminar on 
Alternative Crops organized by the Catholic Church. They debated with 
tobacco growers and agrotechnicians in southern Brazil, the heart of 
tobacco production in the country. As a result of that work, today 1,000 
families grow alternative crops such as corn and beans instead of tobacco. 
The NTCP was gaining ground, and demand for action was growing. 
Team members felt that they had to take advantage of the favorable polit- 
ical climate created by a succession of ministers who were at least not 
against tobacco control action, if not explicitly for it. Above all, they 
wanted to act while Marcos Moraes was director of INCA. He strongly 
supported public health initiatives and was interested in moving tobacco 
control forward. 
The team recognized the need to consolidate the process of creating part- 
nerships and attracting qualified people with varied professional back- 
grounds to the program. With this goal in mind, in 1994 INCA organized 
the First National Congress on Tobacco Use, with the support of FUNASA 
and the CCCTB. Over 400 people attended the meeting, including politi- 
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cians, Catholic Church leaders, lawyers, teachers, physicians, nurses, psy- 
chologists, and media professionals. During the congress, the WHO 
awarded INCA the Tobacco or Health Prize for its work on tobacco control. 
As a result of the congress, a partnership among the main health pro- 
fessional associations began. Meetings were held in 1996 and 1999. In 
2000, 21 associations met and produced the Consensus on the Treatment of 
Tobacco Users, which INCA published in 2001 and is distributing to health 
professionals across the country. The Consensus was the first document 
published in Brazil that provided a technical guide for health profession- 
als who want to help smokers quit (Ministry of Health, INCA, and CON- 
PREV 2001a). 
Throughout the 1990s, tobacco control events became stronger and 
more frequent, with the yearly celebrations of World No Tobacco Day 
(May 31) and the National Day Against Tobacco (August 29). The 
National Day Against Tobacco, which promotes a link between sports, 
arts, and not smoking, has become more and more popular across the 
country. The NTCP team at INCA coordinates the central production of all 
publications and advertisements with the aim of improving communica- 
tion through the use of a single message and image. 
Restricting Tobacco Advertising and Promotion 
At the end of 1994 the NTCP team handed the health minister a daring 
initiative—a proposed bill banning all direct and indirect advertising and 
promotion of tobacco products. The bill would also require that packages 
of tobacco products display the Ministry of Health's six rotating health 
warnings. 
When the proposed bill arrived in Congress, an intense debate about its 
constitutionality erupted between the government on one side and the 
tobacco industry and its allies (advertising professionals and representa- 
tives of television and radio advertisers) on the other. The industry and its 
allies argued that the bill was a crime against freedom of information. The 
NTCP team welcomed the debate because it provided additional public- 
ity about the harmful effects of tobacco use. 
The outcome was weaker legislation (Law 477/1995) that merely 
restricted tobacco advertising to the hours between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. and 
included less assertive warnings on cigarette packs. For example, the 
word "may" was added to the warning about heart attacks so that instead 
of stating "Tobacco causes heart attacks," it read "Tobacco may cause 
heart attacks." 
Tobacco control measures in the 1990s were not as strong as advocates 
would have liked, but they seem to have had an impact on cigarette con- 
sumption. Decreases in real prices in 1990—91 and between 1992 and 1994 
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should have led to an increase in consumption, as had happened between 
1983 and 1986 (a period of extremely high inflation). Figure 3.1 shows that 
consumption fell in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggesting that the 
usual effect of lower prices was counteracted by other factors such as 
health warnings on cigarette packs, limits on indoor smoking, and restric- 
tions on tobacco advertising (Silva and others 1999). 
Economic Measures Considered 
In 1995 the NTCP team decided that it was time to consider adding eco- 
nomic measures to existing tobacco control efforts. Published evidence 
from other countries indicated that an increase in prices would lead to a 
decrease in tobacco consumption. Health Minister Adib Jatene ordered an 
econometric study to evaluate the impact of a price change on consump- 
tion and supply in Brazil. The study provided the NTCP team and other 
tobacco control players with the information needed to coax the financial 
and economic sector to work with them. 
In the meantime, worried about the contents of tobacco products sold 
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brands to Canada for content analysis. NTCP staff compared the results 
with limits for tar, nicotine, and other components set by countries where 
the contents of tobacco products were controlled. The Brazilian cigarettes 
exceeded most limits. 
Both the econometric study and the content analysis proved valuable 
in 1999 when they were used to support the inclusion of tobacco in the list 
of substances regulated by the National Sanitary Vigilance Agency 
(ANVISA), the Brazilian counterpart of the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis- 
tration. Both studies and their results were summarized in Brazilian Ciga- 
rettes: Analyses and Proposals to Reduce Consumption (Silva and others 1999). 
The States Become Involved 
The NTCP team knew that its activities had to be improved and expanded 
if the program were to succeed. These efforts depended, as usual, on polit- 
ical decisions; policymakers and decisionmakers had to be committed to 
the program. Accordingly, at the end of 1995 the NTCP team proposed 
that the health secretaries of all the Brazilian states be invited to the 
NTCP's annual evaluation and planning meeting. The meeting, chaired 
by Health Minister Jatene, was held during the national meeting of the 
State Health Secretaries Council. It included the first appraisal of NTCP 
management in the states and a presentation of the program's needs for 
resources for local action. 
This was a historic moment: tobacco control finally became part of the 
health agenda in all the states. An agreement was reached in which finan- 
cial resources were transferred from the central to the local governments. 
Those resources could be used only for a work plan developed and assessed 
annually by the states and INCA together and supervised by INCA. 
Implementing Decentralization 
The increased involvement of the states reinforced the NTCP team's com- 
mitment to decentralization. To be successful, the program had to reach 
people across the country, but Brazil's huge area and large population cre- 
ated a challenge. The NTCP team took advantage of the existing network 
of the Ministry of Health Management System to develop a decentralized 
program for tobacco activities. 
In 1996 NTCP team members gave management training courses to staff 
from all 27 state health secretariats and 300 municipal health secretariats. 
This helped develop a large, well-trained national workforce at the local 
level. That 300 municipalities were willing to allocate funds and to send 
their staff for training was an indication of the demand for the courses and 
of commitment across the country. The relatively large numbers of people 
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involved helped persuade policymakers and decisionmakers to allocate 
federal funds to build capacity for local NTCP staff and other agents. Since 
1997, training courses have been held all over the country. 
Two books have been written about the experience: Basis for the Imple- 
mentation of a Tobacco Control Program (Goldfarb and others 1996) and Prac- 
tical Guidelines for the Implementation of a Tobacco Control Program (Silva and 
others 1998a). The local health secretariats use these books to prepare 
courses and train staff. In addition, the WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, now 
coordinated by Vera L. da Costa e Silva, uses these texts and the method- 
ology they describe for similar actions in other countries around the world. 
INCA Becomes a WHO Collaborating Center 
Recognizing the need to encourage new people to take part in the NTCP, 
INCA supported the state of Ceará in northeastern Brazil when, in 1996, the 
state hosted the Second National Congress on Tobacco Use. This congress 
had twice as many participants as the first one, held in 1994, and it estab- 
lished the basis for a National System for the Evaluation and Surveillance 
of Tobacco Control. Since 1996, the congress has been held in different 
regions. Each congress produces a document, "Final Recommendations," 
that establishes the basis for further action on tobacco control in Brazil. 
At the 1996 congress INCA's director, Marcos Moraes, announced an 
expansion of the responsibilities of NTCP staff. Within their ambit would 
be the National Coordination of Tobacco Control and Primary Cancer Pre- 
vention (CONTAPP), which included the NTCP and other prevention 
programs for cancer risk factors. 
At the end of 1996 Brazil was designated a WHO Collaborating Center 
for the Tobacco or Health Program. With this move, INCA had achieved 
both national and international importance: it was now responsible for 
providing information on the WHO Tobacco or Health Program to Brazil 
and beyond—to Latin America, and to Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking 
countries all over the world. 
The national coordination bulletin Tobacco News became a key tool for 
INCA in fulfilling this mandate. Published in Portuguese since 1992 and 
in English and in Spanish since 1994, Tobacco News was distributed to 100 
institutions and individuals around the world and to 19 Latin American 
countries, in addition to 10,000 subscribers in Brazil. In 1996 its scope 
was widened to include other risk factors. It was also used to set out the 
guidelines for the Collaborating Center's activities. Another publication, 
Data and Facts, was created in 1999 to communicate news about tobacco 
issues in Brazil and arc)und the world, and about the NTCP's actions dur- 
ing the negotiations for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). 
GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP IN TOBACCO CONTROL 49 
In 1996 INCA began the first of a series of research projects to support 
its tobacco control efforts. The first research study evaluated a pilot pro- 
ject on educational interventions in four schools in Rio de Janeiro city. The 
pilot project was designed to provide experience and to test materials for 
the National School-Based Health Knowledge (Saber Saüde) Program. In 
2000 an analysis of the project's research results was presented in a pub- 
lic health master's degree thesis, which demonstrated that the interven- 
tion significantly reduced tobacco experimentation among students 
(Goldfarb 2000). 
More International Involvement 
From November 1996 on, 12 professionals were on the staff of CONTAPP 
(which included the NTCP). In addition to the four physicians who had 
worked there from the beginning and another physician, they included a 
lawyer, a teacher, a chemist, a psychologist, a nutritionist, a nurse, and an 
epidemiologist. Attracted by the dimensions of the NTCP and the avail- 
ability of NTCP/INCA facilities and staff support, two major events took 
place in Rio de Janeiro in 1998: the annual meeting of CLACCTA and the 
Seminar for an Agenda on Tobacco Control Priority Research for Latin 
America and the Caribbean Islands. 
The first event brought together representatives from 19 countries and 
from the CDC, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the 
WHO, and the American Heart Association. CONTAPP staff took the 
opportunity to present Brazil's tobacco control activities and plans in 
detail. This led to discussions of the possibility of using the Brazilian 
experience to develop pilot studies in other countries throughout the 
region. 
The second event, supported and chaired by Research for Inter- 
national Tobacco Control (RITC)—a secretariat of the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada—brought together 
researchers from a variety of institutions. As a result of their participa- 
tion, many of these institutions adopted tobacco control as a priority 
action item (RITC 1998). 
Research Continues 
Research on tobacco-related topics continued on several fronts. In 1998 
the "Study on the Impact of Tobacco Use on Death by Heart Attack among 
Women Aged between 35 and 59 Years in Rio de Janeiro" was the subject 
of a doctoral thesis in public health that showed a positive association 
between tobacco use and myocardial infarction among women in the 
studied population (Silva 1999). 
50 LuI5A M. DA COSTA E SILVA GOLDFARB 
To expand research efforts, the Ministry of Health, through INCA, 
began developing research links with universities. In 1998 a partnership 
with Johns Hopkins University in the United States was signed to carry 
out a study on smoking behavior, passive smoking, and the determining 
factors for nicotine levels in saliva in Rio de Janeiro. The study was com- 
pleted at the end of 2002. Preliminary data show a drop in smoking preva- 
lence in Rio among adults (age 15 years and older) from 30 percent in 1989 
to 21 percent in 2002. The reduction is strongest among the 16—24 age 
group and is larger for men than for women. Of the smokers interviewed, 
85 percent were aware that passive smoke causes harm; 53 percent sup- 
ported a total smoking ban in restaurants; 70 percent supported a ban on 
all advertising; and 76 percent supported a ban on sports sponsorship by 
the tobacco industry. 
With a view to stimulating research, the NTCP team began reserving 
part of its budget for studies within the states to evaluate local educa- 
tional interventions in schools, health units, and workplaces. This initia- 
tive has had limited success so far because it has been difficult to find 
qualified professionals at the local level to conduct the evaluations. 
In 1999 NTCP staff broadened the scope of research to investigate other 
health issues in addition to tobacco. Experts from different areas were 
invited to formulate questions for the National Household Survey on Risk 
Behavior and Related Morbidity from Noncommunicable Diseases, 
funded by the World Bank and by two institutions associated with the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health: FUNASA and the National Centre for Epi- 
demiology. Data collection began in 2002, and preliminary data will be 
available in 2004. 
Also in 1999, the NTCP tobacco control pilot project in workplaces was 
evaluated and described in a master's thesis in occupational health 
(Feitosa 1999). This study supported the findings of previous research 
showing a positive relationship between educational interventions and 
reduction in tobacco use. It formed the basis for the NTCP's workplace 
programs. 
In 2000 another study evaluated the Tobacco-Free INCA Program, 
designed to make INCA's buildings tobacco free. This study, which also 
showed a positive relationship between educational interventions and 
reduction of tobacco use, formed the basis for NTCP programs in health 
service units (Ministry of Health 2000b). 
Support for strengthening the program's outreach to health profes- 
sionals came from a master's thesis in public health on physicians' atti- 
tudes toward tobacco use, tobacco users, and their efforts to stop smoking 
(Cavalcante 2001). Physicians' attitudes and preconceptions about 
tobacco use, its health effects, and its addictiveness were shown to affect 
their support for and use of training and related materials. 
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The commitment to research continues. Important surveys were carried 
out in 2002: the National Survey on Tobacco Use among students, sponsored 
by a partnership between the Brazilian states and INCA/Ministry of Health, 
and the CDC/PAHO/ WHO Global Youth Tobacco Use Survey in 13 Brazil- 
ian municipalities (1 funded by PAHO and the WHO, 5 by INCA, and the 
rest by the Brazilian Health Ministry and by state health secretaries). 
Political Will Brings Increased Support 
With the CLACCTA and IDRC events in Rio de Janeiro and the ongoing 
national activities, 1998 had been an intense year, but it still had a surprise 
in store. In December INCA's new director, Jacob Kliegerman, transferred 
early cancer detection to the NTCP team. Already in charge of programs 
for other cancer risk factors, this small team now had to balance its 
expanded responsibilities with those of the NTCP. Vera L. da Costa e Silva 
became the general coordinator of all prevention and detection programs, 
and the author took over coordination of risk factor prevention, in which 
the NTCP was involved. 
The NTCP team members recognized that the time was right for greater 
action: they had physical facilities, were highly motivated, and continued 
to have the support of INCA's director. Above all, they had the health min- 
ister, José Serra, on their side. Serra was more than supportive: he became 
NTCP's leader and canvassed the president for his support as well. 
Stronger Laws on Tobacco 
From 1998 on, the framework of laws controlling tobacco and tobacco use 
broadened as a result of Serra's efforts (Ministry of Health, INCA, and 
CONPREV 2001d, 2001e). The first was Ministry of Health Ruling 2,818 in 
1998, which banned smoking in the ministry building. A crucial next step 
was the approval in January 1999 of Federal Law 9,782, which established 
the ANVISA. With the creation of this agency, Brazil became a world 
leader in regulating and controlling the production, content, and adver- 
tising of tobacco products. 
Also in 1999, Ministry of Health Ruling 695 mandated new, more 
assertive warnings to be published on cigarette packages. Two phrases 
were particularly striking: 
• "Nicotine is a drug and causes addiction"—which represented a major 
victory against the industry 
• "Smoking causes sexual impotence"—which put Brazil, only the sec- 
ond country in the world to adopt this warning, in the forefront of anti- 
tobacco action. 
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Next, ANVISA Resolution 320/99, requiring annual registry of tobacco 
products and reporting by the industry, was proposed. Companies would 
be required to pay a fee for each brand they produced. The money would 
have been used for funding tobacco control initiatives such as the Labora- 
tory for Tobacco Analysis and the Centre for Clinical Studies on Nicotine 
Addition in INCA. This resolution was later replaced by Resolution 105. 
The National Commission on Tobacco Use 
In August 1999 Decree 3,136 created the National Commission on Tobacco 
Use (NCTU) to prepare Brazil for the coming world negotiations on the 
FCTC. The ministries represented on the commission are Inland Revenue, 
Health, Education, Development, Industry and Trade, Work Relations and 
Employment, Agriculture and Supply, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. Each 
minister nominates a representative. The president of the commission is the 
health minister, and the executive secretary is from INCA. By involving all 
these ministries—not only the Ministry of Health—the NTCP became a 
stronger program, with many ministries contributing to a common tobacco 
control effort, supported and implemented by states and municipalities 
across the nation. 
Since its establishment, the NCTU has listened to many sectors of society, 
including tobacco proponents, to gather as much information as possible to 
support Brazilian actions at home and abroad. Its agenda includes important 
tobacco control issues within Brazil, such as a provisional measure to ban 
tobacco vending machines, which make it much easier for children and 
teenagers to buy cigarettes. One way that the tobacco industry tries to increase 
tobacco consumption is to make buying tobacco products as easy as possible. 
The NCTU has held regular meetings to analyze its white paper for the 
FCTC that establishes the basis for the Brazilian position at meetings of 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body. It has also met with the Brazil- 
ian Tobacco Growers Association (AFUBRA), at that group's request, to 
discuss the growers' concerns about the FCTC (Ministry of Health INCA, 
and CONPREV 2001f). 
In August 2000 the NCTU held the first public hearing on the FCTC. 
The hearing was designed both to inform the public and to receive input 
about Brazil's participation in the FCTC. Over 15 days, 30 institutions and 
interested individuals, including representatives from tobacco-related 
business, presented their interventions in favor of or against the 
FCTC /WHO document. 
Swift Action and Strong Support: A Legislative Victory 
Studies carried out abroad have confirmed the effectiveness of a compre- 
hensive ban on tobacco product advertising in reducing tobacco con- 
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sumption, especially among young people (Saffer 2000). In 2000 Brazilian 
society was ready to take this step, and the Ministry of Health decided to 
present an antitobacco bill to the Congress. The NTCP team knew that 
dealing with the tobacco industry would be a tough task. The industry 
had reacted fiercely whenever faced with restrictive legislation in other 
countries. Experiences such as the rejection by the U.S. Congress of pro- 
posed changes to legislation in 1988 suggested that rapid action would be 
the best way to get changes through. 
Information on the new tobacco control strategy had to be provided 
quickly to key individuals and to the Brazilian people. The NTCP team 
focused on preparing to neutralize industry's attempts to interfere with 
the planned legislation. In May 2000 the health minister sent to Congress 
Bill 3,156, which would limit the advertising of tobacco products to the 
point of sale only. The action had begun. 
Canvassing Public Support 
To gain public support for the new bill, the Ministry of Health released the 
television movie Traficante (Trafficker), together with outdoor display 
advertisements and advertisements in the main Brazilian magazines. The 
campaign had enormous public impact. The movie showed the correla- 
tion between nicotine consumption and use of other drugs, and the simi- 
larity between drug dealers and the tobacco industry. At the same time, 
the ministry sponsored the exhibition Seeing through the Smoke, designed 
to attract public attention to the tobacco issue, promote discussion, and 
inform people, especially teenagers. The exhibition included publicity 
films, sculptures, videos, photos, and interactive installations in São 
Paulo, Brasilia, and Rio de Janeiro. 
Soon afterward, the Ministry of Health released the movie Jornalista 
(Journalist), in which a real person, a journalist, talked about his legs being 
amputated because of thrombosis caused by his dependence on tobacco. 
The ministry's bold actions stirred enormous public interest. The press fol- 
lowed the issue closely and interviewed NTCP staff, INCA's director, and the 
health minister many times in the months before Congress voted on the bill. 
To assess the campaign's impact, people in 100 municipalities were sur- 
veyed about the movie Traficante; 97 percent approved of it. In a national 
sample, 73 percent said they knew of the government's campaign against 
smoking, and 94 percent approved of the comparison between tobacco 
and drugs. For the movie Jornalista, public recall was almost 90 percent, 
one of the highest ever for a government prevention campaign (Ministry 
of Health and ASCOM 2000). 
The industry reacted noisily, saying that it was surprised both by the 
government's action and by the content of the bill and that the law was 
too radical. It looked to advertising agencies and the public for support, 
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and it lobbied members of Congress to include alcohol in the law. Health 
Minister Serra responded quickly by saying that those who wanted alco- 
hol included in the law should be considered tobacco industry lobbyists. 
That was enough to defuse any attempt by members of Congress to sup- 
port the countercampaign. 
The Importance of Partnerships 
The government now moved to enlist broad support by developing a con- 
tact network of 3,000 institutions. Information was sent out through the 
Internet, and handouts (similar to those produced by the European 
Union) were distributed that spelled out why tobacco advertising and 
sponsorship should be prohibited. INCA's Internet site included a discus- 
sion space that received about 250 comments and queries every month. E- 
mail addresses for members of Congress were publicized, and citizens 
sent them thousands of messages. 
An interesting partnership was set up with the nongovernmental orga- 
nization (NGO) Rede de Desenvolvimento Humano (REDEH), a collec- 
tion of 5,000 pro-woman and citizen organizations. About 350 community 
radio stations belonging to CEMINA, a member of REDEH, aired spots 
warning about health damage from tobacco use and giving information 
on the proposed law. 
The Brazilian Societies of Cardiology and Pediatrics, the Federal Med- 
ical Council, the Federal Council of Dentists, the Federal Nutrition Coun- 
cil, and the Brazilian Medical Academy all showed their support for the 
law by making public statements on its urgency and importance. Many 
international institutions also supported the law because of Brazil's posi- 
tion as a major tobacco producer and exporter and because of its potential 
to serve as an example to other countries. 
Industry Action 
Meanwhile, the tobacco industry and advertising agencies stepped up 
their actions. Tobacco proponents said they were puzzled by the "sensa- 
tionalistic and radical way" the government was dealing with the matter. 
They claimed that Brazil's constitution guaranteed freedom of commer- 
cial expression for the tobacco industry. 
The industry sent letters to 1,400 radio stations and 200 television sta- 
tions condemning the ban on tobacco advertising and claiming that "to for- 
bid [advertising] is to deny freedom of expression, the right to information, 
and consumer's freedom of choice." They recommended that the media 
spread a message emphasizing freedom of creation and expression—the 
"oxygen of publicity." 
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The media generally tried to present both sides of the discussion. But 
not everyone in the media had the same clear understanding of what was 
at stake. One newspaper published a message favoring tobacco and stat- 
ing that "the president of Souza Cruz [Brazil's major cigarette producer 
and the Brazilian arm of British American Tobacco] defends the freedom 
of the market and maintains that the government ought not to interfere in 
people's lives or force them to be happy, healthy, or good." 
In response, the NTCP/INCA distributed to the media a statement say- 
ing, "There is no freedom without responsibility. Freedom to advertise 
cigarettes may be restricted constitutionally for health reasons, particu- 
larly because it concerns a product that kills half its consumers and uses 
misleading advertising messages." 
To widen the focus, two public debates were organized before the 
Commission of Constitution and Justice and the Commission of Social 
Affairs in the Brazilian Senate. The debates between lobbyists on both 
sides revolved mainly around freedom of expression, but the economy 
was also a key element. AFUBRA made a brief presentation and asked 
questions. 
As the controversy boiled, the industry promoted a new strategy to 
bypass the existing law that prohibited smoking indoors: "smokers' 
lounges," with comfortable armchairs and complex air conditioning sys- 
tems that were supposed to extract smoke and clean the air. (Considerable 
evidence shows that these air conditioning systems are not effective in 
protecting health; see Tobacco Free Kids 2001.) The promotion of smokers' 
lounges used images that associated smoking with a comfortable lifestyle. 
On December 13, 2000, the tobacco control bill passed the Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies, and on December 27 President Fernando Hen- 
rique Cardoso signed Law 10,167. Tobacco advertising now could appear 
only inside sales points. The industry reacted by trying to increase sales 
to compensate for those lost as a result of the new law. A new marketing 
strategy focused publicity at sales points, the only places it was still 
allowed. The industry increased the number of sales points and 
redesigned some of them as "tobacco shops," a new concept featuring 
attractive layouts and displays of antique and modern tobacco-related 
devices that appeal to art appreciation and curiosity. Sometimes a pipe 
maker demonstrates her craft. (Most pipe makers are women.) 
The National Commission Deals with Rumors 
The passage of Law 10,167 was a victory for tobacco control advocates, 
but it did not mean the battle was won. Skirmishes continued regarding 
many points. A crucial moment for the NCTU came in March 2001 dur- 
ing one of its routine meetings in southern Brazil. NCTU members 
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planned to use the occasion to meet with 230 local people, including 
farmers, university teachers, agricultural technicians, tobacco industry 
workers, and members of syndicates, trade unions, and religious congre- 
gations, to discuss issues raised by the FCTC, particularly those related 
to alternative crops. 
At first, the meeting did not go as planned, as rumors circulated that the 
government was going to ban tobacco growing. The International Tobacco 
Growers Association released a letter that presented an inaccurate analysis 
of the FCTC's intentions, causing great anxiety among workers in the 
region. At the time, the author was executive secretary of the NCTU, and 
she produced a series of papers to explain the government's position. The 
media became involved, and the event had greater repercussions than 
expected, but the message got through: Brazil was planning for a future of 
lower tobacco demand. Tobacco control measures around the world, fol- 
lowing FCTC recommendations and actions, would cause demand for 
tobacco products to drop, and supply would be affected. Because Brazil is 
a major producer and exporter of tobacco, it had to anticipate this process 
so that adjustments could be as smooth as possible. The government was 
seeking ways of gradually substituting other crops for tobacco. 
These arguments neutralized the rumors, and the farmers became less 
wary of the government representatives. They finally joined the discus- 
sion on what kind of help they needed and whether direct technical, 
financial, or operational support should be provided. The NCTTJ sug- 
gested that farmers, industry, and the government work together to 
answer these questions. The commission had turned its detractors' 
attacks to its advantage (Ministry of Health and others 2001). 
More Tobacco Control Legislation 
On March 28, 2001, ANVISA published Resolution 46. Among other pro- 
visions, the resolution sets maximum levels of tar, nicotine, and carbon 
monoxide allowed in cigarette smoke released by tobacco products sold 
in Brazil, which would bring them into line with European Union limits 
(table 3.1). 
Resolution 46 also requires that every cigarette package carry informa- 
tion on the levels of these substances and the warning, "There are no safe 
levels for the consumption of these substances." The resolution was the 
first in the world to forbid the inclusion of any descriptive words or 
phrases such as "light," "ultra light," "low levels," "mild," "soft," "mod- 
erate levels," "high levels," or any others that might mislead consumers 
about the concentration of the listed substances. Through heavy lobbying, 
the industry succeeded in postponing the application of the law from 2001 
to January 2002. At the time, the reason the delay was requested was 
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unclear, but eventually it became obvious that the companies wanted the 
delay so they could launch new marketing campaigns using new package 
designs, colors, and layouts that would be associated with "light" ciga- 
rettes. After the prohibition came into effect, they could use these designs 
and colors to convey the idea without using the actual word "light." 
On World No Tobacco Day, May 31, 2001, Health Minister Serra sent 
Congress another regulation toughening the legislation against tobacco 
advertising. Provisional measure 2,134/30 was signed and became effec- 
tive in January 2002. Following Canada's example, the measure requires 
that the warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements be accompa- 
nied by a picture showing graphically what they mean. 
At the end of that highly productive year, Resolution 105 was pub- 
lished. It required that all tobacco companies—manufacturers, importers, 
and exporters—be registered and submit annual reports to ANVISA on 
their tobacco products, the products' compositions, and sales and pro- 
duction levels. 
Education: The Basis of the NTCP 
The history of Brazil's tobacco control efforts shows how a steady buildup 
of commitment and action can lead to success. Together, education and 
legislation form the foundation of this achievement. 
The "Cascade" System for Training 
Early on in the struggle, NTCP team members recognized that they alone 
could not provide all the training needed to keep the program moving 
forward. The team therefore developed a cascade system to multiply its 
training efforts. The federal team (that is, the NTCP team) trains the staffs 
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of state health and education secretariats, who then train staff from 
municipal health and education secretariats. They, in turn, train profes- 
sional workers at workplaces—schools, health units, and so on—and 
these professionals use their training to reach out to the general public. 
The NTCP training prepares local state and municipal agents for action 
at four activity levels. This staged set of actions, combined with the cas- 
cade training scheme, guarantees a network of capable people in the 
health and education systems. They work together within a framework 
that supports all the activities needed to advance tobacco control. The 
four levels are as follows: 
Level I 
• Deciding on the local political, physical, and administrative structures 
for tobacco control initiatives 
• Planning and evaluating local programs and activities • Conducting public and media relations and keeping the tobacco con- 
trol theme on the media agenda • Giving general information talks on tobacco and the implications of its 
use and production • Coordinating tobacco control activities at the local level 
• Learning epidemiology basics 
Level 2 
• Within the local partnership of health and education secretariats, 
developing and coordinating continuous educational actions through- 
out the year across three community channels—schools, health units, 
and workplaces—with agents from the Family Health Program and the 
Community Agents for Health Program 
Level 3 
• In partnership with those responsible for epidemiology, carrying out 
surveys and research projects and implementing local initiatives of the 
National System of Evaluation and Surveillance on Tobacco 
Level 4 
• Encouraging the development of, proposing, and lobbying for ade- 
quate legislation and economic measures • Providing techniques and support materials for the treatment of nico- 
tine addiction 
By 2002, teams in 26 states and the Federal District (Brasilia) had been 
trained and were training others within levels 1 and 2. The work is being 
carried out in 3,150 cities—almost 60 percent of all cities in the country— 
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by 12,239 trained professionals (Ministry of Health, INCA, and CONPREV 
2001b). Training for level 3 began in 2000 in all states and in Brasilia. 
Level 4 training began in 2001 within the Help Your Patient Stop Smok- 
ing Program in five regions of the country. NTCP staff set priorities among 
routine counseling, group, and individual sessions according to the Con- 
sensus on Treatment of Tobacco Users (Ministry of Health, INCA, and CON- 
PREV 2001a). To provide better support for these actions, the Tobacco 
Studies Laboratory Division at INCA's Centre for Clinical Studies on Nico- 
tine Addiction (CCSNA) is studying the use of drugs to help people stop 
smoking. Through clinical trials, it will investigate the efficacy of nicotine 
replacement therapy, on its own and combined with behavioral interven- 
tions. The information from the studies will be used in deciding whether 
to subsidize public programs that support quitting smoking. 
Also as part of level 4, at the beginning of 2001 a national plan for encour- 
aging legislative strategies and actions was drawn up. The plan helps local 
advocates stimulate the creation of laws, promote lobbying, monitor legis- 
lation, and reinforce tobacco control legislation at the local level. 
Tobacco Control Education in the Workplace, 
in Schools, and in Health Units 
The most popular educational actions are the campaigns and celebrations, 
which are designed primarily to provoke, inform, and promote discussion. 
But these events are not enough to create the changes in attitudes, habits, 
and behavior needed to cut tobacco use. Continuous day-to-day actions 
are essential in health units, workplaces, and schools. In Brazil these 
actions are supported by experiences from the pilot studies mentioned ear- 
lier and compiled in the manuals Implementing NTCP in Health Units, Imple- 
menting NTCP in Workplaces, and Implementing NTCP in Schools. 
The program in health units and workplaces aims first to achieve a 
tobacco-free environment through the Tobacco-Free Places Program. It 
then supports people who want to quit smoking through the Helping 
Your Patient Stop Smoking Program. These programs are led by health 
professionals, who are trained to become "multipliers." They implement 
the program inside their institutions and train others, who then train staff 
members and even clients. The training helps people understand their 
responsibilities as role models and how this relates to day-to-day behav- 
ior, particularly in health units. Respect for others is emphasized, with the 
aim of achieving a better quality of life for everybody. 
In the workplace and in health units. In early 2002 the Tobacco-Free 
Places Program was already under way in 3,150 cities, and 1,042 compa- 
nies were registered in the workplace program. Of these, 358 were taking 
action, and 83 had finished the process and were totally tobacco free. 
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Among health units, 530 were putting the program into practice (Min- 
istry of Health, INCA, and CONPREV 2001b). 
In schools. The statistics on first use of tobacco by children and adoles- 
cents at the beginning of this chapter highlight the need for antitobacco 
programs aimed at young people. The Saber Saüde health knowledge 
program was developed to meet this need. With its emphasis on the qual- 
ity of life and health promotion, the program covers more than tobacco 
control issues; it also deals with alcohol, exposure to sun, diet, physical 
activity, sex, and occupational hazards. 
Under the program, trained teachers develop classroom activities as 
they would for other subjects. The activities are related to the school's 
overall community life and to students' interests. Modules such as "The 
Smoke-Free School" can be adapted to each school. These program activ- 
ities form themes across all disciplines, as required by the national cur- 
ricula of the Ministry of Education: health, environment/ecology, ethics, 
citizenship/politics, and sexuality (Silva and others 1998a; Goldfarb and 
Monteiro 1999). 
The Saber Saüde program has been welcomed by educators. National 
implementation began in 1998, and by 2002, 4,853 workers had been 
trained at the state education secretariats in 2,247 cities. By January 2002, 
5,251 schools were registered in the program, and 2,983 of them had 
already trained between 70 and 100 percent of their teachers, for a total of 
62,024 teachers. These teachers instruct 1,227,358 students in grades 1 to 8 
(Ministry of Health, INCA, and CONPREV 2001c). Although this is not a 
huge number when compared with the total school population, it is still 
very encouraging. Many technical schools and universities are adapting 
the program for their own use, but the results of these initiatives are not 
yet available. 
Legislative Action: Education's Partner 
Education alone would be a slow road to success in tobacco control. 
Together, education and legislation move tobacco control efforts more 
rapidly toward their goal. In Brazil legislative actions take place in the 
wake of and in support of education initiatives. Education, in turn, sup- 
ports legislation by teaching people about the law, why it exists, and how 
it is enforced. It also raises awareness that results in increased advocacy 
and support for tobacco control. 
Legislation-related actions include: 
• Creating and updating a database on tobacco legislation now in force 
and planned across the country • Monitoring voting by political representatives 
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• Providing information to political representatives 
• Researching technical information 
• Providing advice and comments on proposed bills 
• Lobbying. 
The biggest challenge is informing people about the law and encour- 
aging them both to obey it and to help enforce it. Helping people become 
better citizens involves changing attitudes and behavior. 
Legislative actions, like educational ones, are carried out by the three lev- 
els of government: federal, state, and city (municipality). In 2000 alone the 
Congress sent 59 tobacco control bills to the NTCP for analysis. NTCP staff 
provide clear technical and political information to ensure that the pro- 
posed law supports public health interests. Feedback from the NTCP can 
result in changes being made to a bill or can even lead to its withdrawal. 
At the state level, 72 laws regulating the publicity and consumption of 
tobacco have been passed, and at the municipal level, 331. Of the state and 
municipal laws, 73 percent have been approved since the NTCP's estab- 
lishment (Ministry of Health, INCA, and CONPREV 2001d). 
The Other Side of the Picture: 
What Stimulates Consumption? 
Brazilian tobacco advocates have made great progress in controlling 
tobacco use, despite the opposition of a huge international industry. The 
tobacco industry has invested an enormous amount of money in direct and 
indirect tobacco advertising to entice people to smoke. In 1994 US$6.6 bil- 
lion was spent on direct tobacco publicity in Brazil (Nielsen Institute 1996). 
Indirect tobacco advertising in Brazil and elsewhere in the world has 
associated tobacco use with sports, arts, music, popular artists, fashion 
shows, and celebrities by sponsoring events that involve these activities and 
people. Events related to education, ecology, and environmental protection 
have also become targets of tobacco sponsorship. In this way, the industry 
seeks to associate tobacco products with healthy activities to create a posi- 
tive public image. For example, in 1999 tobacco company—sponsored pro- 
grams Hortas Escolares (School Greenery Gardens) and Clube da Arvore 
(Tree Club) reached 3,700 rural schools, 120,000 students, and 5,000 teachers 
in the southern state of Santa Catarina. The programs praise the benefits of 
healthy foods and the importance of protecting the environment and pre- 
serving nature, and they teach students how to grow a school garden or 
make a reforestation camp (Souza Cruz 1999a). 
A similar program by AFUBRA, A Vida Verde (Life is Green), dis- 
tributes seeds and teaches agriculture students how to plant them 
(AFUBRA 2000). In 1999 a partnership between AFUBRA, the Tobacco 
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Industry Syndicate (SINDIFUMO), and other institutions created a new 
program, 0 Futuro Agora (The Future is Now), to train workers for jobs 
in agriculture. 
Souza Cruz, a major Brazilian tobacco company, is one of the sponsors 
of the government education program Alfabetizaçao Solidária (Support- 
ive Literacy Program) and has, through its own initiative, started the pro- 
gram Educar (Educate) to teach illiterate adults and provide technical 
training in agriculture. The company is also one of the sponsors of the 
environmental program Onda Azul (Blue Wave), which has been interna- 
tionally acknowledged and is led by the important Brazilian environmen- 
talist and popular music singer Gilberto Gil (Souza Cruz 1999b, 2001). 
Another campaign, directly focused on younger people, produced 
advertisements with a double meaning: "Smoking after 18. That's Legal!" 
(Fumar so com 18 anos. Isso legal!) and "Smoking? Only with an Iden- 
tity Card" (Fumar? So corn carteira de identidade) (Goldfarb and Mon- 
teiro 1999). The campaign presented itself as being supportive of the leg- 
islation that prohibits cigarette sales to teenagers younger than age 18, but 
in fact it was part of a worldwide campaign by the tobacco company 
Phillip Morris to reinforce the perception among young people that smok- 
ing is an adult activity—a prime reason for its attraction for youths. 
All these publicity campaigns reveal the industry's keen interest in 
establishing a positive social image, particularly among young people. 
This interest coincided with the implementation of the NTCP's Saber 
Saüde program, which is aimed at teachers and students and focuses on 
health and the environment. 
Low Prices Encourage Consumption 
The low price of cigarettes in Brazil is another factor that has encouraged 
consumption. As shown in figure 3.2, Brazilian cigarette prices are rela- 
tively low by world standards, even though tax rates on cigarettes are rel- 
atively high (Sunley, Yurekli, and Chaloupka 2000: 421; Guindon, Tobin, 
and Yach 2002). 
Studies in Europe, Canada, and the United States, as well as in Brazil, 
show that a 10 percent price rise causes a 3 to 6 percent decline in con- 
sumption. Among teenagers, the impact is even greater and may be as large 
as 14 percent in Brazil and 23 percent in Canada (Sweanor 1992; Townsend, 
Roderick, and Cooper 1994; European Union 1995; Silva and others 1999). 
Silva and others (1999) presented data showing that cigarette con- 
sumption doubled between 1970 and 1980, from 72.7 to 142.7 billion units. 
It described the changes in annual per capita consumption of cigarettes in 
Brazil since 1980, which has gone through several fluctuations, decreasing 
and rising with changes in real prices and incomes. 
Figure 3.2. Prices of Imported and Local-Brand Cigarettes, 
Selected Economies, March 2001 
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Figure 3.2. (continued) 
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Note: The purchasing power parity index adjusts exchange rates for the relative cost of 
living in each economy. It allows a comparison of "affordability" rather than simply 
comparing prices. 
Source: Guindon, Tobin, and Yach (2002). Reprinted from Tobacco Control 11(1): 38 
(2002), with permission of the BMJ Publishing Group. 
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Figure 3.3. Trends in Per Capita Cigarette Consumption 
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Source: Silva and others (1999). 
Among people age 15 or over, annual per capita consumption 
decreased between 1980 and 1984 because of inflation that reduced pur- 
chasing power (see figure 3.3). Between 1985 and 1986, annual per capita 
consumption returned to pre-1980 levels as a result of a decrease in the 
real price of cigarettes. In 1987 the price rose again, and, as a conse- 
quence, per capita consumption dropped the next year. In 1989 this ten- 
dency was temporarily reversed by an increase in salaries, which had 
been frozen, but in 1990 per capita cigarette consumption dropped to 
1,752. Official data implied that in 1992 the level was 1,305, but this fig- 
ure hid the consumption of smuggled cigarettes and, on a lesser scale, 
counterfeit cigarettes, which were sold at lower prices and without any 
control. Actual consumption in 1992 was estimated at about 1,370 per 
capita. Until 1999 official consumption decreased and black market con- 
sumption increased, but total per capita consumption was thought to 
have remained stable at about 1,265. Even so, it was lower than the 1986 
figure of about 1,950, leading to the conclusion that smuggling and the 
industry's massive investments in publicity had been counteracted by an 
effective tobacco control policy (Silva and others 1999; IBGE 2000; 
MDIC/SRF 2000). 
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The Role of Smuggling 
One of the challenges of measuring and combating tobacco consumption 
in Brazil has been the impact of smuggled cigarettes, which come in 
mainly from neighboring countries. Some smuggling involves "round- 
tripping," in which cigarettes are legally exported but, instead of reaching 
their alleged export destination, are smuggled back into the exporting 
country. There are no official figures, but Inland Revenue's estimates for 
1998 indicate that 58 billion cigarettes were sold on the black market. That 
figure corresponds to 40 percent of all cigarette consumption in Brazil. In 
1999 around US$800 million was lost due to tax evasion related to ciga- 
rette smuggling (Ministry of Health 1999b; AFUBRA 2000; Ministry of 
Health, INCA, and CONPREV 2001d). 
In an attempt to curb smuggling, the Inland Revenue Office in Decem- 
ber 1998 imposed a 150 percent tax on cigarette exports to South Ameri- 
can and Central American countries. Cigarette exports fell sharply, but 
soon afterward, exports of tobacco leaves rose (tobacco leaves are free of 
taxes). The number of cigarette-producing plants at sites just outside 
Brazil's borders increased (Ministry of Health, INCA, and CONPREV 
2001d; Otta 2001). This shows that it is vitally important to monitor the 
tobacco industry's behavior so that smuggling can be understood and 
prevented. Resolution 105 was designed to provide such monitoring: as 
noted above, the industry must submit annual reports to ANVISA on 
their tobacco products, the products' composition, and their sales and 
production levels. 
Lessons Learned 
Brazil's experience with tobacco control demonstrates how a public 
health program can succeed despite economic and administrative chal- 
lenges and strong resistance from commercial interests. The lessons to 
be drawn focus on the role of dedicated individuals and organizations 
in linking information, education, and legislation to create a potent force 
for change. 
The key lessons from the Brazilian experience are as follows: 
• Develop and foster public commitment to tobacco control. Without this com- 
mitment, coupled with strong leadership, the NTCP and other advo- 
cates could not have achieved as much as they have. • Use a decentralized strategy to get the message out. Brazil benefited from a 
strategy based on trainers instructing other trainers so that the message 
could be spread across the country. • Seek political support from those in power. Public commitment would 
accomplish little without the political will to sponsor legislation. 
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• Participate in partnerships with all sectors of society: professional associa- 
tions (particularly those in the health sector), the media, politicians, 
well-known artists and sports people, and religious organizations. 
These partnerships, based on respect and accurate information, were a 
great help in the process. They provided another means of getting the 
message out and helped persuade government ministers and the pres- 
ident to support tobacco control efforts. • Carry out and support research. Evaluations, prevalence surveys, econo- 
metric studies, opinion polls, political assessments, and other studies 
build a strong evidence base that allows sound decisions to be made 
and actions to be taken quickly. • Act quickly. Speed is essential in developing and approving legislation 
and educational programs and improving them. Changes should arise 
from the interaction between education and legislation. • Do not give in to industry pressures, no matter how innocuous the 
demands might seem. Agreements with the industry must be avoided; 
they only delay the adoption of new measures. There is not a second to 
be lost in this race. 
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Legislation and Applied 
Economics in the Pursuit 
of Public Health: Canada 
David Sweanor and Ken Kyle 
Over the past 20 years, Canada has accomplished a great deal in tobacco 
control and has much to be pleased about. Part of the success is the result 
of particularly effective campaigns led by health advocates, both inside 
and outside the government, and supported by a large number of impor- 
tant organizations. Also important were comprehensive tobacco control 
strategies at all levels of government, including prevention, protection, 
and cessation initiatives, as well as bold action by many politicians. The 
achievements are impressive: 
• Coordinated efforts in the 1980s to increase taxes and so reduce the 
affordability of tobacco products have contributed to significant 
declines in smoking: in 1965, 50 percent of Canadians age 15 and older 
smoked, but by 2001 the rate had dropped to 22 percent. 
• There is extensive protection from secondhand smoke in workplaces, 
in public areas, and even in restaurants and bars in some of the larger 
cities. Canada was the first country to end smoking on international 
commercial passenger flights, and Canadians played a key role in 
international efforts to remove secondhand smoke from air travel. 
• Efforts to inform consumers about the risks of smoking have led to 
groundbreaking changes in package labeling, including pictorial warn- 
ings covering half of the surface area of cigarette packages. 
• Canada has forced the disclosure of additives and many of the toxins 
in tobacco smoke and has enacted legislation to require changes in 
tobacco product design. • The impact of the decline in smoking prevalence is beginning to show 
up in lung cancer rates among Canadian males age 20 and older. Since 
2000, the number of new cases has fallen by 100 per year, from 12,200 
in 2000 to 12,000 in 2002 (Canadian Cancer Society 2002). 
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It is generally believed that Canada has achieved as much as it has 
because of particularly favorable circumstances that do not exist in other 
countries. There is, however, little basis for this assumption. Canada bat- 
tled the same obstacles—low priority for disease prevention, meager 
tobacco control resources, and general lack of interest in tobacco issues by 
government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—as faced by 
most other countries. While the accomplishments are to be applauded, it 
must be recognized that the success of the tobacco control campaign is 
also partly explained by the state of affairs 20 years ago: things were so 
bad then that significant improvements were not hard to achieve. And 
Canada still has much to work on. 
• Tobacco death rates remain very high, and with a rising population, the 
total number of smokers is about the same as when the tobacco epi- 
demic was first identified. 
• Extremely high smoking rates are still found among many segments of 
Canadian society, especially Aboriginal people. 
• Too little attention is given to helping smokers quit or otherwise reduce 
their risks. 
• Many of the individuals and organizations with mandates to reduce 
disease are still playing only minor roles in the efforts to enact healthy 
public policies on tobacco control. • Canada still produces more tobacco per capita than the United States. 
With its mixed picture, the Canadian experience provides important 
lessons, both for those in Canada who are directly involved and for those 
deciding what to do—and what not to do—in other countries. 
A Generation Gap: Before Tobacco Control 
There are many reasons for Canada's failure to make major tobacco con- 
trol inroads prior to the 1980s. Perhaps the most significant was that the 
public health community never managed to institute policies that would 
have influenced attitudes about smoking and tobacco use. For their part, 
the tobacco companies were adept at fostering strong relations with fed- 
eral and provincial governments and effectively forestalling any mea- 
sures that could have reduced sales, 
Among the obstacles in the way of tobacco control was the increasing 
affordability of cigarettes. When adjusted for inflation, the real price of cig- 
arettes decreased from the end of World War II until 1982. During those 
years the economy expanded rapidly and personal incomes rose, making 
tobacco increasingly affordable. The impact was obvious in the numbers. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Canada's per capita consumption of tobacco 
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was among the highest of any country on the planet. Canada also had the 
dubious distinction of having the highest per capita consumption among 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) coun- 
tries. Smoking among teenagers age 15—19 was extraordinarily high; in 
1979, 46 percent of this group reported being smokers, and 42 percent of 
them already smoked daily (Health Canada 1991). 
There were no legislated restrictions on tobacco advertising and no 
mandated warning on tobacco packages until 1989. The only "controls" 
on advertising and labeling were in a voluntary code of conduct that the 
tobacco industry constantly violated (NSRA 1986). 
The tobacco companies appeared to recognize early on that their con- 
tinued well-being in the face of an avalanche of damning scientific evi- 
dence was dependent on ensuring that politicians did not move deci- 
sively to curb tobacco consumption. Unlike the health groups, which at 
that time were generally absent from political discussions, the tobacco 
industry made itself heard. It had the ear of government and did its best 
to control the levers of power. 
Given that the Canadian tobacco companies have long been owned or 
controlled by large international companies, this tactic should have come 
as no surprise. The companies appear to have realized decades ago that 
if science is not your friend, you had better be sure that governments are. 
But the success of this strategy in Canada seemed to exceed even its leg- 
endary accomplishments elsewhere in the world. When, for instance, the 
U.S. surgeon general released the landmark 1964 report on smoking and 
health, which said unequivocally that smoking was the cause of an epi- 
demic of death and disease, the tobacco companies expressed little con- 
cern. Even as Judy LaMarsh, then minister of national health and wel- 
fare, stood in the House of Commons asserting that the government 
would take serious action to confront the problem, the Canadian sub- 
sidiary of Rothmans made it clear in its annual report that it saw no rea- 
son for concern (Rothmans 1964). The fact that a former prime minister 
of the country, and the former leader of the party then in power, was 
chairman of the board of Rothmans in Canada at the time may have 
influenced this stance. 
But the tobacco companies did not reach their position of effective pro- 
tection from political action against their industry by having just one for- 
mer prime minister in a position of influence. Several former cabinet min- 
isters and senior government advisers have taken jobs with tobacco 
companies. (Indeed, just recently three senators were simultaneously sit- 
ting in Parliament and on tobacco company boards of directors.) Other 
"political kingpins in waiting" were appointed to tobacco company posi- 
tions, and tobacco manufacturers were in politically significant areas such 
as Montréal and Québec City. Tobacco farmers in Canada were also a 
74 DAVID SWEANOR AND KEN KYLE 
powerful political force, using their own government-supported research 
and their influence on export and marketing boards. 
The 1980s: A Decade of Change 
A combination of circumstances in the early 1980s fundamentally 
changed the face of tobacco control in Canada. In hindsight, this change 
might look revolutionary, particularly when compared with the inaction 
of earlier years, but in fact it was a rather slow and sometimes painful 
evolutionary process. 
A Lesson in Applied Economics 
Relatively high inflation in the 1970s caused both the federal and the 
provincial governments to guard against the erosion of their revenue base 
by increasing taxes. Both levels of government indexed some taxes to the 
retail price of specific products, including cigarettes. Each tax increase by 
one level of government stimulated an increase by the other level. A hike 
in prices by tobacco companies accelerated this ratcheting. 
As a result, after 1981 tobacco prices began increasing in real terms for 
the first time in 30 years. Then something interesting happened: total cig- 
arette sales starting falling for the first time in 30 years. Canadian health 
advocates got an unexpected lesson in the principles of price elasticity, 
and they used this information in the political battle surrounding taxa- 
tion. (See "The Power of Taxation," on page 87.) 
Mounting Evidence and Interest 
The mounting scientific evidence of the harm caused by tobacco use solid- 
ified the interest and support of many individuals whose "time had 
come." These included tobacco control advocates who had honed their 
skills in campaigns in some of the larger cities, fighting for smoke-free 
public spaces and bans on tobacco advertising on public transportation. 
They included reporters who were becoming interested in tobacco issues 
and advocates who were learning by trial and error (particularly in 
Toronto) how to work with the print and electronic media. And they even 
included public servants in the federal health department who, because of 
personal interest, developed their knowledge about tobacco and became 
serious about reducing the death and disease that result from tobacco use. 
Many of these people had come of age during a time of social activism 
and had witnessed individuals successfully working together to protest 
wars, influence environmental policy, push for civil rights, and accom- 
plish other social goals. As tobacco products became recognized as major 
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killers, it was not surprising that many of these people were inspired to 
take on the cause of tobacco control as another area of social activism. 
Institutional Response and Coalition Building 
By far the single most important development in the movement for 
tobacco control in Canada was the founding of the Non-Smokers' Rights 
Association (NSRA) in Toronto in 1974 by a small group of social activists. 
From the beginning, the NSRA combined concern for the rights of non- 
smokers with an interest in pushing for policy changes that would reduce 
the overall death toll from tobacco use. 
Garfield Mahood was hired as the association's first executive director. 
He had already developed social activist skills as head of an environmental 
law association and had been successful in working on other social issues. 
His success in achieving policy breakthroughs attracted the attention of 
others who shared the view that political activism could save lives. One of 
them was a young lawyer, David Sweanor, who by 1983 was working full- 
time alongside Mahood and trying hard to match his feverish intensity. 
Around this time, a chance incident provided the catalyst for the forma- 
tion of a tobacco control lobby. In 1985 the federal minister of agriculture 
proposed the creation of a national Flue-Cured Tobacco Marketing Agency 
to promote the sale of Canadian tobacco at home and abroad. A number of 
health groups decided to make presentations to the government to oppose 
this initiative. Some individuals from these organizations found themselves 
waiting in the same room for the presentations to begin, and it occurred to 
them that there might be advantages to cooperation. So, despite being told 
by senior government officials and members of the media that there was no 
chance of derailing the marketing board concept, they increased the pres- 
sure through media advocacy and other measures that made a "done deal" 
look badly in need of serious reexamination. Soon, the tobacco industry 
itself became splintered on the issues involved, and the idea of a marketing 
board fell apart. A lesson learned: seemingly irresistible forces within the 
tobacco industry could be successfully challenged by effective advocacy. 
A partnership soon developed between this fast-response advocacy 
group and the biggest, most prestigious voluntary health charity in the 
country, the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS). The main function of the 
CCS up to this point had been to raise funds for medical research through 
a massive door-to-door campaign held every April. The organization also 
had a long history of conducting health promotion programs, providing 
support to cancer patients, and disseminating information on cancer. But 
by 1986 the CCS decided that it needed to become more involved in advo- 
cacy. Ken Kyle was hired as director of public issues, and he was instru- 
mental in building a coalition with the NSRA to work on tobacco control. 
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With a few key committed people taking hold of the political levers and 
feeding off each other's knowledge and enthusiasm, it did not take long 
for support for the coalition to grow. After a few years other health groups 
became involved: first, the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada and, to 
a lesser extent, the Canadian Lung Association and the Canadian Medical 
Association. The Canadian Council on Smoking and Health (CCSH, now 
the Canadian Council for Tobacco), which was initially run by staff of the 
three health charities, was part of the coalition from the start. Other civil 
society groups such as the United Church of Canada, labor unions, and 
women's groups played a smaller but supportive role. 
Forging Links between Research and Advocacy 
By the early 1980s a strong body of evidence concerning the impact of 
tobacco product pricing on consumption and the danger of secondhand 
smoke had been developed, and there was clear recognition of the need 
for serious governmental action in reaction to this evidence and of the 
effect that advocacy could have in achieving public health objectives. 
More important, the information from researchers was finding its way to 
government officials and to health advocates. Academics, often frustrated 
because research that could save lives was not readily adopted and 
embodied in government policy, took note of the actions of advocates and 
sought them out to present useful information. Some of the key data on 
advertising, taxation, and secondhand smoke made its way to advocates 
in this fashion. Other researchers and medical specialists, inspired by the 
publicity garnered by the advocates' activities, were increasingly recep- 
tive to their requests for expert assistance. Advocacy groups such as the 
NSRA quickly learned that success in public health battles brought more 
opportunities for progress, including the impetus to build alliances. 
Working for Policy Change: An Overview 
Successful advocates learn to take advantage of opportunities as they 
arise and to respond quickly and creatively. But long-term strategies are 
important too. As the tobacco control lobby moved toward working at 
senior levels of government in pursuit of significant policy change and 
law reform, the "rapid response" approach had to be effectively inte- 
grated with long-term efforts, and the strategy shifted from short-term 
battles toward a long-term campaign. Health advocates learned to set 
objectives and use their relative advantages of information, science, 
energy, quickness, and dedication to achieve them. 
Of the many policy initiatives on tobacco control proposed over the 
past 20 years in Canada (see the Appendix to this chapter), those dis- 
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cussed in this section best illustrate successful strategies for policy change 
on this important issue. These examples may be helpful to others seeking 
information and inspiration for policy change. 
The Advertising Tug-of-War 
At the time the NSRA was formed, the tobacco industry faced no adver- 
tising restrictions in Canada. Advertisements showed up everywhere and 
were accepted as part of the landscape. The NSRA recognized that any 
efforts it or other groups made to help smokers quit were sure to be 
swamped by massive advertising designed to entice new recruits. As 
Mahood commented in media interviews at the time, "It is like trying to 
bail a boat while someone else drills a hole in its bottom." 
The NSRA therefore began by producing background information on the 
detrimental effects of tobacco advertising and put together comprehensive 
arguments for restricting or eliminating tobacco advertisements. In those 
early days the NSRA did not have the organization or resources to lobby 
effectively for a nationally legislated end to tobacco advertising, so it set its 
sights on a smaller target. It launched a campaign to have tobacco advertis- 
ing removed from the popular Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), the 
busiest transit system in Canada, which carried over 400 mfflion passengers 
a year on its subways, streetcars, and buses—and exposed them to continu- 
ous enticements to smoke cigarettes. The tobacco industry fought hard 
against the effort to limit its advertising in the TFC and was supported by 
advertising agencies, billboard companies, and some newspapers and mag- 
azine publishers, all of which benefited financially from the advertising. 
In 1979, after a two-year battle supported by a loose coalition of other 
health groups and backed by Emerson Foote, a living legend in the adver- 
tising business, the transit authority agreed to drop the advertisements. 
Those with a vested interest in tobacco advertising were not pleased to 
have been beaten. 
A battle had been won, and a war began. What had been learned was 
that the tobacco industry seemed to have a hard time with constantly 
moving targets. The tobacco control health lobby built on this lesson with 
a strategy of using numerous individual efforts to move creatively and 
methodically toward the long-term goal of ending tobacco product pro- 
motion. Much of the initial leadership in the campaign for the advertising 
ban came from Mahood and Sweanor of the NSRA, but there was also a 
great deal of support from Victor Lachance of the Canadian Council on 
Smoking and Health and Ken Kyle, whose CCS office in downtown 
Ottawa became known as the "war room." Pro—public health civil ser- 
vants like Neil Collishaw also began to have a more receptive audience 
for the work being done inside the government on tobacco control. As the 
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core group of strategists grew, and as other health groups gradually began 
to focus on tobacco issues, the realm of what might be achievable also 
expanded. 
As the campaign moved forward, no one was ever quite sure what 
would happen next. But the next step came suddenly. In 1983 the Cana- 
dian subsidiary of the RJR-Macdonald tobacco company became the spon- 
sor of the Canadian Ski Association, allowing the firm to associate ciga- 
rettes and smoking with skiers who were national heroes. Many of the 
skiers and the team physicians were appalled. They opposed the decision 
of their governing body and decided to fight the sponsorship. What could 
have been a coup for the tobacco industry became a rallying point for the 
health lobby. Health and medical groups that had long paid lip service to 
public health without getting involved in tobacco control were forced to 
take positions as the debate heated up. The tobacco promotional contracts 
with the ski association were leaked, and protests were held. Eventually, 
the skiers themselves stole the show by refusing to accept trophies associ- 
ated with cigarettes, and they publicly denounced the tobacco company 
sponsorship. All of this publicity assisted the federal minister of health, 
who was under pressure on other tobacco issues, to cut government sub- 
sidies for sporting bodies that accepted funding from the tobacco industry. 
The industry countered any call for legislation by trumpeting both its 
own voluntary code on advertising and the voluntary self-regulation of the 
advertising industry. Before legislation could reasonably be expected, the 
health groups had to prove that these existing measures were ineffective. 
Efforts by a member of the public helped the cause. Ed Flis, a Canadian 
citizen, had written several letters to the tobacco companies during the 
1970s in an effort to force the industry to define what it actually meant by 
the statements in its code of conduct. This was a spontaneous action by a 
citizen who was simply interested in doing something about tobacco's toll 
on society. Flis turned the responses over to the NSRA, and suddenly the 
health lobby had operational definitions of the code—for example, what 
the tobacco industry meant by terms such as "immediate vicinity" in ref- 
erence to the rule about keeping tobacco advertisements away from 
schools. 
Armed with this evidence, the health lobby was able to show that the 
voluntary codes were totally ineffective. In 1984 the NSRA released a list 
of 250 billboards with tobacco advertisements that were within the pro- 
scribed distance from schools. Complaints were also filed with the self- 
regulatory body of the advertising industry. The responses to those com- 
plaints suggested an unwillingness to remove a single tobacco ad. Even 
when the complaints were backed by the expert opinions of epidemiolo- 
gists, linguists, and lawyers, which left no doubt that the voluntary code 
had been violated, the initial reaction was to amend the code to allow the 
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complained-of practice. In 1986 the NSRA prepared a major report, A Cat- 
alogue of Deception, that documented ongoing violations of virtually every 
rule in the voluntary code. Some of them were blatant. For example, 
according to Rule 7, advertising was to be addressed only to adults over 
18, but Imperial Tobacco paid to have its brand name and logo on the cen- 
terfold map of the guidebook to Toronto's "Canada's Wonderland," 
whose roller coasters and other attractions are designed for children 
under 18. Rule 1 stated that there would be no advertising or promotion 
of sponsorships of sports or other popular events through the use of 
brand names, corporate names, or logos on radio or television, but 
tobacco logos and brands were constantly seen on televised coverage of 
sports and other events sponsored by the tobacco industry. 
In 1986 Health Minister Jake Epp acknowledged that self-regulation of 
tobacco advertising was ineffective. What really pushed the government 
into legislative action, however, was a private member's bill sponsored by 
Lyun McDonald, a member of Parliament from an opposition party and a 
fierce opponent of smoking. (Private members' bills are sponsored by 
individual members of Parliament, not by the government, and rarely 
pass into law.) 
McDonald's bill, introduced in the House of Commons in October 
1986, proposed regulating smoking in federally regulated workplaces and 
placing tobacco under the Hazardous Products Act. This would mean that 
tobacco advertising would be prohibited unless exempted by specific pro- 
visions. Health groups pressured members of Parliament from all parties 
to support the bill. Eventually, the government decided to draft its own 
bill banning tobacco advertising, and in 1987 Minister Epp introduced 
such legislation. The resulting Tobacco Products Control Act was enacted 
in 1988 and came into force on January 1, 1989. McDonald's bill, entitled 
the Non-Smokers Health Act, also passed, without the section on adver- 
tising but with the sections on smoking in public space. (See "Achieving 
Smoke-Free Space," on page 84.) 
The goal of moving the government into action had been met, but the 
war was just heating up. The tobacco industry poured massive sums of 
money into efforts to derail the legislation. It hired additional lobbyists, 
including Bill Neville, who was very close to the prime minister and was 
well connected with virtually the entire federal cabinet. Neville was con- 
sidered the most powerful lobbyist in the country and was purportedly 
paid more than any lobbyist in Canada had ever received. 
Neville's power was undermined by the health groups, which 
delighted in pointing out his personal connections—this at a time when 
there was great public interest in eliminating personal influence that sub- 
verted due process in government. In what many considered to be a mas- 
ter stroke of the campaign, the health lobby ran a full-page advertisement 
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in the national newspaper, the Globe and Mail, showing a picture of the 
prime minister next to a picture of Neville and accompanied by an appeal 
to put the interests of Canadian children ahead of the interests of the 
tobacco companies. The health lobby also exposed some tobacco industry 
deceptions, most notably when it showed that an influx of letters to mem- 
bers of Parliament, designed to look like public opposition to the law, 
actually consisted of letters composed and printed by the tobacco lobby. 
Meanwhile, advocates worked hard to build public support for an 
advertising ban through news conferences, paid newspaper advertise- 
ments, pamphlets, and the publication of favorable polling results. The 
CCS organized a campaign to send 35,000 black-bordered postcards 
(one for every tobacco-related death that year) to members of Parlia- 
ment. The Canadian Medical Association asked its members to vote 
against any member of Parliament who did not support the bill. An 
equally important part of the lobby was the "inside" strategy, whereby 
health groups worked with the minister of health and his advisers, offi- 
cials of the health department, and members of Parliament sitting on the 
legislative committee reviewing the proposed law. 
The tobacco industry responded to the passage of the Tobacco Products 
Control Act with continual efforts to undermine the impact of the regula- 
tions. And it launched a successful court challenge: in 1995 the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that a total ban on tobacco advertising was uncon- 
stitutional, effectively invalidating important provisions of the act. 
Health groups reacted immediately to this setback by launching a cam- 
paign for new legislation controlling tobacco advertising and promotion. 
In November 1996 the health minister, David Dingwall, introduced a new 
bill, the Tobacco Act, which sought to outlaw most existing tobacco adver- 
tising but allowed limited advertising in publications with a mostly adult 
readership, through direct mail, and in places where young people are 
prohibited, such as bars. It also incorporated the provisions of the Tobacco 
Sales to Young Persons Act, which had come into force in 1994. That Act 
raised the minimum age for buying tobacco to age 18, restricted tobacco 
vending machines to bars and taverns, and set hefty fines for infractions. 
The new Tobacco Act furthermore provided for the first government- 
approved product design standards, package labeling that included 
health messages, regular industry reports to Health Canada on a variety 
of matters, and restrictions on tobacco sponsorship advertising. 
The tobacco control lobby, which became known as the National Cam- 
paign for Action on Tobacco, campaigned heavily. Particularly important this 
time was the existence within major health organizations of professionals 
who by now had many years of experience in lobbying for tobacco control 
legislation. Key campaign participants included the NSRA, the CCS, and 
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada. The Heart and Stroke Foundation of 
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Canada and the Canadian Lung Association lobbied more actively this time. 
A new and important player was the Coalition quebecoise pour le contrôle 
du tabac (Québec Coalition for Tobacco Control). 
Despite growing support for tobacco control, the campaign still had 
weaknesses, including a lack of initiative by some health groups, poor 
coordination within the whole health community, and the usual lack of 
financial resources (May 1988). The tobacco industry seemed to be 
always organized and vigorous in its opposition to the campaign, partic- 
ularly over the issue of tobacco advertising through sponsorship. The 
industry even established a lobbying group, the Alliance for Sponsorship 
Freedom, to fight the new law. This group, consisting of organizations 
receiving tobacco sponsorship money, was funded by the tobacco indus- 
try and was run through a public relations firm directed by the industry. 
The industry also engaged in tough direct lobbying, including extensive 
media advertising. 
Many of the sports and cultural events sponsored by the tobacco 
industry were held in the province of Québec, and the opposition Bloc 
Quebecois in Parliament did not support the proposed sponsorship 
restrictions. The minister of health eventually agreed to amendments 
that delayed the bill by two years. Lobbying activities were then redi- 
rected to the Senate, where the bill had still to be approved. With a fed- 
eral election expected shortly, the industry strategy was to force delays 
so that the bill would not be debated and passed in Parliament before the 
election. The bill finally passed the Senate on April 16, 1997, less than two 
weeks before Parliament was dissolved for the election, but in order to 
get it through caucus, Health Minister Dingwall had to agree to intro- 
duce a new bill after the election to allow tobacco sponsorship of inter- 
national automobile races. 
The new minister of health, Allan Rock, introduced such a bill in June 
1998. This Act to Amend the Tobacco Act delayed the implementation 
date for partial restrictions on tobacco sponsorship from October 1, 2000 
to October 1, 2003. Nevertheless, Minister Rock showed an important 
commitment to tobacco control through a new provision, contained in the 
bill, to ban all tobacco sponsorship advertising by October 2003. Parlia- 
ment passed the bill on December 10, 1998. 
A Picture Worth a Thousand Words: Product Labeling 
Under Canadian law and the laws of many other countries, manufactur- 
ers are obligated to warn consumers about the nature and extent of any 
hazards associated with their products. The warning must be clearly com- 
municated and must not be negated by collateral efforts on the part of 
manufacturers. 
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In Canada from 1972 to 1989 the only warning on cigarette packages 
was one placed voluntarily by the tobacco companies. It appeared in very 
small type on the side of tobacco packages and read, "Danger to health 
increases with amount smoked. Avoid inhaling." Health groups had long 
argued that better information should be provided to consumers, but it 
was not until the 1980s that a serious campaign for legislated messages 
was launched. 
After some discussion, the tobacco control lobby agreed to press for 
large pictorial warning messages and for further information on the 
inside of tobacco packaging. This particular campaign benefited from one 
of the most effective combinations of NGOs, the Office of the Minister of 
Health, and federal bureaucrats, working as true partners. It also saw far 
more use of scientific studies and focus groups than in earlier campaigns. 
A major problem was the lack of a clear agreement on standards for 
"informed consent." The tobacco industry has consistently claimed that 
smokers understand smoking may be harmful. Health advocates argued 
that a much more rigorous standard of informed consent with respect to 
the harm caused by tobacco products was appropriate and that the level 
of detail of the information provided should be more like that required of 
the pharmaceutical and automobile industries. The existing warning on 
cigarette packs conveyed little more than a vague notion of the existence 
of some risk and did nothing to list the specific risks or to quantify them 
for smokers. 
Tobacco control advocates aimed to ensure by regulation that worth- 
while information would be provided by the tobacco companies them- 
selves as a condition for their selling their products. They began by rais- 
ing awareness of the need for more information. Consumer surveys were 
conducted, and past surveys from the federal health department were 
obtained under freedom of information laws. The results were astound- 
ing. The surveys revealed that smokers, and young people in the age 
group most likely to initiate smoking, were unable to name many of the 
diseases caused by smoking. Most could not even recall that smoking 
caused heart disease—the single biggest cause of death due to tobacco use 
(Environics Research Group Ltd. 1990). 
Health groups were successful in using results from medical research 
and public opinion surveys to instigate hard-hitting media advocacy cam- 
paigns for legislative reform. Complaints were filed under provincial trade 
practices legislation accusing tobacco companies of violating provisions of 
the laws that prohibit "deception by omission"—failure to state material 
facts, so that consumers are deceived or tend to be deceived. There were 
also coalition news conferences and newspaper articles about the lack of 
effective and truthful health messages on cigarette packaging, and com- 
parisons with the countries that did have legislated package warnings. 
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The Tobacco Products Control Act created a legislative framework for 
regulating package health warnings. Regulations under the act called for 
cigarette packages to display prominent warnings in contrasting colors 
covering 20 percent of each of the main panels of both cigarette packs and 
cartons. The tobacco industry complied, but barely. Suddenly, the "con- 
trasting colors" turned out to be silver on white, gold on brown, and other 
combinations that made the warnings hard to read easily. The "main 
package panel" on cartons was interpreted by the industry as the small- 
est panel—the ends of the cartons, rather than the sides, obviously con- 
trary to the intent of the act. 
The tobacco control coalition turned this short-term setback into a 
powerful tool for even better package warnings. It exposed to politicians, 
bureaucrats, and the media the wording of the regulations and the 
tobacco industry's interpretation of them. Typical responses were anger, 
laughter, or both. In June 1989 the NSRA released to the public informa- 
tion it had obtained showing how the tobacco industry had succeeded in 
weakening the warnings during the regulatory process. The industry may 
have won a temporary delay against better warnings, but it lost credibil- 
ity. In January 1990 the coalition celebrated success when the minister of 
health, Perrin Beatty, announced that the regulations would be revised in 
July 1991 to require eight rotating messages covering the top 25 percent of 
the front and back of the packages and printed in black and white—not 
the package colors. 
Over the next several months, the issue of the regulations went back 
and forth. The tobacco control coalition lobbied the new minister of 
health, Benoit Bouchard, not to implement the new regulations. The 
NSRA and the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada sent pamphlets to 
the households of the electoral districts of all the members of the cabinet 
committee that would be deciding on the new (weakened) regulations. A 
survey by Health Canada found that smokers liked the new proposals for 
bigger warnings better than the old format. Finally, in 1993 another new 
minister of health, Mary Collins, pushed the new warnings through the 
cabinet with an implementation date of September 12, 1994. 
After all that, in 1995 the Supreme Court of Canada, as part of its rul- 
ing on the Tobacco Products Control Act (see "The Advertising Tug-of- 
War," on page 77), narrowly decided in favor of the tobacco industry, say- 
ing that it was unconstitutional to mandate health warnings unless they 
were attributed to the government. The tobacco industry's argument was 
that free speech included the right to silence and that the existence of 
mandatory but unattributed messages gave the erroneous impression that 
the tobacco industry was itself giving the warnings. 
Despite its victory in court, the tobacco industry was in no position to 
remove the "unconstitutional" messages. Doing so would have raised 
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serious problems in pending product liability cases and would also have 
angered legislators. The warnings stayed virtually unchanged for the time 
being, although the industry made it clear that new legislation would be 
needed if the warnings were to exist in the future. Within three years, the 
new Tobacco Act, containing even broader powers to regulate warnings, 
was passed. In January 1999 Health Minister Rock released a discussion 
paper that proposed expanding the warnings to the top 60 percent of the 
front and back of packages and giving additional information, such as 
cessation tips and reference to a Website, on the inside of packs. In April 
the coalition researched and then released to the media and politicians 
mock-ups of the warnings, which helped greatly with political support. 
On January 19, 2000, Minister Rock made public 16 pictorial messages 
that were to appear in rotation on 50 percent of the front and back of packs 
(see figure 4.1). Some of the pictures were gruesome, but research from 
both the federal Department of Health and the CCS showed these warn- 
ings to be more effective than text-only ones. 
The final regulations received unanimous approval (a rarity) by both 
the House of Commons Committee and the House of Commons and were 
then approved by the cabinet. The Tobacco Products Information Regula- 
tions became law on June 26, 2000.1 
Reaching the goal of providing better information to smokers is an 
ongoing battle that has taken a lot of hard work. It has been aided, how- 
ever, by the ability of Canadian health advocates to use research and 
advocacy to turn defeats into victories, codified in new government poi- 
icy and legislation. Things that seem to be obstacles can in fact open up 
new opportunities. The key is the ability to see the opportunities when 
others might see only obstacles. 
Achieving Smoke-Free Space 
Protecting the public from secondhand smoke was always considered an 
important public health goal, given the acute and chronic health problems 
resulting from exposure. As with all the other major Canadian efforts on 
tobacco control, it was possible for advocates to determine a long-term 
goal and then choose appropriate tactics for short-term efforts aimed at 
eventually allowing Canadians to be free from secondhand smoke. 
By the mid-1970s community-based groups of activists such as the NSRA 
were involved in efforts to get municipal bylaws that would offer protection 
from secondhand smoke. To begin with, the goals were seemingly modest: 
1. Details can be found on Health Canada's Website, <www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/tobacco.htm>. 
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Efforts moved to the national level in 1986 when, as described above, 
Lynn McDonald introduced the Non-Smokers Health Act in the House of 
Commons. This private member's bill was designed to ensure protection 
from secondhand smoke in federally regulated workplaces. Although it 
was given little chance of success, it gathered growing support and man- 
aged to dodge various efforts to have it killed. 
Much of the credit for the eventual enactment of the bill goes to Cyn- 
thia Callard, now executive director of Physicians for a Smoke-Free 
Canada, who was at the time an assistant to McDonald. She brought to 
the effort a passion for public health, knowledge of the Canadian parlia- 
mentary system, and an ability to get others involved. McDonald's bill 
provided the catalyst for the government to draft its own bill limiting 
tobacco advertising, the Tobacco Products Control Act (see "The Adver- 
tising Tug-of-War," on page 77). The two bills ended up traveling together 
through the legislative process. Every effort by the tobacco industry to 
stop them was countered, and each bill helped the other move forward. 
On May 31, 1988, both bills were passed by the House of Commons in 
an extraordinary vote in which members voted as individuals rather than 
along party lines. The power of the tobacco lobby and its advocacy 
groups, and its questionable claims of little harm from secondhand 
smoke, had been beaten back. 
The Non-Smokers' Health Act essentially gave all federally regulated 
workers (about 10 percent of Canada's workforce) the right to a smoke- 
free workplace. Flight attendants, passenger train workers, and intercity 
bus drivers fell under the law and received the right to be free from ciga- 
rette smoke. Naturally, implementation was a challenge. Many of the 
companies involved, including the airlines, claimed that the law would 
put them out of business. The airlines were particularly effective in 
obtaining extensions of the deadline due to concerns about competition 
on international routes. 
But the health lobby pressed forward. The flight length for smoke- 
free aircraft was gradually increased until all flights except those to Asia 
were covered, and then that exemption was also eliminated. Canada 
became the first country to have all flights of its airlines smoke-free. As 
it turned out, not only was there no competitive disadvantage; the air- 
lines found that the clean air policy attracted business from competitors. 
In only a short time other airlines recognized the advantages of smoke- 
free travel, and within a few years virtually all the major air carriers 
were smoke-free. 
Airlines were not the only battleground for the implementation of 
the new law. At one point the government nearly passed a regulation 
that would have exempted intercity buses from the nonsmoking law. 
Rather than attack the government plan, the NSRA and the CCS 
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approached the bus companies directly. It was pointed out that other 
forms of transportation were going smoke-free and that the buses 
would suffer from a "lower-class" image if they continued to allow 
smoking. This happened precisely when the industry was trying to 
move up-market. The result was that the bus companies demanded to 
be designated smoke-free, proving that allies can often be found when 
they are creatively sought. 
The federal law led the way, but provincial regulations were not far 
behind, as smoke-free spaces became the norm. Meanwhile, the fight for 
further protection from secondhand smoke moved to restaurants and 
bars, previously thought to be off-limits to clean air policies. In many 
cases this move was voluntary, but to give a consistent level of protection, 
legislation was needed. As with earlier efforts to clear the air, the first 
steps were taken at the municipal level. By 2002 most of Canada's largest 
cities either had smoke-free bars and restaurants or were in the process of 
making them so. It has been a long journey from the days of fighting to 
get smoking out of food stores and elevators, but there was never doubt 
about the eventual achievement of the broader goal. 
The Power of Taxation 
The affordability of tobacco products has repeatedly proved to be the 
single biggest factor in determining per capita consumption (World 
Bank 1999). As with virtually all other products, as prices increase, con- 
sumption decreases. Yet, as in other countries, Canadian health advo- 
cates were rather slow in turning this fundamental law of economics 
into a public health tool. 
In 1983 it began to be clear that price was a very powerful factor in cig- 
arette sales. As a result of the indexation of taxes, cigarette prices began to 
show a sustained increase in real terms for the first time in over 30 years. 
There was an immediate impact: total cigarette sales began to fall—some- 
thing the country had not previously experienced. 
Some very good analyses of the price elasticity of tobacco products had 
already been done, primarily in the United States and the United King- 
dom, and they had been replicated for Canada and disseminated by Neil 
Collishaw at the federal health department. But although the tax structure 
in place was a huge benefit to public health, it was under attack by the 
tobacco industry, as well as alcohol companies, which had been subject to 
the same escalating taxes. Under pressure from these interests, the federal 
government set up a committee to review the taxes and recommend 
changes. The members of the committee came from the tobacco and alco- 
hol industries; not one representative of health groups was invited to 
attend, nor did any health groups (except for one that sent a single letter) 
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make any submissions to the committee or to the government. The result 
was that the indexed tax increases were repealed. 
But once again, a defeat paved the way for a much greater victory. In 
1984 the Progressive Conservative Party was elected to form the govern- 
ment. After an advocacy campaign led by David Sweanor of the NSRA, 
the new finance minister, Michael Wilson, raised tobacco taxes by a penny 
a cigarette in 1985. Consumption fell once more, and health advocates 
began to understand the relationship between prices and consumption. 
Under the NSRA's leadership, an organized effort began to take shape to 
press for greatly increased tobacco taxes (NSRA 1992). 
Once again, health advocates set a long-range goal and started work- 
ing on the building blocks necessary to reach it. In the early stages the 
efforts were relatively simple. Letters and submissions were sent to gov- 
ernments, presenting both the health justification for tobacco tax increases 
and the sales and revenue implications, using the best available estimates 
of price elasticity for cigarettes. In some cases meetings were held with 
civil servants and political advisers involved in crafting budgets. These 
efforts began to show results. Government officials were often very 
pleased to have health advocates talk about tobacco taxes, occasionally 
mentioning how for years they had been lobbied by the tobacco industry 
and had always wanted to get the perspective of "the other side." 
But significant obstacles stood in the way of imposing higher tobacco 
taxes. Perhaps the biggest was that posed by Ontario. The province was, 
after North Carolina and Kentucky, the largest grower of tobacco in North 
America, and its tobacco taxes were among the lowest of any province. A 
new provincial government had just been elected, and the minister of 
finance was a long-serving politician from the "tobacco belt." He was on 
record as opposing any tobacco tax increase because of the impact on 
tobacco farmers, and one of the first acts of his government was to rescind 
a pending tobacco tax hike. Ontario represented well over 35 percent of 
the nation's population, and its low tobacco prices acted as a ceiling that 
kept neighboring provinces' taxes lower. It was critical that the "Ontario 
obstacle" be removed. 
To that end, the NSRA conducted an analysis of the impact of rescind- 
ing the previously announced tobacco tax increase. Particular attention 
was paid to tobacco growers. Tobacco leaf is an exceedingly tiny part of 
the price of manufactured cigarettes—a fact often overlooked when con- 
cern for tobacco farmers is used as a justification for not increasing 
taxes. In late October 1985 the NSRA put together figures showing that 
the government was forgoing revenues of over 130 million Canadian 
dollars (CA$), equivalent to US$95 million, in order to maintain higher 
sales that amounted to the average production of only a dozen farms 
(Sweanor 1985). 
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On November 1, 1985, the NSRA held a press conference at the Ontario 
Legislature denouncing the tax decision as both a blow to public health 
and possibly the least cost-effective farm support scheme that any gov- 
ernment had ever devised. The media were not used to hearing economic 
arguments from health advocates. Some of the reporters called govern- 
ment finance officials for verification and were told that the NSRA analy- 
sis was correct. The next day, both the analysis and a statement by a senior 
civil servant agreeing with it were published in the Globe and Mail. 
Momentum was building. Soon there was a coalition, including the 
NSRA and health charities, that supported significant tobacco tax 
increases in Ontario and recommended that some of the revenue raised be 
directed to helping displaced tobacco farmers. Despite his early pro- 
tobacco leanings, which had earned him the moniker "Tobacco Bob," the 
finance minister delivered the two biggest tobacco tax increases in 
Ontario's history during his five years in office. He also funded realistic 
efforts to help tobacco growers diversify. 
While this was going on in Ontario, complementary actions were occur- 
ring in all of the other provinces and at the federal level. Ongoing meetings 
with government officials, political advisers, and cabinet ministers were 
held. Tobacco industry submissions were obtained (usually under freedom 
of information laws) and critiqued. The CCS, the Canadian Medical Asso- 
ciation, and the Canadian Council on Smoking and Health were making 
effective use of their staffs and volunteers in various efforts across the 
country to bring forward tax submissions and meet with decisionmakers. 
The submissions were primarily produced by the NSRA, which had devel- 
oped expertise in this area. By the late 1980s provincial governments were 
calling the NSRA for information on tobacco taxes and for recommenda- 
tions on how big the tax increases should be. 
The federal government increased its tobacco taxes by more than 6 cents 
a cigarette between 1985 and 1991 as the "tobacco tax project" geared up, 
and provincial governments roughly matched this level of increase. As 
expected, consumption fell dramatically. According to Health Canada and 
Statistics Canada figures, reported domestic sales dropped by 40 percent 
between 1982 and 1992. Health Canada prevalence surveys also showed 
that teenagers, who had long been shown to be price-sensitive, achieved a 
per capita decline of 60 percent. Whereas the 1979 survey showed that 
42 percent of 15- to 19-year-olds were daily smokers, by 1991 only 16 per- 
cent were (Statistics Canada n.d.). 
In response to the tax increases, the tobacco industry fought back. This 
time, it focused on the issue of cigarette smuggling. At the time, cigarette 
prices in the United States were less than half those in Canada. The 
tobacco industry argued that if the price differential remained, a smug- 
gling problem would soon develop. 
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There was little evidence in the late 1980s and early 1990s to back up this 
industry position. Canadians were smoking different brands and different 
tobacco blends than Americans, and sales of U.S. brands in Canada (both 
legal and otherwise) were declining. But in the early 1990s "exports" of 
Canadian cigarettes to the United States surged. At the same time, there 
seemed to be an increase in smuggled cigarettes coming into Canada. 
Interestingly, these smuggled cigarettes were Canadian blends and Cana- 
dian brands—the very ones that were being "exported" in the first place. 
The tobacco companies and their allies meanwhile claimed that smug- 
gling was a huge threat to the country and urged governments to lower 
tobacco taxes as the only way to deal with the scourge. Cigarette retailers 
joined in the effort to secure a tax rollback in hopes of reclaiming lost 
sales. In February 1994 the new Liberal government responded by drasti- 
cally reducing tobacco taxes. As figures 4.2 and 4.3 suggest, there was 
some increase in consumption, especially among young Canadians. The 
tax rollbacks lost much of the ground that had been gained since 1982 and 
poisoned relations between tobacco control advocates and government 
officials for several years. 
The smuggling problem went away as if someone had suddenly 
turned off a tap (NSRA 1994). There was considerable controversy about 
the actual level of smuggling and hence of total consumption. Many 
people argued that the high taxes had "caused" smuggling. They cer- 
tainly provided an incentive to smuggle, but seeing them as the "cause" 
of smuggling is like describing an iceberg as a chunk of ice sticking up 
from the ocean—true as far as it goes, but not the full story at all. The 
key question is where the smuggled cigarettes were coming from—who 
was supplying the illegal market? Most of the smuggled cigarettes were 
manufactured in Canada and exported to the United States, where there 
was little demand for Canadian brands. Did the exporters think their 
cigarettes would stay in the United States, or did they know that they 
would be smuggled back into Canada? Eventually, one of the tobacco 
companies entered a guilty plea in a U.S. court, admitting to having 
knowingly played a role in the smuggling. A criminal investigation was 
instituted in Canada. 
Recently, taxes have again been on the increase and now exceed early 
1994 levels in all provinces. With every increase, though, consumption 
declines. These tax and consumption trends continue to be monitored by 
the NSRA, the CCS, and Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada. 
Working through the Courts for Policy Change 
Lawsuits have been used effectively in Canada in the long-term campaign 
for tobacco control. Using the court system to effect policy change is a 
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Figure 4.2. Cigarette Consumption and Real Cigarette Prices, 
Canada, 1949—98 
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lengthy process and is sometimes unpredictable, but the ultimate positive 
results can be large and durable. 
In a few provinces laws have been used to bring the tobacco industry 
to court. For example, in 1997 the legislature of British Columbia passed 
the Tobacco Damages Recovery Act to assist the provincial government in 
a lawsuit to recover from the industry costs related to provision of pub- 
licly funded hospital and physician services. (The act's title was later 
changed to the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.) 
The provincial government then filed an action in the British Columbia 
Supreme Court against the tobacco industry. The industry challenged the 
constitutionality of the legislation, and in February 2000 the court ruled 
the act invalid but upheld some of its major principles. The legislature 
again amended the act, and the government has launched a new lawsuit. 
Ontario passed similar legislation in 1999: the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Statute Law Amendment Act. In March 2000 the provincial 
Source: NSRA, using Statistics Canada catalogues 91-002, 91-512, and 91-213; labor force 
survey data from Statistics Canada (1991); and "Survey on Canada," cycle 3, 1994. 
government filed a lawsuit against the industry in U.S. Federal Court under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, but in 
August 2000 the case was dismissed on the grounds that the provincial gov- 
ernment could not sue in a U.S. court. The provincial government is plan- 
ning an appeal. 
Newfoundland has also recently passed a Tobacco Health Care Costs 
Recovery Act, originally introduced in December 2000. 
Lessons Learned 
There were, of course, many other battles on other aspects of tobacco con- 
trol, and there was much more to each of the examples cited above than 
can be adequately conveyed in a few pages. Yet the same lessons seem to 
shine through. A small group of dedicated people truly can—and did— 
change the world. They had to set long-term goals and to work realisti- 
cally toward achieving them. They had to look for allies in the govern- 
ment and beyond, to work with the media, and to take advantage of 
opportunities as they arose. They had to use research—both their own 
and from other organizations—to obtain the information they needed in 
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Figure 4.3. Smoking Prevalence among Teenagers Age 15—19, 
Regular Smokers, Canada, 1977—94 
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good time and provide it to decisionmakers and the public. They had to 
be creative, and, for long-term success, they had to have enough sense of 
camaraderie and accomplishment to want to stay in the fight. 
Some other general lessons learned along the way may inform others 
in their own efforts. 
Dealing with an Oligopoly 
The tobacco industry in Canada, as in so many other countries, is composed 
of a very small number of companies that control roughly 99 percent of the 
market. A single company, Imperial Tobacco Ltd., holds roughly two-thirds 
of the entire market. Profit margins have traditionally been huge. This gives 
the tobacco industry a great interest in opposing measures that threaten to 
curtail the market plus virtually unlimited financial resources for backing 
its opposition to measures not to its liking. In more competitive markets, 
the expenditure of millions of dollars on lawyers to fight government leg- 
islation would lower a company's profits and make it uncompetitive in the 
long run. But in the case of the oligopolistic cigarette market, as long as the 
companies are all in it together, the cost of litigation, lobbyists, "science" to 
order, and so on is not a problem. The companies can raise prices to cover 
the costs and continue to realize enormous profits. 
Globally, the industry is consolidating rather than becoming more 
competitive. Countries with competition laws that have been used to 
combat concentrations or lack of price competition in other industries 
have not so far opposed consolidation of cigarette companies or tried to 
curb the power of the cigarette cartels. The companies remain economi- 
cally powerful and use their resources to build political influence, creat- 
ing a formidable barrier to tobacco control policy. This makes trans- 
parency and public debate on proposed legislation extremely important. 
Understanding the Nature of Effective Legislation 
Canadian groups spent much time in the late 1980s and 1990s going 
from one legislative battle to the next. It began to appear more sensible 
to simply regulate tobacco products like other drugs or hazardous prod- 
ucts. The tobacco industry benefited from an approach to regulation that 
essentially said they could do anything that was not specifically forbid- 
den. Given the nature of the product and the legislative precedents for 
other products, it made more sense to reverse the onus. Tobacco prod- 
ucts and the marketing and labeling of these products could be like 
pharmaceuticals—banned except to the extent that a regulatory author- 
ity gives specific permission for specified actions. This was the philoso- 
phy behind the new Tobacco Act. 
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Thinking Globally—Acting Locally 
Canada's total consumption of tobacco products represents less than 1 per- 
cent of global sales. Although significant progress has been made in 
Canada, it is only of global significance when it helps efforts in other coun- 
tries. Similarly, successful measures in other countries can assist efforts to 
achieve breakthroughs in Canada. 
Much of what has happened in Canada has accordingly been done 
with an eye to global relevance. Many of the key Canadian advocates of 
tobacco control have long been involved in working at a global level, and 
much of what has been accomplished in Canada has been immediately 
communicated in various ways to colleagues elsewhere in the hope of 
aiding their work. 
But the learning goes both ways. Interaction at a global level has greatly 
assisted Canadian efforts. Not only were Canadians able to learn from the 
tobacco control initiatives of other countries, but also success in exporting 
Canadian breakthroughs to other countries reinforced the momentum for 
continued progress within Canada. For decisionmakers in Canada the 
moves elsewhere to smoke-free airlines, bigger health warnings on packages, 
and higher taxes—often with direct connections to what had already hap- 
pened in Canada—reinforced the sense that Canada was on the right track. 
Finding Allies 
One of the most intriguing lessons was that although some allies came 
from expected sources, such as the CCS, other health and medical orga- 
nizations were simply not comfortable putting much time, personnel, or 
resources into tobacco control. Indeed, many organizations that repre- 
sented health professionals who daily saw the devastation caused by 
tobacco, and many charities dedicated to battling illnesses caused to a 
large degree by tobacco use, were often only peripheral players in the 
major tobacco control campaigns. 
But other strong allies were constantly being found. Some were dedi- 
cated individuals who could rally the support of various constituencies. 
Individual volunteers with health charities and medical associations were 
often pivotal in the campaigns. There were also some tremendously 
engaged ministers of health—politicians who, once they knew they could 
truly make a difference, literally risked their political futures in efforts to 
put through public health measures. More than one minister threatened 
resignation if an equivocating cabinet sided with the tobacco lobby at crit- 
ical moments in the battles for legislation. 
Assistants to politicians, and particularly aides to ministers, were key 
allies. Usually young, energetic, and idealistic, many of them were com- 
mitted to ensuring that health measures made it through the labyrinth- 
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like structure of government. They were often the key driving force in get- 
ting precedents set, and they seldom received any public acknowledg- 
ment of their tremendous efforts. 
Doing a Lot on a Limited Budget 
Health advocates in Canada seldom had much by way of financial 
resources. Most campaigns were run on energy and creativity in place of 
money. Money was always an area in which the tobacco lobby had a huge 
edge. The health lobby, however, had a relative advantage in its ability to 
move quickly and creatively. 
Many of the major battles cost little or nothing. Volunteers played a huge 
role in many of the tobacco control victories. Persuading a senior CCS vol- 
unteer or prominent physician to speak to a politician was free. Getting 
information to millions of Canadians through effective media work cost lit- 
tle or nothing. Finding tobacco billboards next to schools simply meant 
having someone willing to drive around cities and note the location of the 
signs. Preparing detailed submissions on tobacco taxes often required no 
more than having someone willing to crunch numbers and present the find- 
ings in ways designed to get the attention of a desired audience. 
Money helps. But having a lot of money is not a prerequisite for success. 
Canadian advocates could joke in the 1980s that they were "changing the 
world on five dollars a day." The formula for success in Canada has 
involved dedicated action by a variety of actors: strong commitment by 
municipal, provincial, territorial and federal governments, both politicians 
and civil servants; good research; and leadership by NGOs that added spe- 
cialized political and economic research to existing medical and public 
health research and used it to target public policy and conduct media 
advocacy campaigns. With the use of new and existing alliances and of 
grassroots mobilization, these activities were effective with more or less all 
national political parties. Political ideology played only a minor role in 
these events, and the tobacco control coalition wisely was usually careful 
to maintain a nonpartisan stance. 
To sum up, it is not a stretch to say that a few individuals in the coali- 
tion, working with politicians, the federal bureaucracy, and the media, 
have potentially saved thousands of lives. This is one of the most impor- 
tant public health stories in Canada's history. 
Appendix: Key Dates in Tobacco Control in Canada 
1908: Canadian Parliament passes the Tobacco Restraint Act, which pro- 
hibits the sale of tobacco products to persons less than 16 years of age. 
1951: National Cancer Institute of Canada says there is a possible link 
between smoking and cancer. 
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1963: Federal Health Minister Judy LaMarsh states that smoking causes 
lung cancer. 
1963: Tobacco lobby (Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council) is 
established. 
1968: Health Minister John Munroe condemns the advertising of tobacco 
products. 
1974: Non-Smokers' Rights Association is established. 
1986: Canadian Cancer Society embarks on public policy advocacy for 
tobacco control. 
1988: Parliament passes Tobacco Products Control Act and the Non- 
Smokers Health Act. 
1991: Federal tobacco taxes are increased by CA$6 (US$5) a carton. 
1993: Parliament passes Tobacco Sales to Young Persons Act. 
1994: Federal government cuts tobacco taxes in half. 
1995: Supreme Court of Canada rules major portions of Tobacco Products 
Control Act unconstitutional. 
1997: Parliament passes the Tobacco Act. 
2000: New pictorial health warnings become law. 
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5 
Democracy and Health: 
Tobacco Control in Poland 
Witold Zatoi'ski 
At the end of the 1980s, Poland had the highest cigarette consumption in 
the world. Polish men, in particular, had been heavy smokers for years. 
Their addiction had made cancers common and lives short (figure 5.1). By 
1990, the odds that a 15-year-old Polish boy would live to the age of 60 
were lower than for his peers in most other countries in the world, includ- 
ing India and China (Murray and Lopez 1994). The World Health Organi- 
zation (WHO) estimated that almost half of the premature deaths among 
Polish men were caused by inhaling tobacco smoke (Peto and others 
1992). Over half of the burden of noncommunicable disease among Polish 
men was smoking related. 
The medical community in Poland began to raise the alarm in the 
1980s, when it became clear that the incidence of lung cancer in Poland 
was higher than almost anywhere else in Europe except Hungary 
(Zatoiski and others 1996). The health, economic, and social costs of 
smoking spurred Polish doctors and health advocates to look for ways of 
reversing the advancing health catastrophe. 
Tobacco Consumption in Poland: Historical Background 
Cigarette smoking accounts for nearly 100 percent of tobacco consumption 
in Poland. In the 1920s and 1930s tobacco consumption remained stable at 
a relatively low level of about 500 to 700 cigarettes per person per year. 
After World War II, the figure rose steadily until the late 1970s, when it was 
one of the highest in the world, at well over 3,500 cigarettes per person per 
year (Zatoitski and Becker 1988). The economic crisis of the late 1970s lim- 
ited access to cigarettes, and tobacco consumption stopped rising. 
The earliest studies on the prevalence of smoking in different socio- 
demographic groups date from 1974. The Maria Sklodowska-Curie Memo- 
rial Cancer Centre and Institute of Oncology (referred to in this chapter as 
the Cancer Centre and Institute) in Warsaw has conducted such studies 
almost every year since 1980. The studies revealed that in the mid-1970s, 
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65 to /5 pe er t of Polish men between ages 20 and 60 smoked every day, 
mci 1cs than iu pernt of men in some age groups said that they had 
never smokcd (Zatoiiski and Prz€wozmak 1992a, 1999). Smokers rarely 
quit only a iii ill prop rtion of men said they were cx smokers Smoking 
wa a oual norm in the adult male population. I ar fcwer n omen smoked 
than men, but the figures for women also rose consistently for all age 
'roups I rorr 1974 to 1982, smoking prevalencc imong adult women 
t uxased from 20 to 30 pen ent which was the highest lesel ever 
re orde I (Zatort ki md Pr,ewo,niak 1992a) Some of the increase in smok 
ing prevalence wa a result of the way that cigarettes were rationed from 
1981 to 1983. all cmployees rueived a quota of ugarettcs whether or not 
they 'raked The ra' u1 v as an increase of 1 million in the number of 
moker bitween 1981 and 1982 even though the number of cigarettes 
avail ible or lie markct was statir 
Throughout thc 1980s smoking prevalence among men continued to be 
very high, although minor decreases were noted in all ag groups and more 
peopic in thi oungest group began reporting that they had never smoked. 
I hi c hangi ma ha c been due to limited availability of cigarettes. Ihe 
pe ceirtage of omen smoking remained at about 30 percnl, but consider 
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able differences appeared across age groups. Smoking prevalence among 
the oldest women was 5 to 10 percent, compared with nearly 50 percent 
among the youngest adult women (Zatoiiski and Przewoniak 1999). 
Tobacco-Related Diseases 
The growth of tobacco consumption in Poland after World War TIled to 
an increase in morbidity and mortality caused by diseases and disorders 
related to inhalation of cigarette smoke. Lung cancer is a good indicator 
of health damage caused by smoking because it is found almost exclu- 
sively among tobacco smokers (Tyczyiiski and others 2000). After World 
War II, lung cancer mortality in Poland increased for men and women in 
all age groups. In the mid-1960s it was relatively low compared with rates 
in the United Kingdom and the United States (figure 5.2). In middle-aged 
men, however, lung cancer mortality increased rapidly. By the late 1970s 
it exceeded rates in both the United Kingdom and the United States (fig- 
ure 5.3), and it continued to climb in Poland well after it had dropped in 
the other two countries (ZatoiSski 1995). The health consequences of inhal- 
ing cigarette smoke were less marked for women because of lower smok- 
ing prevalence (Peto and others 1994). 
By the early 1980s the incidence of lung cancer among middle-aged Pol- 
ish men was among the highest in the world and was significantly higher 
than it had ever been in any high-risk Western European country (for 
example, the United Kingdom or Finland). Figures for other cancers 
related to the inhalation of cigarette smoke, such as laryngeal and oral can- 
cer, had also reached their highest levels by that time. Six of the 10 most 
frequent cancer sites in men were tobacco related (Zatoiski and Tyczyrtski 
1997). Epidemiological estimates indicate that 58 percent of malignant 
tumors in middle-aged men were caused by cigarette smoking. Similarly, 
studies showed that 42 percent of cardiovascular deaths and 71 percent of 
respiratory disease mortality among middle-aged men were smoking 
related (Peto and others 1994). 
Tobacco Control in the 1980s 
Unlike the case in most developed and developing countries, information 
about tobacco-related health damage was censored in Poland. Tobacco 
and cigarette production was an important source of government rev- 
enue. Health and the factors determining health were given little promi- 
nence in the media, which were controlled by the totalitarian regime. Sci- 
entific reports on health damage from tobacco smoke that received 
publicity in Western countries did not reach Poles. Public awareness of 
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Figure 5.2. Mortality Trends for Lung Cancer, All Age Groups, 
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Source: Cancer Centre and Institute, Warsaw, using data from Peto and others (1994) 
and Central Statistical Office of Poland (various years). 
Existing tobacco control regulations were paper tigers—they looked 
strong on paper but were ineffective because of lack of enforcement. For 
example, a 1974 law forbidding smoking in health centers was never 
enforced. This was a problem of considerable importance because ciga- 
rette smoking by physicians in health centers became widespread. In 
some medical specialties the percentage of doctors who smoked was 
higher than among the general population. In fact, physician smokers 
outnumbered all Polish women smokers. 
New Information about Tobacco 
The growing catastrophe in adult health was first described in the early 
1980s, as the voice of Polish civil society symbolized by the democratic Soli- 
darity movement, was gaining influence. As Polish society gradually became 
more open, more information on health issues was aired in the media. The 
1980s saw the first publication of general information and scientific papers 
documenting tobacco smoking as the key causal factor in the growing cancer 
epidemic and in premature mortality among young and middle-aged adults 
(see, for example, Zatoiski, Gottesman, and Przewoniak 1987). 
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Figure 5.3. Mortality Trends for Lung Cancer, Men Age 45—64, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 1959—99 
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The political changes of the 1980s made possible the establishment of 
public organizations intent on improving the health of Poles by reducing 
the popularity of smoking. Several groups associated with the medical pro- 
fession launched scientific studies, as well as activities that included devel- 
oping tobacco control programs, educating the public, organizing debates 
and scientific conferences, and establishing links with international organi- 
zations. Through those international contacts, especially with the Interna- 
tional Union against Cancer (UICC) and the WHO, Polish health advocates 
became involved in actions to reduce tobacco consumption. 
In the early 1980s the Cancer Centre and Institute undertook system- 
atic studies on the health consequences of cigarette smoking in Poland. 
Within a framework of international cooperation, investigators used 
WHO standard methodologies and definitions to document the relation- 
ship between smoking and the rapidly growing cancer epidemic. From 
these studies came the scientific basis for the first Polish report on smok- 
ing and health in Poland (Zatoiiski and Przewoniak 1992a, 1992b). 
Also in the early 1980s, the medical and scientific communities orga- 
nized the first scientific conferences and workshops, in collaboration with 
the UICC and with Finnish medical organizations. These gatherings con- 
tributed to the growing understanding of the magnitude of smoking- 
related disease in Poland. They also highlighted the potential for effective 
interventions. During this period, health experts from Finland (Matti 
Rimpela) and the United Kingdom (Richard Peto and Michael Wood) 
helped develop the first research and intervention programs. 
While this scientific and public health activity was going on, tobacco 
control advocates began communicating their message to the public with 
the help of the media. They also organized Poland's first participation in 
World No Tobacco Day, in collaboration with the WHO. 
Advances Despite Constraints 
These efforts did not always receive government support and were some- 
times criticized by government officials. In the early 1980s the prime min- 
ister's legislative council rejected a bill, prepared with the help of experts 
from Finland and the UICC, that would have established regulations to 
help reduce the health consequences of smoking. Officially, the bill was 
dropped on technicalities, but the actual reason was the perceived threat 
it posed to the country's weak economy. The tobacco sector was a gov- 
ernment monopoly, and it was feared that a reduction in smoking would 
affect government revenues. 
Similarly, attempts to alert the public, whether at home or abroad, to 
Poland's poor health conditions could be only partly successful. Free 
media did not exist in Poland, and the government had little interest in 
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health matters. In a nondemocratic system, health-related activities could 
be implemented only to a limited extent unless they were supported by 
the government. 
Despite limited government support, tobacco control advocates made 
the 1980s an important period of preparing scientific assessments, com- 
piling databases, training experts, establishing links with international 
organizations, and developing intervention programs. They took advan- 
tage of their opportunities and achieved four important things: 
• The creation of a body of independent experts • The establishment of the Polish Anti-Tobacco Society, an organization 
of health advocates 
• The initiation of scientific research to document, for the first time, the 
role of tobacco in the adult health crisis in Poland 
• The initiation of collaboration with scientific, social, and international 
organizations abroad. 
The Impact of Democracy and a Free Market 
With the breakdown of the communist system, Polish tobacco control 
advocates faced new challenges and opportunities. Regulations govern- 
ing economic activity were changed to make way for a free market in 1988 
and 1989. The introduction of a market economy seemed likely to increase 
tobacco use, with grim consequences for public health. The production 
and sale of cigarettes, which had been entirely controlled by the govern- 
ment, was one of the first economic sectors to be privatized. Within a few 
years, the Polish tobacco companies were taken over by multinational cor- 
porations, and by the end of the 1990s, more than 90 percent of the coun- 
try's tobacco industry belonged to multinationals. 
An almost immediate result of privatization was the unrestrained avail- 
ability and improved consumer appeal of cigarettes. All international 
brands could now be found on the domestic market, together with new 
local brands such as So1idarno (Solidarity), Lady Di, Sobieski (named for 
a famous Polish king), and George Sand. Privatization also led to a rapid 
shift away from reliance on tobacco grown in Poland, and this, together 
with the introduction of modern equipment, caused a considerable reduc- 
tion in the workforce. With the construction of new and technically more 
advanced factories, the industry's productivity increased substantially. 
In the rapid privatization, the authorities made considerable con- 
cessions to the multinational companies, such as agreeing to keep 
tobacco taxes low for several years. As a result, the real prices of ciga- 
rettes remained low throughout the first half of the 1990s: a pack of 
one of the cheapest brands cost less than a loaf of bread. Higher 
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tobacco taxes that raised cigarette prices were levied only in the sec- 
ond half of the 1990s. Even so, at the end of the 1990s the tax rate was 
only 47 percent, while in European Union (EU) countries the minimum 
rate was 57 percent. 
The Tobacco Lobby Moves into Action 
The multinational tobacco companies developed a lobby to promote their 
inteiests. An important part of their efforts involved establishing good 
relations with the emerging class of politicians, particularly economic and 
financial specialists. For example, the tobacco lobby made a donation to 
Lech Walesa, then leader of the Solidarity trade union, in hopes of gain- 
ing his support. 
As soon as they entered the Polish market, transnational tobacco com- 
panies worked to undermine the traditional ban on tobacco advertising. 
They were unable to overturn the internal regulations against tobacco 
advertising on national television (there were no private television chan- 
nels at the time), but they did manage to overcome restrictions in all other 
media, including public radio and the press, the first of the media to be 
privatized. The tobacco companies introduced advertising techniques 
that Poles had never before experienced. The industry soon became the 
largest advertiser in the country; toward the end of the 1990s it was 
spending US$100 million a year on advertising cigarettes in Poland 
(National Association of the Tobacco Industry 1998). 
The unfamiliar marketing tecimiques had a powerful effect on a recep- 
tive public. The decrease in the prevalence of smoking halted, and the 
number and percentage of occasional smokers rose. The most important 
change was a surge in the number of children experimenting with ciga- 
rettes, with a particularly dramatic increase in the number of girls who 
smoked. The percentage of girls between the ages of 11 and 15 who 
smoked at least once a week increased from 16 percent in 1990 to 28 per- 
cent in 1998 (Mazur, Woynarowska, and Kowalewska 2000). 
The opening of the market, the takeover of Polish tobacco companies 
by the multinationals, and the use of state-of-the-art marketing tech- 
niques all appeared to have determined the future of the tobacco epi- 
demic in Poland. The industry set itself a goal of increasing tobacco con- 
sumption by about 10 percent over 10 years. Predictions concerning 
health were pessimistic. The evidence of increasing premature mortality 
among young and middle-aged adults between 1988 and 1991 seemed to 
confirm such fears (Zatoiiski 1995). 
These growing health threats were challenges for health advocates. But 
democracy, an emerging civil society, and independent, news-craving 
mass media also opened up new opportunities for action. 
DEMOCRACY AND HEALTH: TOBACCO CONTROL IN POLAND 105 
The Kazimierz Declaration 
Even before the political system changed in most Eastern European 
countries, Poland hosted a conference at Kazimierz in November 1990 
with the title "A Tobacco-Free New Europe." The Cancer Centre and 
Institute organized the conference under the honorary patronage of 
Lech Walsa, the historic Solidarity leader, and in collaboration with the 
UICC and the American Cancer Society. It was the first meeting of 
health advocates from Western and Eastern Europe aimed at taking 
action to close the health gap between the two parts of the continent. It 
was also the first opportunity to present comprehensive scientific evi- 
dence on the magnitude of the health damage caused by smoking in 
Eastern Europe. 
The conference targeted public health leaders from Eastern Euro- 
pean countries. Many of the participants later became national leaders 
in tobacco-and-health policy in their own countries. Other participants 
included representatives of leading international health organizations 
such as the WHO and experts on tobacco and health from Europe and 
the United States, including Richard Peto of Oxford University; Greg 
Connolly of the Massachusetts Department of Health, director of one 
of the biggest tobacco control programs in the world; and Michael 
Wood from Belfast, then director of the UICC's Program on Tobacco 
and Cancer. 
The conference ended with the endorsement of the Kazimierz Declara- 
tion, which recommended that national governments adopt comprehen- 
sive tobacco control programs to reduce the health consequences of ciga- 
rette smoking. The declaration emphasized that in a democratic state, 
legislation was the key to curbing the damage to health from smoking. It 
recommended that governments take the following steps: 
• Introduce and enforce a strict ban on all direct or indirect advertising 
and promotion of tobacco goods or trademarks • Adopt, as a minimum, EU standards for health warnings on cigarette packs • Adopt, as a minimum, EU standards for maximum tar deliveries 
but with delays to allow national tobacco manufacturers to comply 
with maximum levels of 20 milligrams by 1995 and 15 milligrams 
by 2000 • Ban the introduction of smokeless tobacco and any new forms of tobacco • Impose a substantial health surcharge on all tobacco products to raise 
the minimum price of cigarettes • Regularly monitor tobacco-related mortality and smoking prevalence • Immediately establish national tobacco control coordinating committees • Recognize the need for smoke-free public environments 
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• Educate the public, especially young people, about the hazards of 
tobacco use 
• Support smokers who want to stop smoking. 
The Kazimierz conference also provided a framework for cooperation in 
tobacco control among Central and Eastern European countries. Not long 
after the conference, the WHO Collaborating Centre on the Action Plan for 
a Tobacco-Free Europe was set up at the Department of Epidemiology and 
Cancer Prevention of the Cancer Centre and Institute. Through it, Poland 
became a center for educating and training public health leaders in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
The Kazimierz Declaration provided a basis for health-related tobacco 
control action in Poland in the 1990s. Polish public health advocates saw 
the Kazimierz conference as a milestone in formulating objectives and as a 
catalyst for work on a parliamentary bill to reduce cigarette smoking with 
the goal of improving the health of the Polish people. Not surprisingly, the 
international tobacco industry viewed the conference with anxiety. 
Establishment of the Health Promotion Foundation 
In the new political milieu, nongovernmental institutions could be set up 
to achieve public goals. The Health Promotion Foundation was estab- 
lished to organize and support health promotion activities aimed at pre- 
venting smoking-related diseases and increasing consumption of fruits 
and vegetables.' Its continuing activities include: 
• Developing and offering education programs • Supporting scientific research • Cooperating with local and international organizations such as the 
UICC and the WHO 
• Organizing and making presentations at conferences and workshops. 
The foundation's tour de force has been a mass campaign to help 
smokers quit. This drive takes place every autumn, climaxing on the third 
Thursday in November. Its Polish name can be translated as the Great Pol- 
ish Smoke-Out, and it is based on the Great American Smoke-Out cam- 
paign. Within a few years, it became the largest regular public health cam- 
paign in Poland. Originally centrally organized, the campaign now relies 
on the active involvement of local communities and local media. 
1. The foundation was set up by the author. Its limited budget comes from private donors, 
and its project funding, from international and other organizations. Its work is greatly facil- 
itated by a strong partnership with Polish media. 
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Studies tracing the campaign's impact year by year have shown that 80 
to 90 percent of Poles have heard of it. Many smokers credit the campaign 
with inspiring them to smoke less or stop smoking (Jaworski, Przewoniak, 
and Zatoiiski 2000): 
• Every year, 20 to 30 percent of smokers have tried to smoke less. • Every year, about 1 million smokers (out of about 9 million daily smok- 
ers) have attempted to quit smoking. • Every year, 200,000 to 400,000 people claim to have quit smoking 
thanks to the campaign. 
Over more than a decade of campaigns, more than 2 million people 
have successfully quit smoking for good. These impressive results testify 
to the campaign's importance in improving the health of Poles. 
Part of the campaign's success comes from a popular annual competi- 
tion. All Poles who have quit smoking since the beginning of the year can 
take part simply by sending in postcards to the Health Promotion Foun- 
dation. The competition has become more popular each year, and in 2000, 
the 10th year, more than 40,000 postcards were submitted. The prize, 
awarded to a number of randomly chosen participants, is a one-week stay 
in Rome, including a private audience with Polish-born Pope John Paul II. 
Both public and commercial media support the program, with public 
radio and television being the main media sponsors. Every year, thou- 
sands of news items describe the campaign. Special advertisements, infor- 
mation on how to quit, discussions, and reports are broadcast and 
printed. The competition and the trip to Rome traditionally receive wide 
television coverage. 
New Legislation for Tobacco Control 
In 1989 the upper chamber of Parliament, the Senate, became the first 
democratically elected political institution in postwar Poland. Because of 
their high social status, medical professionals formed an unusually high 
proportion of senators. Consequently, health advocates chose to begin 
legislative action in the Senate. 
Soon after the Kazimierz conference, a working group at the Cancer 
Centre and Institute developed a preliminary draft of a tobacco control 
bill, together with a statement of reasons for approving it. The health- 
related arguments presented were backed up with scientific evidence, 
which included the dramatic level of premature mortality in Poland 
caused by inhaling cigarette smoke. The bill was based on WHO stan- 
dards for good tobacco control legislation and included a comprehensive 
set of provisions for reducing cigarette consumption. 
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Politicians, and especially the medical professionals holding senatorial 
posts, welcomed the draft bill. A working group headed by Dr. Maciej 
Krzakowski of Cieszyn was formed in 1991 to prepare the motion. Soon 
afterward, the bill was introduced in the Senate. 
Controversy Over the Proposed Bill 
To the surprise of politicians and health advocates, the bill encoun- 
tered strong opposition from the tobacco lobby. For the first time in the 
new democratic era, politicians were faced with the activities of a well- 
organized interest group determined to achieve its goals. 
The controversy over the bill soon became public. The health of Poles 
and the harm done by cigarette smoke became the subject of a stormy 
public debate lasting many years. The media, now independent, but not 
always free of external influences, played a key role in the debate. The 
health evidence was irrefutable—which is not to say that the tobacco 
industry has never questioned it. The discussion therefore centered on 
whether legislation (which is, after all, a piece of paper) could improve the 
health of a nation. 
Cigarette companies tried to make parliamentarians (and the entire 
nation) believe that the legislation would be ineffective. They questioned 
the efficacy of an advertising ban, health warnings, economic regulations, 
and education, and they referred to freedom of advertising. Above all, 
they warned that a ban would have a negative impact on Poland's future 
economic development. 
Initially, the media and public opinion were skeptical about the need 
for the legislation. What seemed to turn public opinion was the consis- 
tent argument by health advocates that smoking was largely responsi- 
ble for the catastrophic state of the health of adult Poles, In the last 
stage of the debate, opponents of the bill, now losing ground, concen- 
trated their attack on the proposed advertising ban. The maintenance of 
the right to advertise cigarette products became a key area of possible 
compromise. 
On the government side, financial decisionmakers disagreed with the 
proposal to allocate some tobacco tax revenue for financing actions to 
improve health by reducing smoking. In general, however, support for 
the legislation was rising among politicians and the public, irrespective of 
political affiliation. Public attitudes toward smoking were changing. The 
ongoing public debate had drawn the attention of Poles to the health costs 
of smoking, and they were also becoming more aware of reduced toler- 
ance for smoking in other countries. As public awareness increased, polit- 
ical parties took notice. 
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The Bill Passes 
In a country where democracy was only beginning to take root, a succes- 
sion of short-lived governments might have been vulnerable to the efforts 
of the tobacco lobby to derail the bill. The industry encouraged the use of 
a presidential veto and, failing at that, sought at least to delay the passage 
of the bill as long as possible. But no matter which political party domi- 
nated Parliament, the work and the debate on tobacco control legislation 
continued. On November 9, 1995, the Law for the Protection of Public 
Health against the Effects of Tobacco Use passed with an overwhelming 
majority (90 percent) of votes from all political parties. 
Some of the key areas covered by the new act were 
• Smoking bans in health care establishments, in schools and other edu- 
cational facilities, and in closed spaces in workplaces. • A ban on selling tobacco products to minors under 18. • A ban on selling tobacco products in health care establishments, 
schools and other educational facilities, and sports facilities. • A ban on selling tobacco products in vending machines. • Aban on producing or marketing smokeless tobacco products. • A total ban on advertising tobacco products in electronic media (radio 
and television). 
• Restrictions on advertising in other media. (Advert * nents in print 
media and on billboards had to carry health warnings in the upper part 
of each advertisement, occupying 20 percent of the area.) • Publication of health warnings on all cigarette packs. (The warnings 
were to occupy 30 percent of two of the largest sides of each pack.) • Free provision of treatment for smoking dependence. 
With the exception of two areas—lack of a total advertising ban and of 
a fund dedicated to improving smokers' health—the new law included 
all the actions outlined in the WHO's gold standard for tobacco control. 
The Polish legislation effectively provided for the protection of non- 
smokers and introduced the world's largest health warnings on cigarette 
packs. It also obligated the government to prepare annual action pro- 
grams for controlling the health consequences of cigarette smoking. 
Implementation reports have been presented to Parliament every year 
since then. 
The new regulations were enforced without much trouble, although 
there were some technical problems. For example, no company or indus- 
trial enterprise had a separate ventilated room to allocate for smokers' 
use. As a result, the regulation on implementing this measure only 
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became effective after five years; the provision of special rooms finally 
became a requirement on January 1, 2001. Within a short time, many 
workplaces, particularly in the private sector, became truly smoke-free, 
allowing smoking only in specially designated places. 
The Industry Strikes Back 
Having succeeded in preventing a total ban on tobacco advertising, the 
tobacco lobby immediately launched an aggressive campaign against the 
placement of large health warnings on cigarette packs. The lobby main- 
tained that the new legislation was inconsistent with current EU regula- 
tions and would hinder Poland's admission to the EU. Industry officials 
feared that these health warnings, the first to be introduced in a European 
country, would create a precedent. 
They were right. A few years later, the European Parliament referred to 
the Polish example as it began action to implement even larger health 
warnings on cigarette packs sold in EU countries. Warnings that occupy 
30 to 40 percent of the two larger sides of a cigarette pack are being intro- 
duced in the EU in 2003. 
A pro-tobacco parliamentary lobby was mobilized on an unprece- 
dented scale to try and thwart the plans to introduce the health warnings. 
Many Polish politicians regard the scope and intensity of that lobby as the 
most powerful in the entire first decade of parliamentary democracy in 
the country. For health advocates, the offensive against the existing legis- 
lation provided another opportunity to call the public's attention to the 
health catastrophe resulting from cigarette smoke. 
The fight of the tobacco industry's Goliath against the health advo- 
cates' David came under intense scrutiny in the media and even received 
international coverage. Undaunted by successive defeats, the tobacco 
lobby made three attempts to change the 1995 legislation during the vaca- 
tio legis (the period between the promulgation and the implementation of 
a law). The last attempt, a few months before the 1997 elections, was 
marked by a vigorous debate that almost resulted in a physical fight in 
Parliament. In spite of the enormous political and financial effort, on April 
11, 1997, the tobacco lobby lost the battle to change the size of health 
warnings on cigarette packs. This time, however, the majority was small: 
148 in favor, 122 against, and 100 abstentions. 
In mid-1998, after two and a half years of negotiations, Parliament 
finally confirmed that health warnings on cigarette packs sold in Poland 
were to occupy 30 percent of the two larger sides of the pack. These were 
the largest warnings in the world until Canada introduced larger, pictor- 
ial warnings in 2001. 
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Figure 5.4. Nominal and Real Trends in Tobacco Excise Taxes 
and Average Monthly Salaries, Poland, 1993—2002 
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The Role of Cigarette Pricing 
In privatization agreements concluded in the early 1990s, the government 
had agreed to freeze tobacco taxes. As a result, in the first half of the 1990s 
increases in cigarette prices remained below the inflation rate (which was 
high at the time), and taxes on cigarettes never exceeded 30 percent of the 
retail price, compared with the EU minimum of 57 percent and an EU 
average of about 75 percent. Increases in nominal cigarette prices matched 
income growth, and so cigarettes become increasingly affordable 
throughout the decade (figure 5.4). 
The 1995 act stipulated that the government must take effective eco- 
nomic action through a pricing policy designed to limit tobacco use. In 1997 
health advocates began collaborating with the World Bank and the Univer- 
sity of Chicago to investigate the economics of smoking in Poland. The 
work included analyzing the effect of cigarette taxes and price increases on 
smoking behavior (see, for example, Zatoiski, Matusiak, and Przewoniak 
1998). The preliminary results of this analysis showed that higher taxes and 
higher cigarette prices would result in a decrease in the number of ciga- 
rettes smoked and an increase in total tax revenues. Only when these results 
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were presented did the rate of tobacco tax increases accelerate. In 1999 and 
2000 the tax on tobacco products increased by approximately 30 percent 
each year. It must be stressed that this economic tool—higher taxes that 
raise prices—has a particularly strong impact on less well-educated and 
poorer people. This is often the group with the highest smoking prevalence 
and the least likelihood of quitting in response to information about the 
harmful health effects of smoking (World Bank 1999). Unfortunately, not all 
politicians and economists are convinced of the effectiveness or advisabil- 
ity of using prices as a tool for limiting tobacco use. 
Advertising Back on the Agenda 
In 1998 a newly elected Parliament moved tobacco advertising onto the 
agenda once again. Parliamentarians were alarmed by new evidence 
showing a decrease in the age at which children (especially girls) begin 
smoking (Mazur, Woynarowska, and Kowalewska 2000). They were also 
responding to growing public concern about aggressive advertising by 
tobacco companies, which Poles regarded as being targeted mostly at chil- 
dren. There was a general consensus that these two factors—the growing 
popularity of smoking among children and aggressive cigarette advertis- 
ing—were directly related and could be changed by a total ban on ciga- 
rette advertising. A new bill was introduced and this time moved rapidly 
through Parliament. A total ban on tobacco advertising was passed on 
September 10, 1999, by a large majority: 374 in favor, 11 against, and 12 
abstentions. All political parties endorsed the bill. The new law included 
a provision for allocating 0.5 percent of tobacco excise tax revenue to the 
National Tobacco Program with the aim of reducing the health conse- 
quences of smoking. By December 2000, tobacco advertisements had been 
removed from billboards all over the country. Since 2001, tobacco adver- 
tising has been banned in all print media. 
The progress of this bill, the parliamentary debate, and the media 
commentaries reflected the change in Polish society's attitude toward 
smoking. The decrease in smoking prevalence and the interest among 
smokers in trying to quit are striking. International studies indicate that 
the climate in Poland for health improvement through reducing tobacco 
consumption is one of the most favorable in Europe (Fagerstrom and 
others 2001). 
Democracy Is Healthier 
Democracy and a free-market economy have turned health into an impor- 
tant value in personal and family welfare in Poland. Pro-health behavior, 
the growing share in the Polish diet of vegetables and fruits (now avail- 
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able in great variety all year round), the popularity of a Mediterranean 
diet, and sports—all are at odds with inhaling tobacco smoke. The change 
in attitude toward smoking is most noticeable among educated Poles who 
have more experience of life in other countries, especially in the United 
States, and are aware of a lack of tolerance there toward smoking. In cer- 
tain communities, being a nonsmoker has become fashionable, and smok- 
ing no longer receives social approval. Quitting smoking is a popular 
New Year's resolution. 
Local and religious communities have become an important setting for 
discussions about the health effects of smoking. The Catholic Church is 
the main sponsor of the annual November antismoking campaign, and it 
also encourages nonsmoking at the local level—for example, when priests 
meet with engaged couples. Schools are also active in health promotion, 
helping to increase awareness of the dangers of tobacco use. The activities 
are aimed at parents, as well as at students and teachers. 
Consumption Drops Dramatically 
In the 1990s sales figures for cigarettes in Poland decreased for the first 
time since World War II. Tobacco industry data show that cigarette con- 
sumption fell by 10 percent between 1990 and 1998 (Michaels 1999). This 
reduction was achieved when the market was functioning normally and 
despite the enormously aggressive advertising policies of the tobacco 
companies. (As noted above, in the late 1990s the tobacco industry was 
spending US$100 million annually on advertising.) 
The drop in cigarette consumption was the result of reduced smoking 
prevalence in many different groups in society (Zatoiiski and others 
2000). As figure 5.5 shows, smoking prevalence among men decreased in 
all age groups between 1975 and 1999. For women, a reduction in the 
popularity of cigarette smoking has been observed mainly in the 
younger age groups. The least significant reductions and the highest 
smoking prevalence are among middle-aged Poles of both genders, with 
no decline in prevalence evident (yet?) among middle-aged women. The 
overall decrease in smoking is most marked among better educated 
groups; among less well-educated Poles, the decrease in smoking is 
much less. 
To sum up, smoking in Poland peaked at the end of the 1970s, with 
approximately 14 million smokers. At that time, 62 percent of all adult 
men and 30 percent of adult women smoked, and percentages for many 
age groups were higher. Prevalence levels remained at these levels in the 
1980s but decreased substantially in the 1990s. At present, slightly fewer 
than 10 million Poles smoke—about 40 percent of adult Polish men and a 
little more than 20 percent of adult Polish women. 
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Figure 53. Smoking Prevalence by Age Group, Men and 
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Health Indicators Improve 
The drop in smoking across much of the Polish population has 
improved the country's health indicators. As noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, the incidence of lung cancer is the best and most specific 
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measure of changes in exposure to tobacco smoke. In Poland shifts in 
this epidemiological indicator clearly reflect the history of exposure of 
the Polish population to cigarette smoke. 
The upward trend in lung cancer mortality in the youngest age group 
of adult men (age 20—44) was reversed in the 1980s, and by the end of the 
1990s mortality had decreased by about 30 percent from the peak level. A 
19 percent decline in lung cancer mortality in middle-aged men (age 
45—64) followed in the early 1990s. In the over-65 population, the effects 
of the changes in exposure to cigarette smoke are still not evident. 
In Hungary trends in lung cancer incidence before 1980 were similar to 
those in Poland. Hungary has not implemented effective tobacco control 
measures, and unlike the trend in Poland, the incidence of lung cancer is 
still increasing. The current incidence figures in Hungary are the highest 
ever for young and middle-aged adult men and women. In the United 
States and the United Kingdom, by contrast, trends in the epidemiology 
of lung cancer resemble those observed in Poland, although over a differ- 
ent time period (see figure 5.2, above). 
Paralleling the changes in lung cancer mortality in Poland are decreas- 
ing mortality trends for other tobacco-related cancers, such as those of the 
oral cavity, larynx, and pancreas (Zatoiski and Tyczyiski 1997). Another 
positive change since 1991 has been a significant 20 percent reduction in 
cardiovascular disease (Zatoiski, McMichael, and Powles 1998). About 10 
to 40 percent of all cardiovascular disease in Poland is estimated to be 
tobacco-related. (The range reflects age-group and gender differences.) 
Exposure to cigarette smoke plays a less important role in cardiovascular 
disease than in lung cancer, but some of the decrease in cardiovascular 
disease is probably due to reduced exposure to cigarette smoke. 
The reduction in smoking in Poland in the 1990s was also a factor in 
the drop in infant death risk during that decade. The lower risk is 
related to a decrease in the percentage of infants with low birth weight 
(<2,500 g)—from 8.4 percent in 1989 to 5.9 percent in 1999 (Szamotulska 
and others 2000). An estimated 20 to 30 percent of the reduction in risk 
can be attributed to lower exposure to cigarette smoke among pregnant 
women and their unborn and newborn babies. Between 1985 and 1999, 
the prevalence of smoking among women age 20—29 dropped signifi- 
cantly, by about 23 percent. 
Overall, the total mortality rate in the Polish population from all causes 
fell by about 10 percent between 1991 and 2000, corresponding to a decrease 
of nearly 36,000 deaths annually. The reduction in cigarette consumption is 
estimated to be responsible for about one-third of the reduction in mortal- 
ity across all age groups, or about 10,000 deaths a year (Zatoski 2000). Life 
expectancy—the best overall health indicator—increased in the 1990s by 
almost four years for men and almost three years for women. 
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Lessons Learned 
Despite the significant progress in the past decade, Poland's journey 
toward health improvement through tobacco control is just beginning. 
The experience gained in these early stages will provide the foundation 
for future strategies. 
Strong Warnings Have an Impact 
One focus of early efforts has been on increasing public awareness of the 
health hazards of smoking. A valuable tool in raising awareness has been 
the large, clear warnings on cigarette packs. As a result of the introduction 
of the warnings, 3 percent of smokers stopped smoking, 16 percent 
attempted to quit, and another 16 percent are now more aware of the 
harm done by smoking (Zatoiiski, Przewoniak, and Porebski 2000). 
Pricing Policy Is Key, Especially 
for the Health of People with Low Incomes 
The message about the harmful effects of cigarette smoke has mainly 
influenced better-educated Poles. Among people with basic education, 
including pregnant women, smoking prevalence has decreased very little 
(Zatoiski and Przewoniak 1999). Cigarette prices have been rising at a 
slower pace than incomes, which makes cigarettes more affordable and 
tends to increase consumption, especially among lower-income groups. 
Pricing policy is an area of strategic importance for further limiting the 
health consequences of cigarette smoking. The World Bank's review of 
evidence shows clearly that it is the strongest and most effective single 
measure (World Bank 1999), and recent observations in Poland have con- 
firmed this (Czart and others 2000). But the reduction in tobacco con- 
sumption that Poland has achieved so far is not attributable to the intro- 
duction of a pricing policy, since significant price increases occurred only 
after 1997. Taxation policy has only just begun to be used to reduce 
tobacco use in Poland, and more could be done. 
Doctors and Other Medical Professionals Need to Do More 
Medical advice is another effective method of motivating smokers to quit. 
Even though the antismoking climate in Poland is one of the most favorable 
in Europe, the contribution of physicians and other medical professionals to 
treating tobacco-dependence syndrome remains insignificant. Only 2 to 
3 percent of ex-smokers report medical assistance in quitting. 
Polish ex-smokers are mostly those who were the least addicted. 
Nearly one-half of daily smokers (about 4 million) smoke their first ciga- 
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rette within the first half-hour after waking up. In the most addicted 
cases, 8 percent of adult male smokers and 4 percent of adult female 
smokers (a total of 0.5 million people) wake up during the night to smoke 
a cigarette (Zatoiski and Przewoniak 1999). 
The smokers with the strongest addiction and the greatest exposure to 
cigarette smoke are those born between 1940 and 1960. They reached ado- 
lescence (and started smoking) between 1955 and 1975, a period of wide- 
spread social acceptance of smoking. Smokers in this group either already 
suffer from severe smoking-related health problems or will before long 
see symptoms of the health damage caused by their smoking. This group 
should receive special medical attention and should be the target of care- 
fully designed immediate interventions. Stopping exposure to cigarette 
smoke always brings substantial health benefits, even after many years of 
smoking (Peto 2002). 
Nicotine addiction is a medical problem, so supporting those who 
want to quit or have quit is a special task for physicians. Both general 
practitioners and specialists (cardiologists, pulmonologists, obstetricians, 
pediatricians, and oncologists) should be made aware that helping people 
cure their tobacco addiction is part of a doctor's responsibility to his or 
her patients. It is impossible to cure patients of major diseases, such as 
chronic bronchitis and cardiovascular diseases, including coronary heart 
disease, without first getting them to quit smoking. Health providers in 
Poland are becoming more involved in helping patients stop. Some health 
insurance policies cover treatment to help people stop smoking, which 
makes economic sense, since smokers have much higher annual health 
care costs than nonsmokers. 
Another great challenge in Poland that demands immediate action and 
a long-term campaign is reduction of pre- and postnatal exposure to 
tobacco smoke. Smoking during pregnancy and exposure of young chil- 
dren to cigarette smoke remain problems. In fetal and infant life, second- 
hand smoke is an important contributing factor to poor health. Interven- 
tion programs supported by local communities should be undertaken to 
protect children from this risk. 
Science-Based Evidence Is Important to Justify Action 
In all of Poland's tobacco control efforts, solid scientific evidence has 
played a key role. It has helped convince the general public of the dangers 
of tobacco consumption and has provided the justification for programs 
and legislation. 
The Polish experience in changing people's attitudes toward smoking 
shows the dominant role of medical evidence. This evidence, based 
chiefly on domestic data compiled in collaboration with leading research 
centers abroad under the auspices of the WHO, demonstrated the extent 
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of the epidemic of diseases caused by inhaling cigarette smoke. In partic- 
ular, highlighting the causal relationship between cigarette smoke and 
cancers, especially lung cancer, proved to be a good tactic. People viewed 
news on this link as reliable because the information came from the 
national Cancer Centre and Institute and was endorsed by prominent sci- 
entists. The ready acceptance of this information in the late 1980s may 
have been the result of increased awareness of the problem as the epi- 
demic of tobacco-related diseases reached its peak. Poles were able to 
compare the health messages and scientific evidence with news about the 
health of their relatives and friends who were smokers. 
Legislation Is Essential for Progress in Tobacco Control 
Another important contribution to Poland's progress in tobacco control 
has been the legislation enacted in 1995 and 1999. The years 1990 to 1995, 
in particular, when the tobacco control law was drafted, were crucial to 
the later success of tobacco control efforts. Especially effective was the 
debate surrounding the bill, when the public heard the strong health evi- 
dence against smoking and observed the tobacco industry's actions to 
prevent the bill from being passed. The process of introducing and 
defending the legislation provided a forum for changing public attitudes 
toward tobacco, especially among the best-educated groups of society. 
One important lesson from the Polish experience in preparing the bill 
is that legislative tactics must correspond to the level of public awareness 
of the issue. In the early 1990s Poles did not understand the importance of 
a total ban on tobacco advertising for reducing the health consequences of 
tobacco smoking. Only after years of watching the practices of the tobacco 
industry and following the national debate did people change their atti- 
tudes. This is reflected in the initial rejection of the total advertising ban 
in 1995 and its adoption in 1999 by an overwhelming majority of votes 
and with support from all political parties. 
Both the 1995 legislation and its 1999 amendment have proved instru- 
mental in changing the attitude of Poles toward tobacco use. Still, this 
transformation should be viewed as a phased process rather than a revo- 
lutionary change. Large, clear health warnings on cigarette packs that stig- 
matize the product, a ban on smoking in public places, and a total ban on 
tobacco advertising help reinforce this attitudinal change day after day 
Local Involvement in Tobacco Control Efforts Is Crucial 
Rapid further progress in tobacco control is not possible without the 
involvement of local communities. In recent years activity regarding 
tobacco control has been transferred from the Parliament and the central 
government to local communities. The attitudes and participation of local 
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role models have become ever more important in supporting tobacco con- 
trol activities. Involvement of local health providers is crucial in the bat- 
tle against tobacco-related diseases. 
Despite all these achievements, several thousand Polish smokers still 
die needlessly and prematurely every year because of smoking. Tobacco 
control continues to be a health priority in Poland. 
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Political Change in South Africa: 
New Tobacco Control 
and Public Health Policies 
Mia Malan and Rosemary Leaver 
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic turnaround in the South 
African government's attitude toward tobacco control. Before 1993, 
tobacco control policy was virtually nonexistent, but the 1999 Tobacco 
Control Amendment Act gave the country some of the most progressive 
tobacco control policies in the world. 
Today, all tobacco advertisements and sponsorships have been banned; 
smoking at work and in restaurants is illegal, except in clearly demarcated 
areas; and explicit health warnings are required on all cigarette packs. 
Although cigarettes are still relatively cheap in South Africa, excise taxes 
represent almost 50 percent of their total retail price, after significant 
increases in 1994 and again after 1997 (van Walbeek 2002b). 
As a result of these policies, cigarette consumption is on a downward 
spiral. According to Come van Walbeek of the School of Economics, Uni- 
versity of Cape Town, it decreased from 1.9 billion packs in 1991 to about 
1.3 billion packs in 2002. The rate of decline has accelerated especially 
since 1997, when large tax increases sharply increased the price of ciga- 
rettes. In light of these accomplishments, many today regard South Africa 
as a model for other countries. 
But these gains have not come easily. They are the result of decades of 
steadfast lobbying by the health community and antismoking groups and 
of the new South African government's commitment o public health. And 
they have come in the face of vehement opposition from the tobacco indus- 
try, advertising agencies, hospitality associations, and, until the early 1990s, 
an apartheid government with extraordinarily close links to the trade itself. 
The History: Early Days, Early Struggles 
As long ago as September 1963, the South African Medical Journal, in a far- 
sighted editorial, offered advice to the health minister of the time: 
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There should be no hesitation about banning smoking in public places 
and on public transport. . . . Cigarette advertising should at first be 
restricted as to quantity and content with a view to its eventual limita- 
tion. It might also be advisable to insist that each cigarette packet should 
carry a notice to the effect that the contents are potentially dangerous to 
health. The minister of health may also attempt further restrictions of 
smoking by increasing the taxation on cigarettes.. . . The matter is impor- 
tant and urgent. 
Dr. Yussuf Saloojee, executive director of the National Council Against 
Smoking (NCAS), has ironically remarked that these suggestions were 
considered so "important and urgent" that 12 years passed before a sin- 
gle one of them was acted on (Saloojee 1993a). In 1975 the tobacco indus- 
try volunteered not to advertise cigarettes on television, but it took 
another 12 years for it to agree to print on cigarette packs a warning 
("Smoking is a health risk.") that was "vaguely worded, badly placed and 
in very small print" (Hansard 1993). 
"A Crime of Apart heid" 
Some have maintained that the government's historical lack of interest in 
tobacco control was "a crime of apartheid," arguing that the tobacco indus- 
try was dominated by white, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans with very 
close ties to the government (Wilkins 2000). The history of the tobacco 
industry in the country, particularly prior to 1993, bears out this view. 
The tobacco manufacturing industry in South Africa is very highly con- 
centrated. The Rembrandt group used to control 87 percent of the market, 
with British American Tobacco South Africa (BAT) being the only other 
company with any significant market share. Under the able leadership of 
the Afrikaner businessman Anton Rupert, Rembrandt developed into a 
very successful corporation, and it is often perceived as a symbol of the 
Afrikaans-speaking community's rise to economic power. After its merger 
with Rothmans International, it gained control of 95 percent of the mar- 
ket. Rupert retained a strong hand through his control of two companies, 
Remgro and Richemont, that owned 30 percent of BAT. 
Rupert became one of the most powerful businessmen in South Africa: 
he built up strong links with virtually every major decisionmaker, includ- 
ing legal firms and media institutions, and was on the board of most major 
trusts. Yach (2002) recalls that "anywhere you turned in the media and 
tried to get a story published that advocated tobacco control, you were 
blocked by their absolute fear and trepidation of Rupert's long reach 
through his tobacco companies." Ironically, Rupert's wife was involved 
with South Africa's Cancer Association, while her husband's products 
were killing many of the people she was fighting to keep alive (Yach 2002). 
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Rembrandt had a long history of backing the National Party, which 
was dominated by Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. The two were, in 
fact, founded in the same year, 1948, and "grew up together" (Yach 2002). 
The National Party represented Afrikaner political power, and an 
unhealthily close relationship between the tobacco industry and the gov- 
ernment had far-reaching implications for policymaking. 
In the early 1990s Rembrandt rebuilt one of then-president F. W. de 
Klerk's homes, and there were annual Rembrandt-funded outings for cab- 
inet ministers. For its part, the National Party government demonstrated 
a favorable attitude toward the industry through low excise taxes, virtu- 
ally unrestrained advertising, and an absence of restrictions on smoking 
in public places. For instance, within party circles, it was well-known that 
F. W. de Klerk's predecessor, P. W. Botha, strongly disliked smoking—so 
much so that he forbade it at cabinet meetings. Yet Botha never expressed 
his attitude in antitobacco measures (Perlman 1991a). 
During this time, the tobacco industry (in effect, Rembrandt) was the 
Ministry of Finance's prime adviser on cigarette excise matters, with no 
indication of any Ministry of Health influence. This was clearly reflected 
in Finance Minister Barend du Plessis' 1983 budget speech, when he 
warned, "The Tobacco Board has presented justified arguments for the 
maintenance of the status quo regarding the excise taxes on tobacco and I 
do not intend to wake sleeping dogs." Three years later, in 1986, du Plessis 
again refused to increase excise taxes on cigarettes, arguing that any tax 
increase could adversely affect consumption and lead to a reduction of 
revenue (van Walbeek 2002a). 
At the time, excise taxes accounted for less than 30 percent of the retail 
price, and the real excise rate on tobacco had been decreasing steadily for 
the previous 15 years, eroded by inflation, it is hard to imagine that the 
minister's grasp of basic economics was so flawed that he believed his 
own statement. He, like his peers in many countries around the world, 
would have known very well that a tax rate increase would in fact lead to 
an increase in revenues. The decrease in consumption in response to a 
price increase would be smaller in percentage terms than the tax rise. The 
higher tax revenues per pack would generate higher total revenues, 
despite a somewhat lower sales volume. 
The Cape Town Debate 
The effect on policy of the relationship between the government and the 
tobacco industry became evident in 1989, when the Cape Town City 
Council announced plans to restrict cigarette advertising and smoking in 
public places. In protest, Rembrandt threatened to withdraw its sponsor- 
ship of the Cape Town Symphony Orchestra. The company's influence 
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went well beyond its sponsorship: it commanded an enormous network 
of power and influence, and there was a significant threat of retribution if 
its wishes were thwarted. Rembrandt's tactic worked: Kobus Meiring, the 
administrator of the Cape Province, refused to pass the legislation needed 
to enforce the council's plans (Dennehy 1989a). 
The restrictions, which had been proposed by Dr. Michael Popkiss, 
Cape Town's chief medical officer, would have required restaurants to set 
aside at least half their tables for nonsmokers (Doman 1989a). Existing by- 
laws outlawed smoking only on the lower decks of buses, in cinemas, and 
in public elevators. New restrictions on tobacco advertising were also pro- 
posed: in addition to the ban on cigarette commercials on television, cig- 
arette advertising would be prohibited in all council-owned buildings 
and properties (Dennehy 1989a). 
Four days before the council debate on the proposal, Popkiss wrote to 
Anton Rupert appealing for funds for an AIDS awareness campaign. An 
outraged Rupert turned down the request, saying that his refusal came 
"from an industiy you have decided to destroy" (Bateman 1989b) in pursuit 
of "not only dictatorial, but clearly impracticable" objectives (Morris 1989). 
The exchange prompted Cape Town mayor Peter Muller to rebuke Popkiss 
for his insensitivity and bad timing, declaring that he found it "incongruous 
that the [medical officer] can write a financial appeal only four days before 
a major smoking debate—he must either think that Dr. Rupert is foolish, or 
alternatively, he's totally devoid of any sensitivity" (Bateman 1989b). 
Muller's chastisement was immensely embarrassing to the medical officer, 
as it was highly irregular for a mayor to publicly rebuke a city official. 
At the council debate, strong support was shown for the proposal, with 
25 councillors voting in favor and only 5, including the Cape Town mayor 
himself, against. A palpable discomfort existed, however, between Pop- 
kiss and the administrator and mayor. This tension was exacerbated by 
the leak of internal correspondence between Rupert and Popkiss in which 
the Rembrandt chair accused Popkiss of being "hell-bent to create new 
regulations against the freedom of the individual to decide for himself" 
(Bateman 1989b). To worsen the situation, there was a further leak of a let- 
ter from the mayor to the council's executive committee in which he was 
highly critical of Popkiss and his suggested regulations. 
The publicity surrounding this feud sparked a heated debate in the let- 
ters pages of Cape Town newspapers. The National Council Against 
Smoking, the Heart Foundation, the Cancer Association, and the Medical 
Association of South Africa sprang to Popkiss's defense, praising him for 
creating awareness about the health hazards of smoking and pledging 
their full support for the bylaw. 
The restaurant industry, which had remained silent until then, began 
actively voicing its concerns. A local organization, the Cape Restaurateurs 
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Association, gave the council 12 days to withdraw the bylaw or face the 
threat of court action. When the Cape Town council refused to oblige, the 
association issued a summons, stating that the ban was "irregular, ultra 
vires, invalid and unreasonable" (Doman 1989a). The Federation of Hotel, 
Liquor and Catering Associations of South Africa (FEDHASA) organized 
a petition signed by 307 Cape Town restaurants to protest the new bylaw. 
The restaurateurs' primary objections were that the bylaw infringed on 
their right to decide how best to run their businesses (Doman 1989a) and 
that some restaurants were too small to be reasonably expected to divide 
their eating areas (Leaver 2002). The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 
did not remain silent either: it argued that business in South Africa was 
already overregulated and that "efforts should be directed toward doing 
away with regulations rather than devising more ways to inhibit business 
activity" (Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 1990). 
Against the fierce opposition to the bill, the health lobby made a com- 
pelling case based on the health hazards posed by smoking and inhaling 
secondhand smoke. And a large majority of the Cape Town public sup- 
ported restrictions on smoking in enclosed public spaces. The bylaw was 
only one step away from becoming effective when it was vetoed by Cape 
Province administrator Meiring. In response, Popkiss commented that he 
"had never been in favor of the 50—50 rule anyway, because [it] had not 
been shown to protect non-smokers" (Leaver 2002). 
The Evidence against Tobacco Mounts 
Meanwhile, a small success was achieved in a different arena. Key play- 
ers in the public health community, including Prof. Harry Seftel, then at 
the Medical School of the University of Witwatersrand, and Drs. Derek 
Yach and Krisela Steyn of the Medical Research Council, were compiling 
evidence on the harm caused by tobacco in South Africa and on the high 
costs that tobacco use imposed on both the state and patients in the form 
of treatment costs for tobacco-related illnesses, forgone earnings, and pre- 
mature deaths. 
As early as 1982, Yach published one of the first tobacco control arti- 
cles in the South African Medical Journal. His study was considered so 
controversial that the Medical Research Council refused to publish it 
under its own name but instead listed it as a personal contribution. The 
study focused on the economic aspects of smoking in South Africa, 
claiming that "while it is true that a reduction in tobacco and cigarette 
production would cause some losses to the national economy and indi- 
viduals, it is also true that the reduction in total costs accompanying 
such a decrease would more than compensate these losses" (Yach 1982). 
Encouraging authors to publish studies under their own names was "a 
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highly exceptional stance to take," indicative of even the medical estab- 
lishment's fear of "the impact of negative reactions of tobacco compa- 
nies" (Yach 2002). 
But the persistent efforts of Yach and his colleagues eventually paid off. 
In 1988 they succeeded in arranging a special "tobacco focus" issue of the 
South African Medical Journal, to coincide with the first World No Tobacco 
Day. It was the first time ever that an entire issue of the Journal had been 
devoted to one preventive aspect of public health, and it was considered 
a major breakthrough in tobacco control. Yach described it as a critical 
turning point because "we were not just saying the deaths were rising, we 
started getting a projection of what was going to happen in the future and 
introduced the fact that there were practical legislative options that had 
been taken around the world." The Journal had a huge impact in South 
Africa, receiving extensive coverage and discussion and helping set a 
basis for future action. So, the publication of the special issue was a first 
step toward "bridging the gap between epidemiological data sitting in 
scientific journals and popularizing the data in the mass media and 
among political groups" (Yach 2002). 
The high medical costs of treating smoking-related illnesses at hospi- 
tals were drawn to the public's attention. In an editorial in the South 
African Medical Journal, Anton Rupert was accused of using "emotive lan- 
guage" to obscure facts, including the fact that "smoking caused almost 
half of the cases at Groote Schuur, Cape Town's premier hospital" (Bate- 
man 1989b). These realities did not elude authorities at the University of 
Cape Town, who used the hospital as a training facility. In March 1989 
smoking and the sale of cigarettes were banned in all public areas of the 
medical school campus, including cafeterias and bars (Cape Argus 1989b). 
As political opportunities emerged in later years, the strong evidence 
base helped support and justify actions. Yach (2002) saw the first indica- 
tion of success in 1991, when initial documents of the new African 
National Congress (ANC) government's Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment Plan strongly featured tobacco control as an intended policy. It was 
helpful that a number of people who eventually assumed senior posi- 
tions in the government had become colleagues of Yach and Steyn in the 
Medical Research Council in the years just prior to the turnover of power. 
The most prominent of these were Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, who was health 
minister from 1994 to 1999, and Dr. Olive Shisana, who became director- 
general of health in 1995. 
Action and Reaction: Efforts Elsewhere 
Where Cape Town had failed, Johannesburg dared to tread. In March 1991 
the Johannesburg City Council banned smoking in take-away restaurants 
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and required that 60 percent of seating in all other eateries be reserved for 
nonsmokers (Burgers 1991). The council faced strong opposition from 
pro-tobacco groups such as the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce 
(Woodgate 1991), but it stood by its decision, arguing that council mem- 
bers would rather have "egg on their faces than death on their con- 
sciences" (Nevill and Gill 1991). 
Steps had also been taken in the Eastern Cape Province, where the 
medical officer of Port Elizabeth had banned smoking in prominent pub- 
lic buildings in the city. Even private companies started to act: many 
declared their cafeterias and boardrooms smoke-free areas and encour- 
aged smoking executives to attend subsidized quit-smoking courses (Bar- 
rett 1989). 
These events, particularly those in Johannesburg, prompted Popkiss to 
launch a new offensive against smoking in 1992, asserting that Cape Town 
should match the bylaw passed in Johannesburg. The Cape Town medical 
officer was convinced that his new recommendations would fare better 
than previous ones had, since they were shorter, simpler, and easier to 
understand. For the second time, however, his proposals came under 
heavy attack from pro-tobacco lobby groups, and once again the Cape 
Province administrator refused to pass the bylaw. 
A Turning Point 
With the second failure to pass a no-smoking bylaw, prospects for legisla- 
tion in the Cape Province seemed dim. On the national level, however, the 
appointment of the country's first woman health minister provided a 
gleam of hope. Dr. Rina Venter may not have been a pro-control advocate 
when she assumed office, but she was an open-minded social worker 
with sympathy for nonsmokers who had to suffer from passive smoking 
(Saloojee 1993a). Perhaps her most important quality was that she was a 
skilled politician and person of integrity who was prepared to fight for 
legislation she believed in. 
Yussuf Saloojee remarked that "the spark that may have served to 
focus the mind of the minister on the issue" came in 1991, in the debate 
on her first health budget (Saloojee 1993a). During the discussion, an 
opposition member of Parliament, Carole Charlewood, criticized the 
government, accusing it of "protecting the vested interests of the power- 
ful tobacco industry, and not the people of the country." Charlewood's 
attack was based on the 1988 report of the Medical Research Council, 
"Smoking and Health in South Africa: The Need for Action" (Yach and 
Townsend 1988), which argued that "the costs of the tobacco industry to 
society outweighed its benefits" (Wilkins 2000) and advocated strong 
measures to discourage smoking. 
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Venter knew that, other than low-key, low-budget educational cam- 
paigns, the government had very little with which to defend itself against 
Charlewood's accusations. In her reply the health minister therefore 
promised to look into the possibility of tobacco control legislation. She 
later said that "she regarded the matter as sufficiently important to make 
the decision there and then without having first consulted with her cabi- 
net colleagues" (Saloojee 2002). According to Saloojee, that moment was 
the turning point in the administration's approach to tobacco control: "It 
was a vital public commitment, and the first signal of new thinking on 
this issue at the highest levels of government." 
Building Support 
Venter was well aware of her party's vested interests, and she recognized 
that it would be unrealistic to expect full support for her plans. She also 
knew that one minister, however determined, was "not going to disperse 
the smoke ring alone" (Perlman 1991a). The outcome of her undertaking 
would depend crucially on how much support the health department got 
from the rest of the government. It was not only her party's well-oiled links 
with the industry that seemed to stand in her way: the state president and 
many of his colleagues were chain-smokers. In fact, when F. W. de Kierk 
was asked to observe No Tobacco Day by not smoking, his office replied 
that his schedule that day was too stressful for him to do without (Perlman 
1991a). But despite being a heavy smoker, de Kierk knew that the addiction 
was harmful, and he supported moderate measures to discourage smoking. 
The tobacco industry was a major source of taxes, export revenue, and 
jobs. According to Penman (1991a), in 1990 the industry generated 988 mil- 
lion South African rand in taxes, employed over 60,000 people, and spent 
nearly 90 million rand on advertising.1 There were, furthermore, several 
major tobacco-sponsored sports events such as Benson & Hedges cricket 
and the Rothmans July Handicap, the premier horse race. 
But Venter had a strategy. Shortly after her announcement, one of the 
country's most influential antitobacco alliances, the Tobacco Action 
Group (TAG), sought a meeting with her. TAG consisted of three large, 
highly vocal lobbying organizations: the Heart Foundation of Southern 
Africa, the Cancer Association of South Africa, and the National Council 
Against Smoking. TAG was highly effective in using "public fora and the 
media to warn the public against the dangers of tobacco, to call on the 
government to introduce effective counter measures, and to discredit the 
industry's claims about their product and the importance of their indus- 
1. In 1991, 2.5 South African rand = 1 U.S. dollar. 
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try" (van Walbeek 2002a). Venter knew that she would not be able to steer 
a tobacco control bill through Parliament without positive media cover- 
age and outside support. She therefore made a pact with the alliance: she 
would push for a draft bill from inside if TAG would see to matters out- 
side the legislature (Saloojee 1993a). Saloojee later remarked that Venter 
"stood by her word throughout this process" (Saloojee 2002). 
The agreement meant that the health minister did not have to spend 
time campaigning for favorable media coverage and backing beyond Par- 
liament: experts were going to do it for her. This plan fit well with the 
changing role tobacco-control lobbyists saw for themselves during the 
early 1990s: "Rather than lobbying the policymakers, they were working 
with the policymakers in publicizing the positive aspects of the proposed 
tobacco measures" (van Walbeek 2002a). 
But however skilled TAG was, it did not face an easy task. The coun- 
try's two most powerful media institutions at the time, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and Nasionale Pers, had close ties with 
the tobacco industry and were in many respects government controlled. 
Nasionale Pers owned almost all Afrikaans newspapers and had sold a 
considerable proportion of its company shares to Rembrandt (Penman 
1991a). The SABC received substantial government subsidies and claimed 
that many of its radio stations could not survive without cigarette adver- 
tisements (Saloojee 1993a). 
When the NCAS produced its first antismoking commercial, which it 
regarded as "a first step towards educating the public to stop being 
seduced by cigarette advertising" (Levy 1991a), the SABC refused to 
broadcast it. The corporation conceded that it had a gentlemen's agree- 
ment with the cigarette companies, saying that "because the tobacco 
industry had voluntarily undertaken not to advertise tobacco products on 
TY. it would be unfair to accept anti-smoking ads" (Levy 1991b). In stark 
contrast with other print media companies, Nasionale Pers was (unsur- 
prisingly) reluctant to place the advertisement and coyly said it wanted to 
look at the copy before deciding. The visual broadcast version of the com- 
mercial, entitled "Smoky Conversation," showed six young people pic- 
nicking and smoking in an idyllic setting while talking about the dangers 
of their addiction. It was to be shown in all major cinemas for two weeks 
in April that year, but at a high and unusual cost: Cinemark, one of the 
country's biggest cinema chains, waived its usual policy of presenting 
public service messages gratis and charged for showing it. The reason was 
clear—fear of losing tobacco advertising, as almost a third of all cinema 
ads were for cigarettes (Penman 1991a). 
Saloojee dismissed the SABC's stance as "rubbish." Tobacco was "unde- 
niably the largest preventable cause of death and the NCAS had a right and 
a duty to inform the public about its dangers using all available media." 
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The industry declined to comment, arguing that "smoking was too emo- 
tionally loaded to be put into perspective in a single paragraph" (East Lon- 
don Daily Dispatch 1991). Instead, it released a leaflet, "Common Sense in 
Smoking—Personal Choice and Moderation the Key" (Perlman 1991a), 
which asserted that allegations against smoking were based on heated reac- 
tions rather than factual foundations. One paragraph stated, "The industry 
does not react to points of view which are made merely for the sake of gen- 
erating publicity, but prefers to put its own point of view to those people 
who are mindful of their health and the convenience of others and who are 
prepared to make allowances for other forms of enjoyment." 
When the industry called for private talks with the minister, it became 
apparent that it had more than the distribution of pamphlets planned: it 
was going to spend sizable amounts to fly in three international consul- 
tants to persuade the minister that legislation was unnecessary (Saloojee 
1993a). Venter agreed to the meeting provided that she could involve local 
tobacco control advocates, including TAG, the Medical Research Council, 
and an economist from the University of Cape Town. Two years later, dur- 
ing the proceedings of the Extended Public Committee, she described the 
encounter: "We spent an entire afternoon, from two o'clock to five o'clock, 
on this matter. These people gave an elucidation of research which in their 
opinion, as they interpreted it, indicated that tobacco smoke was not at all 
harmful" (Hansard 1993). 
Saloojee (2002) recalls an apprehensiveness within the tobacco control 
group, some of whose members "felt like the 'B' team, and were slightly 
intimidated by the international experts." But in the end, the South 
Africans were the ones who convinced the minister. At the conclusion of 
the meeting, Venter "unequivocally stated that she was going to proceed 
with legislation because it was her department's duty to warn smokers of 
the risks of smoking and to protect the rights of non-smokers without 
infringing on the rights of smokers" (Saloojee 1993a). 
Yet again, there was a strategy involved. Yach recalled that 
the minister instructed us to be on our worst possible behavior, which 
was quite pleasant to be. I'm pretty sure they thought they were coming 
into a developing country where the knowledge base about the tobacco 
industry's behavior was poor. But we had already been fully briefed— 
through our links with international colleagues—on everybody who was 
going to be before us. We knew all their arguments and that they could 
be countered easily. (Yach 2002) 
Venter later described it as a day of great satisfaction: 
If there has been one day in my life on which I have been proud of our 
scientists, it was that day. Not only did they testify to the thoroughness 
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with which they do research, but also demonstrated that they could hold 
their own in a debate on an international level in which arguments were 
being advanced in regard to the harmfulness or otherwise to one's health 
of tobacco smoke. (Hansard 1993) 
Saloojee believed "the industry's ability to buy expensive foreign lobby- 
ing consultants" had turned into a liability: "Nationalism became an 
advocacy tool. It was a matter of national pride that the home-grown sci- 
entists had put the foreign experts in their places" (Saloojee 1993a). 
The Road to Legislation 
Months later in 1991, Venter introduced the Control of Smoking and Adver- 
tising of Tobacco Products Draft Bill. The proposed legislation would give 
her powers to bar or limit smoking in certain public places and make it an 
offense to sell cigarettes to anyone under 16. But the real sting was in the 
changes the minister wanted to make to the advertising code for tobacco 
products: visual commercials would be required to carry a rotating health 
warning, and broadcast versions would have to include the phrase "smok- 
ing is a health risk" in a voice similar to that of the main presenter of the 
advertisement (Perlman 1991a). Advertisements would not be allowed to: 
• Depict any woman of childbearing age as being associated with smoking • Imply that smoking is associated with success in sports • Imply that the use of tobacco products is a sign or proof of manliness, 
courage, or daring or enhances feminine charm. 
Restrictions were also to be placed on tobacco companies' sponsorship 
of sporting events and any other activities implicitly associated with 
health, success, or youth. Together, these restrictions called almost every 
cigarette advertisement in South Africa into question. 
Tobacco control lobby groups welcomed the proposal but pointed out 
that a multifaceted approach was needed. The National Council Against 
Smoking suggested a "comprehensive anti-smoking program centered 
around increased taxes on tobacco products" (Leaver 2002). The Medical 
Research Council reiterated this plea, expressing concern about the 
increased incidence of smoking among teenagers in poorer, predomi- 
nantly black communities (Medicine Today 1991). The tobacco industry 
chose not to comment. 
Stumbling Blocks 
Venter's draft legislation was to be published in the Gazette on June 28, 
1991. (All proposed legislation must be published in the Gazette before 
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being introduced in Parliament.) It was at this point that the "vested inter- 
ests" that Member of Parliament Carole Charlewood had commented on 
in 1991 became apparent: a day after Venter had her "triumphant" meet- 
ing with the tobacco industry representatives and local antismoking 
advocates, the government delayed her plans to publish the proposals. 
The state maintained that the delay would allow for "the incorporation of 
a few new ideas" and would give the minister time to review them (Pen- 
man 1991b). Authorities promised that the postponement would be min- 
imal. But two months later, in September 1991, the health department 
announced that the draft legislation would only be submitted in the fol- 
lowing year's parliamentary session. 
In March 1992 the proposed law reemerged, this time as the Tobacco 
Products Control Bill. TAG immediately organized a workshop to 
broaden support for the bill, inviting professional, labor, and community 
associations. Each organization was asked to issue a public statement on 
smoking and health and to make representations in favor of the legisla- 
tion. Through this lobbying process, 86 percent of the submissions 
received by the Department of National Health and Population Develop- 
ment were in support of the proposals (Saloojee 1993a). 
The bill's most significant opponents were the South African Business 
Institute and the SABC. TAG felt that there was not much it could do to 
influence the Business Institute but that "the opposition of the SABC 
could prove a major impediment" (Saloojee 1993a). The SABC asked for 
radio to be exempt from broadcasting health warnings, as some of its 
radio stations received up to a third of their revenue from cigarette com- 
mercials. It argued that the industry would shift its advertising from radio 
to billboards and print media, where it could more easily disguise warn- 
ings. The SABC's case was strongly argued, and research had shown that 
many illiterate people identified cigarettes by package design and would 
not understand printed health messages. A compromise was reached that 
exempted radio stations provided that they set aside a pro rata amount of 
free time for broadcasting health messages. 
The tobacco industry yet again refused to comment publicly. It stuck to 
its "private approach," with the Tobacco Institute of South Africa (TISA) 
sending representatives directly to the health minister (Leaver 2002). 
In June 1992 the health department once again announced that the bill 
was unlikely to come before Parliament until the next year. Although 
Parliament was due to adjourn later that month, the bill was not on the 
order paper, nor had it been referred to the Joint Committee on Health 
for consideration. A health department spokesperson said the minister 
was still discussing the bill with interested parties but strongly denied 
rumors that the delay was the result of pressure from tobacco organiza- 
tions. It later emerged that TISA had been given the opportunity to sub- 
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mit further representations to the health minister and had met with her 
earlier that month. 
Many of Venter's fellow National Party ministers were in disagreement 
with the bill. For example, the minister of agriculture criticized what he 
viewed as "punitive measures " against smokers and saw it as "fitting 
that the industry had simultaneously tried to improve its position and 
combat the anti-tobacco lobby by forming the Tobacco Institute of South 
Africa earlier that year" (Leaver 2002). He emphasized how much rev- 
enue the industry provided to the state. Antismoking advocates criticized 
the minister's failure to mention the costs of tobacco use in the form of 
disease, lost productivity, and medical expenses to the state, which, a 
widely publicized Medical Research Council report argued, "far out- 
weighed the benefits of smoking, defined as the sum of tax revenue accru- 
ing to government and income earned by employees in the tobacco indus- 
try" (Leaver 2002). 
Health advocates were also greatly concerned about the delays in the 
legislation, knowing that the industry would do everything in its power to 
use the postponements to stop it from being passed. Saloojee remarked that 
"it was difficult to understand the delay in the bill's publication when the 
express purpose of publication was to elicit comment" (Cape Times 1991). 
Political Support from the New Government 
One important factor that worked against the tobacco industry was South 
Africa's changing political landscape. By 1992, the country was in transi- 
tion; its first democratic elections were only two years away, and Nelson 
Mandela, the country's president-in-waiting and one of the leaders of the 
antiapartheid liberation movement, the ANC, had gained considerable 
support after being released from prison in 1990. 
Two months after the draft bill was finally published for comment, on 
World No Tobacco Day, May 31, 1992, Mandela made his stance on smok- 
ing clear when he declared his total support for the bill, appealing to all 
South Africans to back antitobacco campaigns. Thereafter, the tobacco 
industry's strategy changed noticeably. Saloojee (1993a) observed that it 
moved from "trying to defeat the bill, to simply weakening it" and spec- 
ulated that, after hearing Mandela's statement, the industry realized that 
killing the bill could result in even stronger legislation from a future ANC 
government. These conjectures seemed to be confirmed when, shortly 
after Mandela's statement, cigarette companies complained to the minis- 
ter that the issue had been politicized, "and that while they could trust the 
present government, they were not too sure about the next." 
Another watershed event was the international conference on tobacco use 
and its control in Africa that Yach and other members of the Medical Research 
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Figure 6.1. De Kierk Prepares to Take Leave of Power and the 
Tobacco Control Debate: A Cartoonist's Perspective. 
"It would be better for all if you stopped smoking." 
State President de Klerk was known to be a heavy smoker but supported weak tobacco 
control efforts. Future president Mandela had made a strong statement of support for the 
tobacco control bill, which de Klerk's government was delaying. 
Source: Cape Times, June 2, 1992. 
Council had long been planning and that finally took place in Harare, Zim- 
babwe, in 1993. Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, who had recently been hired by the 
Medical Research Council and was soon to become the first health minister 
of the new South African government, gave the opening speech in her capac- 
ity as a representative of the ANC. She made clear her personal commitment, 
and her party's commitment, to strong efforts to reduce tobacco use in South 
Africa. The more than 100 conference participants included a large South 
African delegation, people from about 35 other countries, several notable 
international experts in tobacco control, and a small huddle of representa- 
tives of tobacco growers (Chapman and others 1994). 
Debates in Parliament 
In Parliament, which still consisted mostly of National Party members, 
the tobacco industry maintained its strong influence. The Tobacco Prod- 
- 
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ucts Control Act was tabled in March 1993, after a delay of more than a 
year. During the interim, TAG was assured that the bill had been 
approved with minor changes. Although concerned that it had not been 
told what these revisions were, the lobbying group saw no reason to make 
a public issue of this. When TAG finally did get to see the tabled version, 
it was sturmed: "The bill as introduced had been completely watered 
down. The clause restricting smoking in public places had disappeared, 
and spoken communications were exempted from the need to broadcast 
health warnings" (Saloojee 1993a). 
It was obvious that the bill had met with considerable resistance in the 
cabinet, as shown by a telling comment that Hernus Kriel, the minister of 
law and order, made before the cabinet meeting at which the bill was dis- 
cussed. He was heard to say loudly that Venter's proposals would never 
reach Parliament, as "50 percent of the cabinet plus one" would oppose it. 
When questioned who the "50 percent plus one" were, he replied that the 
state president was the 50 and he was the "one" (Saloojee 1993a). 
The first reaction of tobacco control advocates was to reject the weak- 
ened bill, but following extensive deliberations they instead decided to 
make representations to Parliament to try to strengthen the proposed leg- 
islation. TAG, the Medical Research Council, and the Johannesburg and 
Cape Town City Councils each asked to be allowed to give evidence to the 
Joint Committee on Health. Cigarette companies sent the Tobacco Insti- 
tute to do the same, yet again with international experts in tow. 
Tobacco control supporters argued that a recent Medical Research 
Council study had shown that the majority of the public supported 
tobacco control legislation, that the bill distorted the meaning of the word 
"advertising" because it did not include radio advertising, and that Par- 
liament would be subject to ridicule if it allowed the legislation to pass 
(Saloojee 1993a). According to the lobbyists, radio was a major issue, as it 
reached more South Africans than the other media. Moreover, radio, in 
contrast to print media, was accessible to the large part of the population 
that was illiterate—a market in which the industry was showing a grow- 
ing interest. 
Cigarette companies responded by releasing studies disputing the 
statements of the antismoking lobby. One study, by Health Buildings 
International, argued that "more workers complained about temperature, 
stuffiness, and lighting than about tobacco smoke and noise" (Penman 
1993). Other studies cast doubt on the links between smoking and disease 
or contended that restrictions on tobacco advertising were ineffective 
(Saloojee 1993b). 
Despite the industry's efforts, all of the health groups' recommenda- 
tions were accepted, with local and national authorities being given the 
power to restrict smoking in public places and radio commercials again 
136 MIA MALAN AND ROSEMARY LEAVER 
being included in the definition of "advertisements." (In certain cases, 
however, radio stations could apply for exemption from the requirement 
to air a health warning as part of tobacco advertisements.) The bill also 
outlawed the sale of cigarettes to minors and empowered the minister to 
prescribe the health warning and the details about dangerous ingredients 
that were to appear on cigarette packs or in advertisements. 
Satisfaction Comes with Success 
On June 17, 1993, the Tobacco Products Control Act was approved by Par- 
liament. In Venter's own words, she had "ultimately succeeded in arriving 
at a piece of legislation" that gave her "the most satisfaction of any legisla- 
tion" since she had had "the privilege of being a minister." Venter made it 
clear that her business was health and not "problems regarding the cultiva- 
tion of tobacco." She refrained from becoming involved in or being drawn 
into a discussion on the interests of tobacco producers, saying, "1 really do 
not believe that it is a matter in which a minister of national health should 
participate." She also mentioned—tellingly—that she had reconciled herself 
"long ago that it would not be possible to take everyone along with me and 
to receive everyone's support for this bill. . . . There are too many vested 
interests that have to be taken into consideration" (Hansard 1993). 
Measured against the international "gold standard" for tobacco control 
legislation, the act was mild. (For legislative "good practice," see PAHO 
2002.) However, it "represented a schism between the ruling National 
Party government and the industry" (van Walbeek 2002a) and was the 
first major dent in what had been a solid wall of vested interest (Saloojee 
1993a). As it turned out, it was the last piece of legislation passed by the 
National Party government. 
New Government, New Regulations 
In April 1994 South Africa's first democratic elections were held. The 
ANC replaced the National Party as the ruling party. Under the new 
health minister, Nkosazana Zuma, the draft regulations for mandatory 
and explicit health warnings were published in the Gazette for comment. 
The regulations specified the size of health warnings required on printed 
advertisements and televised commercials, as well as on cigarette packs. 
The Health Ministry stated that tobacco industry—sponsored events 
would not be affected by the directives, as they were examples of "indi- 
rect advertising" (Miller and Ramsay 1994). This loophole in the legisla- 
tion was subsequently exploited by the industry. 
Eleven different health warnings, each consisting of two parts, were 
listed in the regulations (Louw 1994). The first part was a concise warning 
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on the effects of smoking—for example, "Danger, smoking can kill you," 
and "Pregnant? Breastfeeding? Your smoking could harm your baby." The 
second part explained how and why smoking damaged health, described 
the benefits of quitting, and gave a telephone number that smokers who 
wanted to quit could call to get information and advice. (For example, 
"Nine out of ten patients with lung cancer are smokers. Smoking also causes 
cancer of the lip, mouth, voice box, food pipe and bladder. Quitting smok- 
ing reduces your risk of cancer. For more information or help call. . . .") Writ- 
ten advertisements only had to carry the first part of the warning, posi- 
tioned at the top of the advertisement and occupying 10 percent of the area 
of the advertisement. Another 2 percent of the area had to be dedicated to 
information on tar and nicotine. Cigarette packs had to carry the two-part 
warning, which was to occupy 15 percent of the front of the pack and 25 per- 
cent of the back. 
Antitobacco lobbyists wanted the new labeling in order to give con- 
sumers better information about the health hazards of smoking tobacco 
products, but the cigarette, advertising, and media industries objected 
strongly (Leaver 2002). TISA sent a submission to the government in which 
it argued that the regulatory health warnings were unconstitutional 
because they deprived manufacturers of constitutionally protected prop- 
erty rights of registered trademarks. The industry also asserted that the 
warnings violated the companies' right to freedom of expression by "com- 
pelling manufacturers to include health messages and warnings with a 
propagandistic character . . . without stating the source" (Leaver 2002). 
This argument was supported by advertisers, who said that messages 
without sources gave the "untenable impression that the tobacco adver- 
tiser is warning consumers not to use his product" (Financial Mail 1994). 
Advertisers also claimed that there had been a lack of transparency and 
consultation in drawing up the draft regulations and that if the regulations 
became law, there would be numerous job losses in the advertising indus- 
try because the tobacco industry would end many of its contracts. The 
managing director of Times Media Limited, one of South Africa's leading 
newspaper groups, described the proposals as a form of censorship that 
trampled on the right to free commercial speech (de Villiers 1994a). 
Several newspapers and magazines argued that they stood to lose adver- 
tising revenue. The media's opposition was (over)stated in such melodra- 
matic terms as to be almost farcical: the director of Nasionale Pers, in which 
Rembrandt had shares, predicted a "blood bath" (de Villiers 1994a) and 
foresaw that the print media would lose millions in revenue and be "para- 
lyzed" (Leaver 2002). The Medical Research Council refuted these absurd 
claims, quoting a study by the council which had found that in the "10 most 
popular South African magazines, each with a circulation of over 100,000, 
tobacco accounted for less than 10% of total adspend" (Leaver 2002). 
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The one significant concession was that in August 1994 the health min- 
ister exempted radio stations from the advertising regulations for one 
year. Radio stations had argued that they would be hard hit by the new 
regulations and could lose millions in tobacco advertising revenues (de 
Villiers 1994a, 1994b). They said they needed time to adjust, since a sud- 
den drop in their revenues might force them to close down broadcasts to 
isolated and illiterate rural groups, for whom they were a vital source of 
information and entertainment. For their part, the Independent Broad- 
casters Association agreed that "the proceeds of five advertising spots per 
day per radio station which carries tobacco adverts be given to the [health 
department] for running a campaign aimed at warning people about the 
dangers of smoking" (de Villiers 1994a, 1994b). 
Four months later, in December 1994, the regulations governing the 
display of health warnings on tobacco products and in advertisements 
were published in the Gazette under the Tobacco Products Control Act of 
1993. Enforcement would begin only after several months, to give the 
tobacco industry time to use up stocks of existing packaging materials. 
After the legislation was "gazetted," TISA complained that it had not 
been consulted (Leaver 2002). It had, in fact, voiced its views on several 
occasions but had not prevailed against the counterarguments and factual 
evidence presented by the public health groups, which argued that the 
measures were important for protecting and promoting public health and 
that the actual economic losses would be trifling, in contrast to the exag- 
gerated claims of those seeking to protect their vested interests. 
Implications for the Provinces: New Hope for Cape Town 
The implementation of the Tobacco Products Control Act in 1994 was a 
significant development for municipalities because it granted them the 
right to apply to the health department to promulgate their own regula- 
tions controlling smoking. This was particularly good news for Cape 
Town because it meant that the administrator no longer had veto power 
over antismoking measures in the city. 
Michael Popkiss, Cape Town's chief medical officer, was quick to apply 
for these powers. Within four months the Cape Town City Council had 
tabled draft regulations to restrict smoking in virtually all public places. 
Specifically, the municipal regulations prohibited smoking in 80 percent 
of every city restaurant and banned smoking in shopping malls, theaters, 
cinemas, and all municipal buildings. Public transport, such as trains, 
buses, and taxis, was also out of bounds for smoking (Oliver 1994). A fur- 
ther stipulation was that any room in which smoking was banned could 
be designated as a smoking area, provided that a ventilation system was 
installed to extract the smoky air. The smoking area was not allowed to 
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exceed 20 percent of the total floor area of the enclosed public space, and 
it had to be clearly signposted. 
On March 30, 1995, the antismoking regulations were passed by a large 
majority of Cape Town's new democratically elected council. A month 
later, the regulations were published in the Gazette, and by August 1995 
admission-of-guilt fines for failing to abide by the regulations had been 
announced by the chief magistrate. The regulations came into full effect 
on April 26, 1996. 
The Cape Times, a regional newspaper, was highly critical of the new 
local legislation, calling it a "gross interference in the free market econ- 
omy." The newspaper argued that the council should reconsider its deci- 
sion, as it had no right to tell "private institutions which rely on public 
patronage for their business what they should, and should not, allow on 
their property" (Cape Times 1995a). This tone was repeated four days later 
when a Cape Times column lent implicit support to restaurant owners who 
defied the ban. The newspaper published a photograph of the chairman of 
the Restaurant Guild with a lit cigarette in one hand and a fork in the other, 
accompanied by a statement describing the new law as "no less ludicrous 
or impractical than decreeing that 20% of all restaurant windows must be 
tinted, or that 80% of all tablecloths must be pink" (Jackman 1995). 
Many Cape Times readers were angered, accusing the newspaper of 
irresponsible journalism and of supporting the tobacco lobby. Popkiss 
wrote an open letter in defense of the regulations, noting that their aim 
was to protect the public from being exposed to the dangers of environ- 
mental tobacco smoke and that the council therefore included "any 
indoor area which is open to the public or any part of the public" in the 
legislation, regardless of whether it was state owned or privately owned 
(Popkiss 1995). 
Aside from the restaurateurs and some media, negative feedback was 
limited (Parker 1995). The designers of the new regulations noted that 
where similar smoking bans existed abroad, the incidence of smoking had 
decreased because of social pressure rather than the threat of sanctions. 
Various organizations publicly highlighted their commitment to the new 
regulations. For example, one of Cape Town's major shopping centers, the 
Victoria & Alfred Waterfront, voluntarily began a program of educating 
tenants and staff about the new smoking measures and how best to imple- 
ment them. Information tables were set up around the shopping center to 
promote public awareness of the regulations, and bins were placed at mall 
entrances to allow people to extinguish their cigarettes before entering 
(Smith 1995). The Cape Town City Council issued a booklet containing 
details about the legislation and information about the health hazards of 
smoking, with the aim of educating the public and easing the implemen- 
tation process. 
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In October 1995 the Restaurant Guild launched the "Courtesy of 
Choice" program in an attempt to preempt similar legislation in other 
provinces. It encouraged South African restaurants to voluntarily cater to 
both smokers and nonsmokers by giving patrons the option of deciding 
whether they would like to be seated in a smoking or nonsmoking area 
(Leaver 2002). The key to the success of the program would be the instal- 
lation of adequate ventilation in the smoking sections of restaurants. Par- 
ticipating restaurants were given a ventilation checklist, a training video 
for staff, and a Courtesy of Choice logo, which displayed the message 
"Welcome smokers and nonsmokers" along with a yin-yang symbol with 
one half blank and the other half displaying a cigarette. 
The NCAS was extremely scornful of the campaign. Saloojee noted that 
"if common courtesy alone were sufficient to prevent harm, no laws 
would be needed at all" and that the Restaurant Guild "was disregarding 
the preferences of nonsmokers, who had stated in surveys that they pre- 
ferred smoke-free public places" (Strachan 1995). 
Almost two years later, in March 1997, an issue of the hospitality indus- 
try magazine Hotel and Caterer declared that "the fuss created over the 
past couple of years about cigarette smoking in restaurants seems to have 
died down." This was attributed directly to the success of the industry's 
Courtesy of Choice program in fighting "the fanatical antismoking lobby" 
(Leaver 2002). Little did the restaurant industry know how wrong that 
analysis was and what was in store. 
National Developments 
South Africa's tobacco control cause was helped enormously by the first 
democratic elections in 1994. The new ruling party, the ANC, had no 
alliance with the tobacco industry and had a much stronger focus on pri- 
mary health care than the previous government, including a commitment 
to an effective tobacco control policy. 
More than that, Nelson Mandela, the country's new president, had 
consistently voiced his strong support for antismoking legislation, and he 
was on record as having called for a "world free of tobacco" (Republikein 
1994). Mandela's choice for health minister, Nkosazana Zuma, was 
known to be strong willed and determined. As a physician and asthma 
sufferer, she was acutely aware of the dangers of passive smoking. A 
month after taking office, she insisted on smoke-free cabinet meetings, 
explaining that exposure to tobacco smoke worsened her condition 
(Republikein 1994). Although the tobacco industry had previously been 
able to delay impending legislation, they were not able to do so with 
Zuma as health minister. In fact, Zuma often worked at such a pace as to 
catch the industry off guard, leading to accusations that she was "bull- 
dozing" health bills through Parliament (Stuart 1998). 
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From the outset, Zuma made it clear that she was going to do every- 
thing in her power to reduce tobacco consumption, warning that addi- 
tional "national legislation would have to be passed if companies did not 
voluntarily introduce the necessary anti-smoking policies" (Leaver 2002). 
Saloojee recalled an encounter with Zuma in Harare in November 1993, 
shortly before she became health minister. Both were attending the his- 
toric All Africa Conference on Tobacco and Health. 
Dr Zuma addressed the meeting. . . . She promised that the ANC would 
ban tobacco advertising, would significantly increase excise taxes, and 
would regulate tobacco closely. I was sitting next to Dr Zuma. When she 
returned to her seat, I told her that I had noted everything she had just 
said and would be holding her to it once she became the health minister. 
Two months after her appointment, I wrote asking for a meeting. When I entered her office for the meeting, to my amazement, she remembered 
our conversation and asked: "What took you so long? I've been waiting 
for you." (Saloojee 2002) 
Many prominent delegates to the Harare conference continued on to 
South Africa afterward, giving major speeches "that helped boost the 
tobacco control community in the country significantly" (Yach 2002). 
Applying Tax Increases 
Tobacco lobbyists had long been calling for an increase in taxes on cigarettes. 
International studies had shown that price was an important determinant of 
tobacco demand and that raising the price was the single most cost-effective 
way of quickly reducing consumption. Higher taxes therefore had great 
potential as a deterrent to smoking. In addition, a tax increase would create 
more revenue for the government. The NCAS pointed out that because 
excise taxes had failed to keep up with inflation, the real (inflation-adjusted) 
tax on cigarettes had fallen by 70 percent between 1970 and 1990 (figure 6.2). 
Their pleas seemed to have been answered when ANC health advisers pro- 
posed a 100 percent increase in cigarette taxes shortly before the 1994 bud- 
get. It was a bitter disappointment when finance minister Derek Keys 
announced a mere 25 percent increase. Antismoking advocates saw the new 
tax levels as a betrayal of health interests and argued that the budget had 
effectively sacrificed the lives of thousands of smokers and lost the govern- 
ment millions in revenue. The finance minister responded by saying that as 
a result of health considerations, the government had agreed to eventually 
increase the tobacco tax to 50 percent of the retail price of cigarettes. It had 
opted, however, to phase in the increase; hence the modest rise announced 
in the current budget. 
While tobacco control groups complained that the tax increases were 
too small, the tobacco industry argued that the hikes were excessive and 
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Figure 6.2. Real and Nominal Cigarette Prices and Taxes, 
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discriminatory. Rembrandt alleged that smuggled cigarette brands had 
already started entering South Africa as a result of the new "sin taxes" on 
tobacco (Citizen 1994). The company's new chair, Johann Rupert (Anton 
Rupert's son) claimed that smuggled brands were undercutting local 
ones and that this could backfire on the government by negatively affect- 
ing state revenues (Leaver 2002). According to van Walbeek (2002a), 
Rupert's claims were misleading, and deliberately so: if he could per- 
suade the government that cigarette smuggling was increasing as a result 
of the high taxes, he might also persuade it that the solution would be to 
reduce the tax. 
Only in 1997 was one of the groups finally satisfied, when the new 
finance minister, Trevor Manuel, announced a tax rate of 50 percent of the 
retail selling price of cigarettes, after intensive lobbying by Zuma and 
antismoking groups. Saloojee asserted that the increase would result in 
400,000 fewer smokers and an extra 620 million rand in new revenue for 
the government, which "could be used to employ more customs and 
excise officials and tighten border controls" (cited in Singh 1997). The 
tobacco industry was infuriated by the increase, arguing that thousands 
of the country's farmworkers would lose their jobs. Economists at the 
University of Cape Town challenged this assertion, pointing out that new 
jobs would be created to satisfy increased demand for other goods and 
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services as people switched their expenditures from cigarettes to other 
items. Manuel has since then held firm to his policy and has maintained 
annual tobacco tax increases of about 50 percent in his budgets (van Wal- 
beek 2002b). 
The Struggle for Compliance 
In a parliamentary address in October 1996, Zuma accused tobacco compa- 
nies of ignoring laws requiring the display of health warnings on cigarette 
packs. The minister warned that "if cigarette companies continued to refuse 
to comply with the law, her department would respond by banning tobacco 
advertising" (Leaver 2002). Johann Rupert responded by publishing a full- 
page open letter to Zuma in the Sunday newspapers saying that the absence 
of health warnings on certain brands could be blamed on cheaper smuggled 
goods which had entered South Africa illegally. He alleged that this was the 
consequence of high tobacco taxes that his company had warned the minis- 
ter about. In a statement in reply to Rupert's open letter, the minister vowed 
to intensify her campaign against tobacco, saying, "Responding to individ- 
uals is not really our priority at this stage. We are more concerned with the 
health of the nation" (Leaver 2002). 
Meanwhile, cigarette companies and broadcasters took advantage of a 
loophole in the advertising restrictions in the Tobacco Products Control 
Act. The act considered sports sponsorships an indirect form of advertis- 
ing, thus exempting such events from having to display health warnings. 
The SABC showed Benson & Hedges logos on television during an inter- 
national cricket match, maintaining that displaying a logo, however 
prominent, did not constitute advertising (Rulashe 1996). Both the SABC 
and the tobacco company were strongly criticized, and Zuma threatened 
to take serious action against companies that were considering "taking 
advantage of loopholes" in the future (Leaver 2002; see also figure 6.3). 
The minister's unwavering political support for tobacco control and 
her outspoken behavior left her rather exposed. The tobacco industry 
spent sizable amounts on generating research supporting its position or 
trying to cast doubts on the arguments and evidence put forward by the 
public health groups (Wilkins 2000). Clearly, the industry could outspend 
the groups that were lobbying for tobacco control. 
In 1996 an important new partner joined the tobacco control lobby 
when a number of professional economists entered the debate and set up 
the Economics of Tobacco Control in South Africa (ETCSA) Project. The 
project, established at the Applied Fiscal Research Centre of the Univer- 
sity of Cape Town with funding from the International Tobacco Initiative 
(now Research for International Tobacco Control, a secretariat at the 
International Development Research Centre in Canada), aimed to make 
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Figure 6.3. Zuma versus Rupert: A Cartoonist's View 
available to the government and to others sound and accessible informa- 
tion on tobacco control by systematically researching economic issues 
and providing facts that contradicted the false claims of the tobacco 
lobby (Abedian 2002). 
The ETCSA Project's research findings countered many of the indus- 
try's claims and were well publicized. According to Jraj Abedian, 
ETCSA's project leader at the time, the findings provided important evi- 
dence to support Zuma's anti-tobacco policies and the tax increases. One 
of the most significant conclusions was that a rise in tobacco excise taxes 
would increase government revenues, not reduce total revenues as the 
tobacco lobby claimed. In fact, the research demonstrated that the gov- 
ernment was earning much less than it could from tobacco taxes: it was 
estimated that had the state attempted to maximize its revenue from cig- 
arettes, excise receipts could have been 129 percent higher in 1995 than 
they actually were (see figure 6.4). Other findings were that job losses in 
tobacco-related sectors would be more than compensated for by job gains 
in other sectors, since consumers would spend their money on other 
Health Minister Zuma prepares to obliterate tobacco company chair Rupert's 
opposition to tobacco control. The "writing on the wall" is a set of antismoking statements. 
Source: The Star, October 22, 1996. 
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Figure 6.4. Potential and Actual Cigarette Tax Revenues (Excise 
and Sales Taxes Combined), South Africa, 1971—2000 
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goods and services, and that South Africa did not have a significant ciga- 
rette smuggling problem (van Walbeek 2002a). 
Evidence that the government's tobacco control policy was proving 
effective emerged in May 1996, when a survey found that the proportion 
of adults who were currently smokers had declined from 34 percent in 
February 1995 to 32 percent a year later. lt also revealed that more than 8 
out of 10 adults viewed health warnings on cigarette packs as helpful and 
informative. These findings convinced the health minister "that manda- 
tory health warnings on tobacco packaging had proven to be an effective 
tool in educating the public about the dangers of smoking" (Leaver 2002). 
An anecdote illustrates the power of these warnings for certain con- 
sumers: some shopkeepers reported that shortly after the warnings were 
introduced, some customers asked for the "old" cigarettes rather than the 
"new" ones, pointing to the warnings and saying that the new ones 
would cause them to get sick. These customers assumed that the product 
had changed, necessitating the new warnings (Saloojee 2002). 
Within a year after taking office, Nelson Mandela was awarded two no- 
smoking medals: one in August 1994 by the Commonwealth Games 
Council and another in May 1995 by the World Health Organization 
(WHO). On accepting the latter award on his behalf in Vancouver, 
Canada, Minister of Health Zuma said that millions of children faced pre- 
mature death from diseases caused by tobacco, and that "this preventable 
tragedy must be averted" (Strachan 1995). 
1999 Legislation 
In January 1998 the health minister announced that a Tobacco Control 
Amendment Bill would be tabled in Parliament that year. Initially, Zuma 
gave little indication of precisely what changes it would entail. Address- 
ing a tobacco conference in February, however, she hinted at "an outright 
ban on advertising, sponsorships and promotions, and raising the age at 
which minors could legally buy cigarettes to 18" (Leaver 2002). 
Six months after the minister had announced her plans, the Tobacco 
Products Control Amendment Bill was unanimously approved by the 
cabinet. Among other provisions, it outlawed smoking in enclosed public 
spaces (including workplaces), banned tobacco advertising and sponsor- 
ship, and made it illegal for anyone to sell cigarettes without the pre- 
scribed health warnings on packs (Soal 1998a). 
The cigarette manufacturing industry slammed the health department 
for tabling a "draconian bill out of the blue eight weeks before Parliament 
closes" (Leaver 2002). Many opposition parties agreed, remarking that 
"the Zuma Bulldozer is clearly in overdrive" (Stuart 1998). The industry 
complained that the tobacco control lobby had benefited from many 
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months of access during the bill's drafting process, whereas the tobacco 
industry had been totally excluded from the process. Cigarette compa- 
nies, along with advertising and freedom of expression organizations, 
argued that the legislation was a gross violation of the right to freedom of 
speech. But Zuma had no interest in modifying the proposals in response 
to pressure from the industry, and she threatened to take the battle to the 
country's highest court (Khan 1998). 
Zuma even went a step further: when President Mandela asked her to 
consult with all relevant parties before pressing ahead, she called them 
together on short notice late one night. Also at the meeting were tobacco 
control advocates, including the Medical Research Council's Derek Yach. 
Yach had to counter the fears of the media companies that they would 
lose a large part of their income because of the ban on tobacco advertis- 
ing. When he reminded them that "it's better to associate with life than 
with death," one of the country's largest publishing houses, Caxton, 
which published many medical publications and also community news- 
papers, voluntarily withdrew its tobacco advertising in advance of the 
law (Yach 2002). 
Pro-tobacco groups had the opportunity to present arguments as well. 
Yach recalled that a tobacco representative asked Zuma toward the end of 
the meeting whether she had listened to their arguments and whether she 
was going to weaken the legislation as a result. She responded, "If any- 
thing I'll consider strengthening it, because I don't believe what you're 
saying" (Yach 2002). 
Sporting organizations did not feel comfortable with the bill, as they 
stood to lose sponsorship from cigarette companies. The South African 
tobacco industry annually spent about 40 million rand on sports events 
such as Winfield rugby, the Rothmans July Handicap, the Gunston 500 (an 
international surfing competition), and Rothmans soccer. The Premier 
Soccer League was particularly concerned, as it had a 10-year contract 
with Rothmans worth 100 million rand that it believed would be difficult 
to replace (Khan 1998). 
Zuma's proposals also ended South Africa's Grand Prix hopes. Earlier 
that year the chief executive of Formula One Grand Prix had announced 
that South Africa was being considered as a possible host in the near 
future. But with the tobacco industry being the main motor racing spon- 
sor and competitors contractually obliged to carry their sponsors' names 
on their cars, the event would not be allowed in South Africa under the 
proposed legislation. Shortly after the bill was tabled, Formula One 
released its race calendar, and South Africa was notably absent. Malaysia, 
a country with no restrictions on tobacco advertising, had taken its place. 
Zuma responded to these concerns by noting that cricket had cut its 
ties with its tobacco sponsor (Benson & Hedges) some time earlier and 
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that the sport continued to prosper. The tobacco control proponents also 
pointed out that tobacco-sponsored events were a betrayal of the millions 
of youths who looked to sports to promote health, not to promote a 
deadly addiction (Saloojee 2002). In an attempt to alleviate some of the 
fears, Zuma and the sports minister discussed plans to phase in the 
restrictions in order to protect existing sponsorships. Ever determined, 
however, Zuma commented that "it will be a very short phase-in. If they 
have a 10-year contract, they won't be able to finish it" (Soal 1998b). 
Two weeks after being approved by the cabinet, the Tobacco Products 
Amendment Bill was published for public comment. Twelve days later, 
the tobacco industry applied for an urgent interdict to stall the legislation, 
citing "a lack of consultation in the bill's drafting" (Leaver 2002). Zuma 
was undeterred and told a journalist that "consultation does not mean we 
must keep consulting with them until they agree" and that she was now 
"more than ever determined to get the legislation through Parliament" 
(Soal 1998b). The applicants asked the Cape Town High Court to order the 
minister to disclose "all the information that the department had taken 
into account when drafting the bill" (Leaver 2002). But the case was dis- 
missed eight days later; the court ruled that the information was public 
knowledge, and Zuma proclaimed that no one would be allowed to fili- 
buster the process (Baleta and Oliver 1998). 
Two months later, a public hearing, dubbed by some as being like "the 
biblical battle between David and Goliath," was scheduled in Parliament. 
More than 80 groups applied to give oral evidence over two days. Three 
days after the hearings, the parliamentary health committee approved the 
bill, to the dismay of cigarette companies. Yet again, the tobacco industry 
threatened to go to court, but, as in the past, the threat failed to material- 
ize. Instead, after a day's heated debate, the National Assembly approved 
the proposed legislation, with 213 votes (all from the ANC and the 
African Christian Party) in favor and 106 against. 
Following approval by the National Council of Provinces, the bill was 
sent to the president for his signature. Mandela, however, sent it back to 
Parliament, asking that the terms "organized activity" and "public 
places" be more clearly defined to resolve constitutional uncertainties. 
The president specifically wanted clarity on whether public places 
included private residences in which employees such as domestic work- 
ers performed their duties. Of particular concern was that "people may 
not be able to smoke in their own homes if they employ a domestic 
worker," although, on the other hand, domestic workers should not be 
subjected to the health risk posed by secondhand smoke (Saloojee 1999). 
A month later, the health department had completed the work of draft- 
ing amendments to the definitions in question, with "public places" cited 
as including workplaces but not private homes. In March 1999 the amend- 
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ments were approved by both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces. Only two provinces, the Western Cape, held by the 
National Party, and Kwazulu-Natal, held by the Inkatha Freedom Party, 
voted against the bill. The Tobacco Products Amendment Act became law 
on April 23, 1999, when it was published in the Gazette. (The legislation 
would only come into effect once a date had been set by promulgation in 
the Gazette.) 
The tobacco control lobby was extremely satisfied with the new legis- 
lation, with the Medical Research Council remarking that the act was "a 
fitting finale to Mandela's term of office because it would entrench laws 
that will protect children for generations to come" (Leaver 2002). The act 
came into effect on October 1, 2000, with the new health minister, Dr. 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, saying that she did not expect any constitu- 
tional challenges. After January 2001, anyone found guilty of disobeying 
the law (except for restaurant owners who had applied for a six months' 
exemption to install nonsmoking areas) would be liable to a fine. 
Zuma's tough stance against smoking was recognized by the WHO in 
May 1999, with the Tobacco Free World Award. The organization's 
director-general, Gro Harlem Brundtland, told Zuma, "We congratulate 
you on your work—you have strengthened our hands and given hope 
to many countries" (WHO 1999). 
Back in South Africa, the tobacco and advertising industries continued 
their exaggerated, even absurd, rhetoric, comparing the new legislation to 
laws enacted by Nazi Germany and referring to Zuma as a "new Hitler." 
The minister replied, "I'm getting used to the names by now. What is 
important is whether we are transforming society for the better, and I 
think we are" (Soal 1998b). 
Conclusion 
Derek Yach believes there is an important lesson to be learned from South 
Africa's achievements: "You need the right combination of science, evi- 
dence and politics to succeed. If you have one without the other, you 
don't see action." He believes that South Africa has had an effective mix 
of basic science, political commitment, and the ability to move ahead 
(Yach 2002). 
Despite the significant opposition encountered, South Africa now has 
one of the most comprehensive tobacco control policies in the world. Van 
Walbeek (2002b) noted that "while the health impact of the change of 
smoking patterns will only be felt in years to come, the short-term mea- 
surable outcomes suggest that the South African government's tobacco 
control policy is proving successful: between 1993 and 2000, total tobacco 
consumption decreased by about 26% . . . per capita consumption 
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Figure 6.5. Real Cigarette Prices and Smoking Prevalence by 





































Source: Van Walbeek (2002a). 
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decreased by 37%. . . the percent of adults who smoke decreased from 33% 
to 27%, with the biggest decreases being seen in low income groups. . . and 
the percent of young people aged 16 to 24 who smoke has decreased sig- 
nificantly from 24% to 19%." Figure 6.5 clearly shows the decline in con- 
sumption across all income groups and the much faster and deeper 
decrease in smoking in the lower-income groups. 
Although the degree of compliance with antismoking legislation seems 
to be high, some say more can be done, Saloojee points out that despite sig- 
nificant increases in tobacco taxes, cigarettes in South Africa are still very 
cheap in comparison with other countries and that they continue to be 
affordable, particularly for young people. (See figure 3.2, in chapter 3 in this 
volume, which compares cigarette prices across a number of countries.) He 
adds that it is almost impossible to institute legal action for medical dam- 
ages against cigarette companies without having "sizable amounts of 
money." Saloojee also points out that some countries, such as Canada and 
Brazil, now require large pictorial warnings on tobacco products—"some- 
thing which South Africa needs to consider if we want to keep up with 
leading tobacco control countries in the world" (Saloojee 2002). 
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7 
Tailoring Tobacco Control 
Efforts to the Country: 
The Example of Thailand 
Prakit Vateesatokit 
The need for tobacco control in Thailand is evident in the statistics. 
Among Thailand's 62 million inhabitants, fewer than 5 percent of females 
smoke, but 39 percent of males do (National Statistics Office 1999). 
Although the recent economic downturn and increases in cigarette taxes 
contributed to a decline in consumption from 48 billion cigarettes in 1997 
to 37 billion in 2001, the toll from tobacco use is still heavy. It has been esti- 
mated that in 1993, 42,000 Thais died of tobacco-attributable disease 
(Ekplakorn, Wongkraisrithong, and Tangchareonsin 1991). Lung cancer is 
the number one cancer in Thai males except in the northeastern region, 
where endemic liver fluke disease makes liver cancer more common 
(Deerasamee and others 1999). 
Understanding Thailand's efforts to work toward successful tobacco 
control requires an appreciation of the complex sociocultural, political, 
and even personal dynamics that interact to shape Thai thinking and 
policymaking. These dynamics cannot be captured in a short case study 
and are not fully described in this deeply personal account, in which the 
political, social, and human factors are intimately entwined. 
The narrative shows that while similarities exist between the Thai 
experience and that of other countries, the success of tobacco control in 
Thailand must also be attributed to a unique historical struggle set in the 
rich context of Thai politics and culture (Muscat 1992). Furthermore, it is 
a story grounded in the rational, iterative world of medical investigation 
and the sometimes chaotic world of political process. Combined, these 
ingredients make for a fascinating story. 
The Story Begins: Small Steps Forward 
The best-known incident in tobacco control in Thailand is the well- 
publicized case in the late 1980s when the U.S. tobacco industry used 
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international trade treaty provisions to force open Asian markets to 
foreign cigarettes. But the struggle for tobacco control in Thailand 
began long before that, as early as the mid-1970s. In 1974 the Thai 
Medical Association successfully petitioned the government to print 
health warnings on cigarette packages. In 1976 the National Statistics 
Office carried out the first national survey of smoking prevalence (now 
conducted every two to three years as part of the National Health and 
Welfare Survey), and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration issued 
an ordinance banning smoking in movie theatres and buses in the city. 
When the World Health Organization (WHO) designated 1980 the Year 
of the No Smoking Campaign, the event was supported by the Thai 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), the Thai Thoracic Association, the 
Thai Anti-Tuberculosis Association, and the Thai Heart Association. A 
series of public health education programs on the dangers of smoking 
was carried out, and the Thai Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) was success- 
fully lobbied to strengthen the health warning on cigarette packages. 
Other sporadic activities and campaigns were undertaken in the 1980s, 
with mixed results. In 1982 the MOPH and the WHO held the First 
National Conference on Tobacco or Health. Subsequently, an expert com- 
mittee was established to implement an ongoing campaign to reduce 
smoking, but because there was no secretariat or organizational support, 
the committee met infrequently, and little was accomplished. The 
National Cancer Institute listed cigarettes as a cause of cancer and carried 
out public education seminars. Tobacco was also included as a health 
issue of the noncommunicable disease division in the MOPH's Depart- 
ment of Medical Services. But without continuous, sustained momentum, 
these efforts had only limited outcomes (Supawongse 1999). When the 
Thai Anti-Smoking Campaign Project (TASCP) was formed in 1986, the 
media commented that they hoped it would not be just another "flash in 
the pan" that would die away (TASCP 1986). 
In a parallel development, in the 1980s health professionals, perceiving a 
need to improve the level of health advocacy in the country, established the 
Folk Doctors Foundation (FDF). The FDF focused on self-care, used public 
advocacy, and disseminated information through educational materials 
and the media to foster a social movement supporting care for the health of 
the Thai population. These efforts were early examples of the potential role 
of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in tobacco control. 
In early 1986 Dr. Pravase Wasi, an FDF board member, respected uni- 
versity professor, and opinion leader, gave a presentation to the Dusit 
Rotary Club on tobacco and health. This presentation resulted in a contri- 
bution of 60,000 baht (US$2,255) for tobacco control efforts. Initially, Wasi 
had intended to give the money to those in the MOPH who were work- 
ing on tobacco control. At the time, however, no special office existed for 
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this type of activity, so he decided it would be more efficient to turn the 
money over to the FDF to support a specific project on tobacco control. 
With this fund, in October 1986 Wasi launched the TASCP at Ramathi- 
bodi Hospital, along with another FDF board member, Prof. Athasit Vej- 
jajiva, who had just become dean at Rarnathibodi Hospital, Faculty of 
Medicine, Mahidol University. Dr. Paibul Suriyawongpaisal of the 
Department of Community Medicine was appointed secretary of the proj- 
ect. The author, who was the chairman of the Department of Medicine, 
was asked to take part in the launch by helping to organize a press con- 
ference on the harm caused by tobacco use. Four patients with chronic 
obstructive lung disease were asked to speak about their suffering, show- 
ing the "human face" of the epidemic. This proved very successful in 
attracting press coverage. 
As a result, the author was recruited to join the TASCP, which would 
serve as a focal point and pressure group in the lobby for tobacco control 
policy. One of the first tasks was to work with Dr. Somkiat Onvimol and 
Laddawan Wongsriwong to produce a three-minute spot documenting 
the life of a patient who suffered from emphysema and was receiving 
home oxygen therapy. This documentary was aired several times in 1987 
and inspired several young doctors from another NGO, the Rural Doc- 
tors' Association (RDA), to organize a run in support of the antismoking 
cause. Dr. Choochai Supawongse, RDA chair, first developed the idea of 
the nationwide run with support from the MOPH and other funding 
organizations. The 250 physicians and paramedics who participated ran a 
total of over 3,000 kilometers in the span of a week. The campaign col- 
lected over 6 million signatures of townspeople along the way, all urging 
Parliament to legislate tobacco control. 
The organized run was another example of sporadic, uncoordinated, 
but genuine and sometimes dramatic efforts by various professional 
groups that arose out of their personal commitment to reducing harm 
from tobacco. Many doctors who are now senior officials trace their 
strong commitment to tobacco control to this event (Supawongse 1999). 
Building Support: The TASCP's Formative Years 
Those working for tobacco control in the early years did not fully appre- 
ciate the importance of having a comprehensive and coherent strategy 
until 1987, when the Sixth World Conference on Tobacco or Health was 
held in Japan. That conference was an eye-opener and provided addi- 
tional impetus to the TASCP. Dr. Halfdan Mahler, then director general of 
the WHO, delivered a provocative speech about smoking mortality, 
describing it as equivalent to 20 jumbo jets crashing each day, or 2 million 
deaths per year. The diversity of the audience of epidemiologists, public 
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health workers, activists, and media advocates reflected the broad impli- 
cations of the issue. It became clear at the conference that the epidemic 
would not disappear soon or on its own: a policy response was essential. 
As a direct result of the conference, the TASCP developed its first edu- 
cational poster. At the conference, Dr. Jureerut Bornvornwattanuvongs, a 
pulmonary disease specialist at Chonburi provincial hospital, presented a 
research paper reporting smoking rates for doctors, teachers, and Bud- 
dhist monks—all influential opinion leaders in Thai society. The TASCP 
used this research information to focus on a campaign to change the reg- 
ular practice of offering cigarettes to monks. Posters reading "Offering 
cigarettes to monks is a sin" were printed and distributed, as well as 
"Smoke-free zone" and "Thank you for not smoking" stickers. The 
TASCP's approach was to remain positive—not to condemn smokers, but 
to oppose pushing cigarettes on others. 
Subsequently, in 1988, the TASCP took advantage of a clinical epidemi- 
ology conference in Thailand, where Dr. Richard Peto, an epidemiologist 
and statistician from Oxford University, was the featured speaker. Peto 
later proved to be a very helpful resource in Thailand's tobacco control 
struggle. The TASCP used the opportunity of the conference to call for 
action to prevent 1 million Thai children from dying from cigarette smok- 
ing, as had been projected by Peto (TASCP 1988). 
All of these efforts and early successes set the stage for Thailand's later 
determination to fight the U.S. trade sanctions. 
Challenges from Beyond: Tobacco Trade Wars 
In the late 1980s Thailand was suddenly awash with cigarette advertise- 
ments. The Thai Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) began promoting its product 
in response to the sudden appearance of advertisements for foreign ciga- 
rette brands. Until then, the TTM had seen no reason to advertise, since it 
was a monopoly and foreign cigarette brands were available only illegally 
or through airport duty-free shops in Bangkok. In the words of the U.S. 
Tobacco Merchants Association, the Thai state-run tobacco industry, 
which had come into existence to displace British American Tobacco after 
World War II, was "fat and extremely uncompetitive" (Tobacco Merchants 
Association 1988). But now the TTM faced an advertising war with for- 
eign producers (Frankel 1996). Meanwhile, the TASCP, concerned that the 
foreign companies were advertising in an effort to launch their brands in 
Thailand, urged the government to ban all advertising, both domestic and 
foreign. 
In January 1988 the TTM applied to the cabinet for funds to build a 
new, more productive, and more efficient tobacco factory. Although the 
project was initially approved, the decision was soon reversed because of 
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media protests fueled by the TASCP. General Prem—a respected career 
soldier who was invited to be prime minister for eight years by the elected 
coalition parties, even though he had not run for election—was respon- 
sive to tobacco control advocates. He said at the time that it was not right 
for the government to obtain income from such an inappropriate source. 
He did allocate some funds for new machinery for the TTM's existing fac- 
tory, but at the same time the cabinet instructed the MOPH to draft a plan 
for tobacco control. 
In April 1988 the MOPH presented a tobacco control plan that was 
approved by the cabinet in its entirety. Dr. Hatai Chitanondh, deputy direc- 
tor general of the ministry's Department of Medical Services, was responsi- 
ble for drafting the comprehensive plan. One of the components was an 
advertising ban, which the TTM did not object to, since it knew it could 
never match the huge resources of the international tobacco companies. 
In December 1988, however, when the international tobacco companies 
were still advertising (claiming that the prohibition by the cabinet was an 
executive order, not a law, and therefore did not have to be followed by 
the private sector), the TTM protested to the government. The cabinet 
directed the Consumer Protection Board, a government agency operating 
under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office, to find a means of stop- 
ping cigarette advertising by law. In February 1989 the board added 
tobacco to the list of regulated products that could not be advertised 
under the 1979 Consumer Protection Act. The international companies 
were given one month to dismantle and remove all their billboards and 
advertisements. (They refused to comply for nine months.) 
In February 1989 the cabinet appointed the National Committee for the 
Control of Tobacco Use (NCCTU), as specified in the tobacco control plan. 
The committee was chaired by Chuan Leekpai, minister of public health, 
and included members from the TASCP and the press. Chitanondh served 
as secretary. It was clear then that the committee would have to formulate 
and coordinate a comprehensive tobacco control policy. 
In March 1989, when the Ministry of Finance proposed opening the 
market to foreign cigarettes, the author, as the TASCP's executive secre- 
tary, personally handed a letter to Major General Chunhawan, the new 
prime minister, opposing the move. The NCCTU followed up with 
another letter to the cabinet. In response, the ministry withdrew the 
market-opening proposal, and the matter was believed to be settled. It 
came as a shock when, only two months later, it was learned that the 
U.S. Trade Office had accepted the U.S. Cigarette Export Association's 
petition to investigate Thailand under Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade 
Act. No one had thought that Thailand could be forced to open the mar- 
ket (Vateesatokit 1996), and the strength of the U.S. tobacco lobby had 
certainly been underestimated. 
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Minister of Public Health Leekpai immediately expressed his opposi- 
tion to the U.S. use of the Trade Act against Thailand, and within a month 
international support was growing for the country's stand. In June the 
John Tung Foundation, an NGO in Taipei, Taiwan (China), that concen- 
trates on tobacco control, invited the author to represent Thailand at a 
meeting to discuss, plan, and lay out a strategy. The foundation feared 
that Thailand was just a step toward opening the whole Asian market. 
About two dozen people attended the conference. Among them were Ted 
Chen, representing the American Public Health Association, Greg Con- 
nolly from the Massachusetts Department of Health, Richard Daynard 
from Northeastern University in Boston, and Terry Pechacek from the 
U.S. National Cancer Institute. Others at the meeting included tobacco 
control advocates from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China), 
all of which had reluctantly given in to U.S. pressure on cigarette trade 
under Section 301. It was hoped that Thailand would take a strong stand 
and avoid the same problem. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Asia- 
Pacific Association for the Control of Tobacco (APACT) was established. 
The conference resolution called for U.S. president George H. W. Bush to 
exclude tobacco from the Section 301 trade items and for APACT to coor- 
dinate tobacco control activities in the region. Thailand would be the test 
case (Chen and Elaimy 1994). 
Point—Counterpoint: Trade versus Health 
At the APACT meeting, Connolly strongly suggested negotiating the 
tobacco control issue with the U.S. Trade Office from the perspective of 
health rather than trade. Initially Thailand had no health representative in 
its delegation, and there was some resistance to the author's participation 
for fear of irritating the Trade Office. The author did manage to work him- 
self onto the delegation and, along with Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, a Harvard- 
educated Democrat member of Parliament, asked for a public hearing to 
present Thailand's case. The two also lobbied health organizations and 
made presentations at international conferences describing the threat to 
Thailand. 
In a short space of time in 1990 the author attended several complemen- 
tary events to gain support for Thailand. First was the American Cancer 
Society's "Trade for Life Campaign" summit in Washington, D.C., attended 
by world tobacco control leaders, where the GLOBALink computer network 
to speed tobacco control communications was launched. Next was the Sev- 
enth World Conference on Tobacco or Health, in Perth, Australia. There Con- 
nolly and the author worked on strategies for negotiations with the U.S. 
Trade Office and for the U.S. congressional hearings scheduled for May 
(Vateesatokit 199Db). Along with William Foege, who was then executive 
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director of the Carter Center, they testified before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Labor and Human Resources, chaired by Sen. Edward Kennedy.' Fol- 
lowing that, Dr. Judith Mackay of the Asian Tobacco Consultancy, John Sef- 
frin of the American Cancer Society, Carlos Alvarez Herrera, from Argentina 
and chairman of the Latin American Coordinating Committee on Smoking 
and Health, and the author testified before the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, chaired by 
Rep. Henry Waxman. At the 15th International Cancer Conference, held in 
August 1990 in Hamburg, Germany, with support from the American Can- 
cer Society the author presented the Thai case in a last effort to build sup- 
port (Vateesatokit 1990a). 
After two inconclusive rounds of negotiations with the Thai govern- 
ment, the U.S. Trade Office referred the dispute to a General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel. Several rounds of testimony before the 
panel were held in 1990, with the WHO supporting Thailand and the 
European Union supporting the United States. Finally, the GATT ruled 
that Thailand's import ban was contrary to trade provisions but that Thai- 
land could maintain and introduce tobacco control measures as long as 
they applied to both domestic and foreign products (GATT 1990; for the 
details of the GATT adjudication, see Chitanondh 2001). 
Toward the end, when the GATT decision was known but not yet 
announced, the U.S. Trade Office made one last unsuccessful attempt to 
gain victory by obtaining Thailand's signature on an agreement that 
would have allowed point-of-sale promotion—something that is prohib- 
ited under Thailand's tobacco control law of 1989. The Thai cabinet 
moved quickly to declare the market open and notified the U.S. Trade 
Office that they had done so, thus precluding any further negotiations or 
the need to sign any agreements. With that, the dispute with the U.S. 
Trade Office was over—but the struggle with the international tobacco 
companies had barely begun. 
The Section 301 trade dispute occurred under General Chunhawan's 
coalition government. Although the Chart Thai Party was the core of the 
government, Chuan Leekpai's Democrat Party played a major role. Leek- 
pai, who was then deputy prime minister, is an honest, respected politi- 
cian with close links to the TASCP. In the coalition government, Leekpai's 
party was in charge of the MOPH and took a strong stand in the negotia- 
tions with the U.S. Trade Office, arguing the health and moral aspects of 
tobacco trade. The prolonged negotiations provided considerable oppor- 
tunities for antismoking advocates to keep the issue before the public. 
1. The Carter Center is an NGO based in Atlanta, Ga., and headed by former U.S. president 
Jimmy Carter. It is active on a number of international issues. 
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This enhanced the advocates' bargaining power and ensured the account- 
ability of the government (Chitanondh 2001). 
The Ministry of Finance adopted a low-key approach in the tobacco 
policy debate, primarily providing information on the TIM's operations. 
Although the Trade Ministry was the accused party in the dispute, it let 
the health representatives argue Thailand's case for the import ban. In 
response to the U.S. complaint to the GATT regarding a discriminatory 
internal excise tax, the tax was adjusted to a single flat rate. The Trade 
Ministry acknowledged early on that smoking is hazardous to health and 
did not oppose the Consumer Protection Board's new regulation for 
warning labels on the front of cigarette packs; thus, it showed that it 
would comply with the government's tobacco control policy. 
By contrast, the Ministry of Commerce was initially uncomfortable 
with the role of health groups in the negotiating process. As head of the 
negotiating team, the Commerce Ministry was keenly aware of the many 
other trade issues at stake and feared that the MOPH representatives 
would take an uncompromising stand that could lead to trade retaliation. 
After a few rounds of talks, however, the ministry began to see the impor- 
tance of using health issues to argue the case and agreed to include 
MOPH representatives (Hatai Chitanondh and the author) in its official 
delegation when the case went to the GAIT. Meanwhile, the U.S. Trade 
Office continued to insist that the issue was one of trade only, and it did 
not include a health representative in its delegation. 
The Ministry of Public Health assured the Ministry of Commerce that 
it would take the strongest stand possible up to the last minute in order 
to increase Thailand's bargaining power but that it would not be unrea- 
sonable if time ran out, since it wanted to avoid trade retaliation. With this 
assurance, the Ministry of Commerce seemed much more at ease with the 
MOPH and worked together with it until the GATT ruling. The coopera- 
tion was so successful that the permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Commerce suggested that it was an opportune time to reorient Thailand's 
tobacco control policy in response to the government's embarrassment 
over the forced opening of the Thai market. With that encouragement, the 
MOPH proposed to the cabinet a Tobacco Product Control bill and the 
establishment of the Tobacco Consumption Control Office (TCCO). Both 
were approved. 
Interestingly, proof of health damage from tobacco did not come from 
Thai research. Thailand has not systematically carried out research on 
tobacco control issues, and studies from other countries and WHO recom- 
mendations were used in lobbying for policy and legislation. For example, 
data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, as well as the U.S. 
Surgeon General's report (USDHHS 1986), were used to lobby for the law 
banning smoking in public places. In 1988 Richard Peto recommended that 
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Thailand undertake several tobacco-related research studies for tobacco 
control. When Peto returned to Thailand in 2001 to receive the prestigious 
Prince Mahidol Award for his contributions to public health, the author 
apologized to him for not carrying out the research he had recommended. 
Peto replied, "Never mind, you got the job done. Two million Thais have 
quit smoking and the smoking rate is down. That's what matters." In his 
press briefing, Peto said, "Thailand is really unique among developing 
countries. It has managed to get a significant reduction in men who smoke. 
A quarter of middle-aged men in Thailand have stopped smoking, which 
is quite different from China and India, where there has been little change 
in smoking patterns" (Bangkok Post 2001). 
Thailand has been able to move tobacco control forward using credible 
evidence from research in other countries, but its success has come in 
large part because of the role of organizations such as Mahidol University 
and the efforts of credible spokespersons. Research is still needed, but if 
action is delayed by demands for country-specific proof, many countries 
may never be able to make speedy progress in tobacco control. It is not 
uncommon for some politicians to request evidence from research as a 
pretext to block or delay tobacco control measures. 
The Sometimes Fine Art of Raising Tobacco Taxes 
Increasing the tobacco tax was an idea that had first been considered in 
1988 as part of the package of tobacco control measures proposed by the 
MOPH to the cabinet, but it never moved forward. In 1989, during the 
trade negotiations with the United States, the TASCP and the NCCTU 
proposed a tax increase, but that too went nowhere because the govern- 
ment did not want to anger the U.S. Trade Office. The minister of public 
health said that he did not wish to propose a tax, arguing that it was a 
matter for the minister of finance. In turn, the minister of finance claimed 
that he did not need additional revenues at the time. The impasse was 
typical of Thai politicians, who hate to lose popularity, especially among 
the many voters who smoke. (In fact, surveys in country after country 
find that most people, including a majority of smokers, support increases 
in tobacco taxes; see, for example, Environics Research Group 2001.) 
In 1993 Supakorn Buasai of the Health Systems Research Institute 
(HSRI), Neil Collishaw of the WHO tobacco control program, and the 
author, as secretary to the NCCTU, urged the minister of public health, 
Arthit Ourairat, to raise the excise tax on cigarettes (Buasai 1993; Coil- 
ishaw 1993). On the advice of David Sweanor of Canada's Non-Smokers' 
Rights Association, the group decided to argue in favor of taxation as a 
means of preventing children from smoking. "You just tell them how 
many children will be prevented [from smoking] and walk away," said 
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Sweanor. No request for money for tobacco control was made, so no accu- 
sations of self-interest could be claimed. 
Judith Mackay, a recognized authority in Asian tobacco control who 
was in town at the time, joined in at a dinner with Minister Ourairat to 
lobby for the tax increase. The argument was put forth that since Thailand 
had a government-owned tobacco monopoly, there were only two policy 
options for generating tobacco revenues. The first was to let the tax stay 
low and sell more cigarettes. The second was to increase the tax, which 
would decrease cigarette sales and the number of people who smoked 
while increasing government revenue—a win-win situation. To avoid 
public criticism, the MOPH would propose the tax increase, allowing the 
Ministry of Finance to appear to play a neutral role. To get the tax 
approved, however, there had to be at least tacit approval by the minister 
of finance, since he was from the Democrat Party, while Ourairat was 
from the Seritham Party. 
During the lobbying of the cabinet members, Paibul Suriyawongpaisal, 
a faculty member at Ramathibodi Hospital, conducted a public opinion 
poil to highlight the level of support for a tobacco tax increase (Suriya- 
wongpaisal 1993). Of the 1,000 Bangkok residents polled, 70 percent, 
including 60 percent of the smokers, favored the tax increase. These 
results were released to the press a few days before the cabinet meeting. 
The TTM strongly opposed the tax, arguing that the country would lose 
money and that the tax would worsen the already bad smuggling prob- 
lem. Despite the great pressure on Ourairat to give up the tax increase 
plan, he eventually won. He emerged from the cabinet meeting saying, 
"Well, you have the tax increase. It was either that or finding a new pub- 
lic health minister." 
This first tax increase in 1993 was from 55 to 60 percent, with a provision 
to adjust the tax for inflation. In 1994, according to the Excise Department 
(Ministry of Finance 2001), revenue from cigarette excise taxes jumped from 
15 billion baht (US$0.576 billion) to 20 billion baht (US$0.769 billion). Since 
then, the tax has been increased six times and currently stands at 75 percent 
of the retail price. 
Politicians in many countries are reluctant to take tobacco control mea- 
sures, fearing harm to the economy. But their fears usually turn out not to 
fit the facts. Higher taxes raise revenues, and declines in sales of tobacco 
products may create many more new jobs in industries to which people 
switch their consumption than are lost in the tobacco industry as a result of 
lower sales. The World Bank regards tobacco control as a good investment. 
World Development Report 1993 noted, "Tax policies on tobacco and alcohol 
have reduced consumption, especially by discouraging use by young 
adults before they become addicted" (p. 87), and a 1999 report on tobacco 
control stated, "For governments intent on improving health within the 
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framework of sound economic policies, action to control tobacco represents 
an unusually attractive choice" (p. x). Thailand's experience demonstrates 
that increased tobacco taxation is good for both public health and the econ- 
omy. The Thai government has gained over 40 billion baht (US$1 billion) in 
additional revenues through cigarette tax increases, while smoking preva- 
lence fell from 26.3 percent in 1992 to 20.5 percent in 1999 (National Statis- 
tics Office 1999; Ministry of Finance 2001). 
Toward a Dedicated Tax for Health Promotion 
A decade after its formation, the TASCP changed its name to Action on 
Smoking and Health (ASH) and became independent of the Folk Doctors 
Foundation. The organization had gained credibility largely because of its 
role in the Thai—U.S. trade dispute and the tobacco excise tax struggle. That 
credibility helped the group continue its advocacy for tobacco control 
when, in 1996, the Ministry of Finance organized a workshop on fiscal p01- 
icy for social development as part of the government's decentralization 
policy. Out of that workshop emerged the idea of using tax revenues for a 
health insurance scheme and for health promotion. 
Coincidentally, at the same time the Health Systems Research Institute 
held a conference in Bangkok on organizational structures for health pro- 
motion in developing countries. Rhonda Galbally, chief executive officer 
of the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (VicHealth), Australia, was 
one of the keynote speakers. VicHealth is a statutory autonomous organi- 
zation that has been funded by a dedicated tobacco tax since 1987. The 
WHO had recommended that member countries adopt the VicHealth 
model for health promotion (Galbally 1997). Supakorn Buasai, deputy 
director of the HSffl, and the author took advantage of Galbally's pres- 
ence and, after the conference, accompanied her to meet with the minister 
of finance, Dr. Surakiat Steinthai, who seemed open to the idea of invest- 
ing in health promotion. After that meeting, at the request of the minister, 
a small Thai delegation went to Australia and New Zealand to examine 
how VicHealth used a dedicated tax to promote health. 
The delegation worked on proposed legislation that would set up a 
Health Promotion Office as an autonomous agency within the Prime Min- 
ister's Office. It recommended a dedicated tax of 2.5 to 3 percent of the 
tobacco tax, or about 700 million baht (US$27 million) per year, to fund 
the office. The sum would be equivalent to about 1 percent of the MOPH's 
yearly budget. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
opposed the idea of a dedicated tax, but the final decision was to let the 
cabinet determine the source of the funds. 
Progress on this matter halted in July 1997, when the Asian financial 
crisis hit Thailand. Work on the health promotion bill did not resurface 
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until 1999. During this period, Dr. Phisit Leeartham, a banker who was 
invited by the Democrat Party to be deputy minister of finance during the 
economic crisis, was admitted to Ramathibodi Hospital as a patient. 
When the author, in his capacity as dean of the university hospital, visited 
Leeartham, the deputy minister promised to help move the health pro- 
motion bill forward. 
Two months later, the MOPH called a meeting to consider a bill, 
drafted by the Excise Department, to reduce alcohol and tobacco con- 
sumption. A proposal was made to fund the program with a 2 percent 
dedicated tax on alcohol and tobacco. This came as a big surprise in light 
of previous resistance to a dedicated tax. The proposed Health Promotion 
Office bill had a good structure but no funding source; the new bill from 
the Excise Department had specific funding provisions but few adminis- 
trative details (HSRI 1997). 
After this meeting, Leeartham (who gave the green light for the dedi- 
cated tax) suggested that health promotion be added throughout the alco- 
hol and tobacco bill and the name changed to "A Bill to Set up a Fund for 
a Campaign to Reduce Alcohol and Tobacco Consumption and for Health 
Promotion." He also suggested that the Health Promotion Office bill and 
the new bill to fund the campaign not be combined, since that would be 
too time consuming (a concern, as the government's popularity was wan- 
ing). Rather, he proposed that the two bills be submitted to the cabinet at 
the same time. The idea was to set up a Health Promotion Office and start 
carrying out health promotion activities with an initial budget while wait- 
ing for the funding bill to make its way through Parliament. 
The cabinet spent over two hours debating whether the Health Pro- 
motion Office should be supervised by the minister of health or should 
be an autonomous organization under the Prime Minister's Office. Prime 
Minister Leekpai finally agreed to the latter. The minister of public 
health, who represented a different political party, was unhappy with 
this decision, and the MOPH had a limited role during the rest of the 
bill's journey into law. 
In October 1999 the cabinet approved both bills and sent them to be 
reviewed by the Council of State. (It should be noted that the prime min- 
ister showed a keen interest in solving alcohol-related problems. His sup- 
port of the lobby made things easier, since the Democrat Party controlled 
the cabinet as well as the House of Representatives.) The bill for the 
Health Promotion Office was approved first, and 152 million baht (about 
US$3.5 million) was allocated for the office's first year of operation. Mean- 
while, a lobby began in favor of naming Athasit Vejjajiva, a politically 
influential figure, as the office's first chairperson. The aim was to 
strengthen the political status of the bill by appointing someone who was 
politically astute and trustworthy. 
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Clearing the alcohol and tobacco use reduction and health promotion 
bill through the Council of State was more difficult because of the provi- 
sion for the dedicated tax. To help push it along, it was moved to a differ- 
ent committee of the council, and its name was changed to "A Bill to Set 
up Funding for Health Promotion." Eventually, it was steered through 
three readings in the Lower House and finally to passage in the last ses- 
sion of the Parliament. Unfortunately, the bill did not get through the Sen- 
ate in the last two days of the parliamentary session. This meant that it 
would have to be approved by the newly elected government before 
being taken up again in the Senate. Luckily the new government's health 
policy included universal health coverage, and it was easily convinced 
that health promotion fit well into its agenda. The government endorsed 
the bill's introduction in the Senate—one among only 27 of the 45 bills 
remaining from the previous government that were reintroduced. 
But the challenges did not end there. Under the new constitution, the 
Senate was elected, not appointed, making it more difficult to steer the bill 
through. In what seemed to be an effort to increase their own popularity 
and visibility, some senators seemed delighted to highlight objections to the 
bill, claiming that it was unnecessary, or that it set a bad precedent, or that 
there should not be an autonomous organization. Interestingly, those who 
objected the most were doctors who were former bureaucrats in the MOPH. 
The bill finally passed in the Senate on September 26, 2001. It was 
signed by the king on October 27 and published in the Royal Gazette in 
early November, thus becoming law. The Health Promotion Office was 
already in operation, and the passage of the funding bill secured its 
future. The Senate, however, specified in a footnote to the bill that a ded- 
icated tax would be allowed this time only and that future governments 
should not propose a law of this kind again. Much concern was expressed 
about the appropriate use of the relatively high budget of the Health Pro- 
motion Office (14 billion baht, or US$35 million per year, compared with 
12 million baht, or US$300,000 per year, for the MOPH's Tobacco Con- 
sumption Control Office). Under Vejjajiva's chairmanship of the board of 
the Thai Health Promotion Office, tobacco control efforts have grown dra- 
matically from the initial allocation of 60,000 baht (US$2,255) for a project 
in 1986 to its current budget and a range of activities that includes health 
promotion as well as reduction of tobacco and alcohol use. 
Continuing Opposition from the Tobacco Companies 
Let it not be thought that the international tobacco industry was inatten- 
tive or inactive in blocking, delaying, or seeking to weaken tobacco policy 
in Thailand. The industry's successful petition to the U.S. administration 
to use Section 301 against Thailand clearly showed its intentions. Its lob- 
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bying to repeal the sports sponsorship ban early on demonstrated its 
understanding of the tools that could be used to change the marketing 
environment quickly. 
One of the early challenges following the GATT decision was the issue 
of sports sponsorship. The tobacco industry worked closely with sports 
associations, sportswriters, and even government sports officials to lobby 
the government to repeal the advertising ban and allow sports sponsorship. 
One association after another explicitly or tacitly succumbed to the indus- 
try, and the press reported growing support for tobacco sports sponsorship. 
The TASCP worked closely with Chitanondh in opposing this trend. 
Several strategies were pursued: launching a counterattack in the media 
by having an ex-smoker sportswriter voice support for the sponsorship 
ban; producing a report explaining why cigarette companies should not 
sponsor sports and referring to the Olympic Charter banning cigarette 
sponsorship; and proposing a sports fund funded by a tobacco tax like the 
one in Australia. In 1991 Privy Council Member Prem Tinsulanonda (the 
former prime minister whose cabinet had issued the ministerial regula- 
tion banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship) made a strong state- 
ment that sports sponsorship by tobacco companies was inappropriate, 
and the matter was laid to rest. 
This struggle is just one illustration of how the tobacco industry oper- 
ates. In fact, recently released tobacco industry documents show that the 
industry views tobacco control advocates as competitors for their market 
(Philip Morris 1994). 
Even after the advertising ban, tobacco companies found ways to pro- 
mote their products. Philip Morris soon announced a program of art 
sponsorship in Southeast Asia, and it now holds an annual Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) arts contest in a different ASEAN 
country each year. The international tobacco companies have also taken 
full advantage of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) by moving 
their production facilities to ASEAN countries so that their products are 
subject to lower tariffs and are much more competitive with local brands 
(Vateesatokit, Hughes, and Ritthphakdee 2000). Now the most popular 
foreign brand, L&M, is cheaper than the most popular Thai brand, 
Krong Thip. 
The AFTA tariff reduction has resulted in a marked increase in for- 
eign brands' market share since 1999. In 2001 foreign brands accounted 
for 15 percent of the legal market and an unknown (but likely very 
high) portion of the illegal market. Internal tobacco industry docu- 
ments strongly suggest that illegal sales and price fixing have been 
used in Thailand to systematically build brand popularity (Economist 
2001). The industry was also keen to obtain some form of joint venture 
with the TTM (Hammond 1999). 
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The international tobacco companies have continued to use indirect 
advertising and point-of-sale promotions, in violation of Thai law (ASH 
Thailand n.d.). To gain favor, they use corporate donations to fund high- 
profile projects and charitable organizations such as population and fam- 
ily planning associations, as well as the Bangkok Metropolitan Adminis- 
tration. They also introduced the "18-plus" project, putting up stickers in 
retail shops reminding consumers that selling cigarettes to people under 
age 18 is illegal. While this may seem like a step toward tobacco control, 
ASH has found that this project actually stimulates interest in smoking by 
young people. 
In comparison with the international companies, the TTM has seemed 
rather benign, but it has slowly adopted some of the strategies of the 
internationals. It began using corporate image advertising and hired a pri- 
vate company to do market research aimed at modernizing its marketing 
approach. It also strongly opposed the introduction on Thai cigarette 
packaging of pictorial health warnings like those used in Canada. 
The Role of the Nongovernmental Sector 
When the TASCP was first formed, it had only two part-time staff: Bung- 
On Ritthphakdee and the author. Up to 1992, most efforts concentrated on 
the U.S.—Thai trade struggle and the two resulting Thai laws, but by 1994 
there was a marked increase in activity. Several programs were operating 
by that time, ranging from tobacco industry surveillance to promoting 
smoke-free homes and schools. The number of programs has grown, and 
their scope has greatly expanded to include both regional and interna- 
tional cooperation and collaboration on many aspects of tobacco control. 
Currently, the TASCP's successor, ASH, has 10 full-time staff and derives 
funding from the MOPH, the WHO, corporate and private donations, and 
fund-raising activities. 
Recently, ASH has added tobacco control research to its list of activi- 
ties. In 1998 it received funding from the HSRI to be the tobacco infor- 
mation clearinghouse for Thailand and to develop and contract research 
proposals with university researchers on topics such as the social and 
economic causes of cigarette smoking, the role of health professionals in 
tobacco control, and women and tobacco. ASH has developed a strong 
working relationship with the National Office of Statistics and with 
other research institutes that gather useful policy-driven data on 
tobacco control. 
In 2000 the Rockefeller Foundation funded ASH as the center for the 
Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance. Several previous attempts by 
ASH to form a network or coalition of health groups against tobacco had 
been unsuccessful, partly because of lack of funding support, so this new 
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support was a huge boost. The main objective of the alliance is to train 
health professionals in research for tobacco control in the region, with 
assistance from the Institute for Global Tobacco Control, Johns Hopkins 
University in Baltimore, and the University of Illinois, Chicago. Potential 
topics for future research include smuggling; counteradvertising; interna- 
tional trade laws and their impact on tobacco consumption, global trade, 
and privatization; and smoking and drug abuse. Such research provides 
an important mechanism for recruiting health professionals and other 
academics to carry out tobacco control research, policy development, and 
program implementation. 
The activities of ASH/TASCP represent the core of NGO actions in 
Thailand, but the government counterpart, the Tobacco Consumption 
Control Office (TCCO) of the MOPH, has also been important. This 
office was set up in 1991 to serve as secretariat to the NCCTU. Early on, 
the TASCP and the TCCO worked hand in hand, complementing each 
other in carrying forward tobacco control programs. The TASCP 
worked on advocacy and campaign activities, while the TCCO focused 
on law enforcement and policy formation. It was unfortunate that this 
complementary, productive relationship was later disrupted because of 
the frequent changes in government and some conflict as to 
approaches. 
Ten years after the legal entry of international tobacco companies into 
the Thai market, the close consultation on tobacco control policy among 
the Ministries of Public Health, Finance, and Commerce no longer exists. 
The MOPH still has a strong policy on tobacco control, but it has not 
taken a tough stand with international companies on ingredient disclo- 
sure. In response to opposition from the tobacco companies, it has also 
delayed its proposal to revise the health warning to a pictorial format, as 
proposed by ASH. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Commerce wants the MOPH to consult it 
on any future regulations affecting cigarette sales, to avoid friction with 
the U.S. Trade Office. And the Ministry of Finance quietly proceeded with 
the TTM's privatization plan to fulfill its obligation to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to privatize state enterprises—a condition of the 
financial assistance package provided to Thailand during the 1997 eco- 
nomic crisis. The ministry backtracked at the last minute under pressure 
from tobacco control advocates, who oppose privatization of cigarette 
manufacturers because they believe it is likely to give multinational com- 
panies greater leverage and a stronger base from which to lobby against 
and undermine tobacco control. 
Despite all this, the three ministries have been careful to appear sup- 
portive of tobacco control policy in light of the strong antismoking senti- 
ment of the Thai public. 
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Spreading the Message: Thai Women Do Not Smoke 
Thailand has long felt that preventing women from smoking is a 
neglected area in tobacco control programs and research worldwide. The 
Kobe Declaration of the 1999 WHO International Conference on Tobacco 
or Health states, "It is urgent that we find comprehensive solutions to the 
danger of tobacco use and address the epidemic among women and girls" 
(Ernster and others 2000). 
Smoking among Thai women is not widely accepted culturally, and 
fewer than 5 percent of them smoke. But over the years there have been 
efforts by the tobacco industry to capture the female market. Before the 
opening of the Thai tobacco market to foreign cigarettes, the TTM tried 
marketing a cigarette specifically to females—fortunately, without suc- 
cess. But there was concern that when the market did open, the targeted 
advertising and marketing of international companies would succeed in 
attracting women to smoke. That certainly was the experience in Japan 
and Taiwan (China), where the number of women smoking increased dra- 
matically after the markets opened (Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1996). 
Following the GATT decision, Greg Connolly suggested lobbying the 
Thai government to restrict the introduction of brands targeting women, 
citing the low smoking rate among Thai females. These efforts failed 
because the head of the Thai negotiating team, Bajr Israsena, did not want 
any further trouble with the U.S. Trade Office and thought that the ban 
would be contrary to GATT provisions. As a result, Virginia Slims, a 
brand of cigarettes marketed to women, was soon introduced in Thailand. 
Faced with the import of cigarettes targeted at women, the TASCP in 1994 
set up the Thai Women Do Not Smoke Project, with the objective of pre- 
serving the nonsmoking norm among Thai women. The TASCP used 
research by Dr. Varanut Wangsuphachart and others (1995) showing that 
smoking was common only among women in certain occupations (47 per- 
cent of massage parlor workers, 10 percent of airline hostesses, and less than 
10 percent of all other groups). The project was supported by Miss Thailand 
and a number of young movie and television stars, who acted as presenters 
for the program. 
In 1996, five years after the opening of the market to foreign cigarettes, 
the TTM announced that it would begin marketing a brand of cigarette to 
women to compete with Virginia Slims. ASH mobilized influential Thai 
women to oppose this move. Women members of Parliament, celebrities, 
and writers all joined in the campaign. Kanjana Silap-acha, daughter of 
the prime minister at the time, Banharn Silap-acha, lobbied her father to 
ask the minister of finance to request the TTM to cancel introduction of 
the new brand. All these efforts resulted in the TTM's dropping its plans 
to introduce "women's" cigarettes. 
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Mackay (1999), using a mathematical model that extrapolates smoking 
trends, and incorporating data from other countries as well, has predicted 
that smoking by women could rise to about 15 percent in Thailand over 
the next 25 years, while smoking by men could drop to about 25 percent. 
Several recent research projects on smoking by girls and women seem to 
support this projection. They show increasing smoking rates by girls in 
secondary school, with uptake mostly of foreign brands of cigarettes. It is 
hoped that this trend can be prevented in Thailand, since social pressure 
against women's smoking is still very strong and the advertising ban pre- 
vents the tobacco industry from targeting females. 
Successes and Challenges 
Thailand's tobacco control efforts, by the government and by NGOs, have 
achieved much. For example, 
• Currently Thailand has a strong, comprehensive tobacco control policy. • At a meeting convened by the National Committee for the Control of 
Tobacco Use on September 20, 2001, two committees were set up to 
evaluate the Tobacco Product Control Act and the Nonsmokers' Health 
Protection Act of 1992 after 10 years of existence. These committees will 
consider upgrading the laws to close loopholes and to strengthen law 
enforcement processes. • The regular tax increase policy is on course. • The current health warnings, which occupy the upper third of the two 
largest areas of cigarette packages and which have been in use for four 
years, will be revised to have a pictorial format, as championed by 
Garfield Mahood in Canada. 
• The government has indefinitely halted privatization of the TTM. It 
had seemed impossible to stop privatization because it was part of the 
IMF bailout package following the 1997 economic crisis. Work contin- 
ued, however, even when the situation seemed hopeless, and eventu- 
ally public health considerations prevailed. • Thailand will continue to take a very strong position on international 
issues such as trade, duty-free sales, smuggling, and transboundary 
advertising and promotion. • Tobacco control is and will be the main project for the new Thai Health 
Promotion Foundation. 
• The Thai Women Do Not Smoke project is being funded by the Thai 
Health Promotion Foundation. 
But success has not been won on every front. More work remains to 
be done. 
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Ingredient Disclosure 
In 1989, at the public hearings in Washington, D.C., on the Section 301 
case, David Sweanor of Canada's Non-Smokers' Rights Association stated 
that he did not think Thailand could win its trade case. He recommended 
trying to pass a law with a provision on ingredient disclosure, which 
would deter American manufacturers from exporting to Thailand, and he 
gave the Thai representatives a copy of the Canadian Tobacco Products 
Control Act of 1988. This document was used as a basis for Thailand's 
Tobacco Product Control Bill, which closely followed the Canadian law. 
In 1990 the cabinet approved the law, including, in Article 11, the pro- 
vision on ingredient disclosure. But in 1992, when the bill was presented 
to Parliament for the second reading, the international tobacco industry 
lobbied extensively for deletion of both Article 4 (a provision barring sales 
to minors under age 18) and Article 11. It was clear that the real intention 
was to get Article 11 deleted, since worldwide evidence showed that laws 
barring sales to minors are nearly impossible to enforce. 
The lobby was so intense that Deputy Minister Vejjajiva informed the 
author that saving Article 11 appeared unlikely. Sensing the author's 
despair, Vejjajiva called General Suchinda Kraprayoon, who held the real 
power, having been the strongman in the 1991 coup in Thailand and hav- 
ing directed the formation of the interim administration and legislature. 
He gave the green light for the bill to sail through with Article 11 intact, 
which empowered the minister of public health to issue a ministerial reg- 
ulation regarding ingredient disclosure. 
Despite the passage of the law, the ministers of health in 1992 and 1993 
took no action on drafting a regulation. Finally, in 1995, Minister Ourairat 
pushed it through in the last cabinet meeting of his government for the year. 
When the Council of State considered the regulation, the international 
tobacco companies tried to have a say but were turned down. Even then, it 
took two more years before the regulation was signed into law by Minister 
of Public Health Montree Pongpanich. The tobacco companies were given 
six months from the time of signing to comply with the regulation. 
Still, the challenge did not end. When the government changed, the 
officials of the new MOPH refused to reveal to the public the list of ingre- 
dients submitted by the tobacco industry, on the grounds that doing so 
would interfere with the ability of the Ministry of Commerce to deal with 
international trade issues. The intensity of the tobacco industry's lobbying 
against this type of law in Thailand and the injunctive action against a 
similar regulation in the U.S. state of Massachusetts led to widespread 
suspicion of intervention by the international tobacco industry. 
So, after all that, the attempt to use a disclosure regulation to prevent 
more harmful cigarettes from entering the market and to keep out foreign 
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cigarettes did not succeed. At present, the law is useless, but not forgot- 
ten. Perhaps another opportunity will come. 
Other Challenges 
There are two other areas in which success has not been achieved: 
removing cigarettes from the duty-free list, and removing them from the 
AFTA free trade zone. Cigarettes remain duty-free because government 
officials fear that a change would affect Thailand's profitable tourist 
industry. Thailand was unable to persuade other ASEAN countries to 
drop cigarettes from the AFTA list of free trade items. It is hoped that the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control will assist countries like 
Thailand to take the strongest stand possible regarding international 
trade and other issues and to do so effectively (Framework Convention 
Alliance 2001). 
Lessons Learned 
Lessons can be drawn from both the successes and the frustrations of the 
struggle for tobacco control. Some of these are specific to the Thai context, 
but many are more widely applicable. 
Working with Legislators and Regulators 
• Regulators often have very specific opinions on the proposals before 
them, and even with the best evidence, they are not always prepared 
to change their minds (Pertschuk 2001). The Thai experience shows 
that when key people oppose proposals and support other interests, 
it is important to wait until more favorable views surface, perhaps 
after a change of leadership, and to seize favorable opportunities 
when they arise. Between 1989 and 2001, Thailand had 9 govern- 
ments and 11 ministers of health, and progress on tobacco control 
often stalled. At least one minister of health during this time was 
referred to in tobacco industry documents as "our friend in MOPH" 
(Le Gresley n.d.). Other ministers, however, have been highly sup- 
portive of tobacco control. • Those with opposing views and interests are well aware that tobacco 
control advocates will guard and protect hard-earned gains. By main- 
taining dialogue with key individuals and agencies, the tobacco control 
lobby was able to gain a clearer idea of how to proceed. 
• When lobbying for tax increases and for legislation, it could be a 
good strategy to make clear to policymakers that the objective is to 
prevent children from smoking and becoming addicted to nicotine. 
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Most people support this goal unequivocally, even if they waver 
with respect to actions aimed at persuading adult smokers to quit. • The effort to pass tobacco control legislation wherever possible should 
be sustained, since governments come and go but repealing or revising 
already-enacted legislation is time consuming and costly. 
Working with Politicians 
• Ultimate goals have to be balanced against reasonable expectations. In 
Thailand the ultimate goal was to prevent the government from open- 
ing the tobacco market to imports, but the lobbying group settled on 
passing the Tobacco Product Control Bill and setting up the Tobacco 
Consumption Control Office. Politicians recognized that they had a 
responsibility to the public to do something to decrease the health risks 
of smoking. Using a moral argument was particularly useful in Thai- 
land's government system. • In Thailand there appears to be a difference between the "technocrat 
turned politician" and the "career politician." Most of the achieve- 
ments in tobacco control policy and legislation in Thailand resulted 
from working with technocrats who seemed to decide policy on the 
basis of objectivity and the value of the issue itself. Most career politi- 
cians (perhaps with the exceptions of Chuan Leekpai and Surin Pit- 
suwan) seemed to be more concerned with balancing vested interests 
against their own popularity, and they would often avoid making deci- 
sions on controversial issues. By contrast, Athasit Vejjajiva, a technocrat 
minister, was a key figure in moving the two tobacco control bills for- 
ward through the cabinet and eventually to Parliament, and Arthit 
Ourairat, a technocrat turned politician, supported the tax for health 
policy in 1993. Phisit Leeartham, another technocrat, was the central 
strategist in moving the Health Promotion Bill, with the dedicated tax, 
which may go down in Thai history as the only one of its kind. It is not 
clear whether these milestones would have been achieved by relying 
on career politicians only. • It is important to be direct, clear, and ready with realistic proposals to 
offer politicians. At times, seemingly controversial political personali- 
ties, shunned by others, were found to be most supportive. • In order to ensure that antitobacco policies are adopted, it may help to 
allow bureaucrats and politicians to claim credit for new initiatives. 
• Personal connections are often invaluable in helping to secure desired 
policy outcomes. 
• A politician's support should never be taken for granted. Showing 
appreciation, along with hard work and good evidence, is key to mov- 
ing tobacco control onto the agenda of politicians. 
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The Importance of Organizational Understanding and Collaboration 
• It is essential to have a lead organization to push for tobacco control in 
both the nongovernmental and governmental sectors. Ideally, collabo- 
ration between the two sectors should enhance each other's work. 
• Networking and coalition building, both domestically and internation- 
ally, are crucial to increasing the lobbying power of tobacco control 
advocates. 
The Importance of Well-Prepared Evidence 
and Good Cultural Understanding 
• Health education is important but is insufficient by itself for effective 
tobacco control. 
• Policy-relevant research is very important in mobilizing public opinion 
and lobbying for government action. 
• Gaining Ministry of Finance cooperation in using taxation as a control 
measure was easier once the evidence about the health care costs of 
smoking and the potential increase in revenues was presented. 
• Nationalism and cultural values can sometimes be successfully employed 
to counter tobacco promotion by international tobacco companies. 
• Tobacco control advocates should seize opportunities to make timely 
counterclaims to arguments by pro-tobacco lobbyists. 
Appendix: Chronological Summary 
of Tobacco Control Efforts in Thailand 
World War 11—1990: The Thai government owns the tobacco monopoly and 
has a closed market. The smoking rate is very high for males, with 
average annual per capita consumption of about 1,000 cigarettes. 
1970s: The Thai Medical Association initiates tobacco control by printing 
health warnings, banning smoking in cinemas and on buses, and 
conducting a national survey of smoking prevalence. 
1976—86: Sporadic smoking control activities are carried out by govern- 
ment agencies and nongovernmental organizations. 
1986: The Thai Anti-Smoking Campaign Project (TASCP) is formed to 
serve as a focal point and pressure group in lobbying for tobacco 
control policy. 
1989: The U.S. Trade Representative, using Section 301 of the U.S. Trade 
Act, brings the issue of tobacco control to national and international 
attention, culminating in the GATT adjudication, the eventual mar- 
ket opening, and the Thai government's approval of the Tobacco 
Product Control Bill. 
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1992: The National Legislative Assembly enacts the Tobacco Product Con- 
trol Bill and the Nonsmokers' Health Protection Bill despite heavy 
lobbying by the tobacco industry. 
1993: Health advocates successfully lobby for the tax for health policy; the 
Thai government gains huge revenue increases, and per capita con- 
sumption of cigarettes is curbed. 
1994: The TASCP organizes the Thai Women Do Not Smoke Project to dis- 
courage Thai women from taking up smoking. 
1996: The TASCP, renamed Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), suc- 
cessfully lobbies the Thai government to call off the Thai Tobacco 
Monopoly's plan to market a cigarette brand targeted to women. 
1998: The ingredient disclosure regulation of the Tobacco Product Control 
Act is passed into law, but the Ministry of Public Health is unwill- 
ing to reveal the ingredient list to the public, thus defeating any 
potential benefit. 
2001: The Health Promotion Bill, funded by a dedicated alcohol and tobacco 
tax, is finally enacted in September, after five years of lobbying. 
2002: Plans for privatization of the Thai Tobacco Monopoly are put on 
"indefinite hold," after seeming to be unstoppable. 
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Tobacco Control Policy: Strategies, Successes, and Setbacks tells the stories of recent struggles, 
successes, and setbacks in six countries—Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Poland, South Africa, and 
Thailand—in which fervent and determined effort helped strengthen policies to reduce tobacco 
use. This collection of experiences in diverse economic, social, and political situations 
demonstrates the varied and important roles played by activists, health practitioners, 
policymakers, researchers, NGOs, politicians, and the press. 
Tobacco Control Policy Strategies, Successes, and Setbacks 
Health has a strong impact on people's social and economic well-being, in developing and 
developed countries. Tobacco use causes diseases and premature death, and threatens both social 
and economic development. This book will help countries that are struggling with the tobacco 
epidemic to rethink their strategies, and to do more to protect the health of their citizens. 
Maureen O'Neil 
President, Intertiatwual Development Research Centre (ID/IC). Canada 
This is inspiring reading for policymakers seeking to implement the provisions of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control in their countries. The six country case studies show how 
important it is to have good science placed in the right hands at the right time. Tobacco control 
can be achieved when scientists communicate with policymakers, when policymakers act on 
science, and when the media and NGOs are effective. It doesn't matter if a country is a major 
tobacco producer or a consumer, from the North or the South, or from the developing or developed 
world. I look forward to the day when all WHO Member States will have positive case studies of 
success to report. 
l)r. Gro Harlem Brundtland 
Director General oft/ic World Health Organization 
These accounts of how six countries put public health before corporate profits and developed 
strong anti-tobacco policies are a fascinating complement to the rigorous analytic work on the 
economics of tobacco control policies previously published by the World Bank, World Health 
Organization, and others. There is clear evidence that strong tobacco control policies can reduce 
tobacco use, and could reverse the alarming increase in deaths caused by tobacco use in many 
low- and middle-income countries. 
James U. Wolfensohn 
President oft/ic World Batik 
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